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The politics of fear have deeply divided the United States of America. Decades of 
propaganda portray Muslims as a terrorist threat to the dominant US culture and society. The 
War on Terror and its consequences, including the rise of ISIL and the 2015 Syrian refugee 
crisis, resulted in the destabilization of democracy in both the US and Europe. I argue that the 
US public’s fear of terrorism is not just a fear of violence but instead reflects racial tensions and 
anxieties in a rapidly changing world. These tensions and anxieties are fueled by media coverage 
leveraging a general fear and distrust of non-white foreigners. The result of this is a pervasive 
fear of violent victimization at the hands of minorities, shaped by mass media content, which 
politicians capitalize on for their own gain. In this dissertation, I study the media effects of 
agenda setting, framing, and reinforcing spirals on public fear of terrorism with data from the 
Granite State Poll (GSP), Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP), and a content analysis of 
broadcast news transcripts from NexisUni. I expand on current research by examining the fear of 
terrorism from the perspectives of criminological theory, critical media studies, and racial 
formation theory. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Today the United States of America stands deeply divided. Arguably the social and 
political divisions seen in 2020 are the deepest that they have been since the US Civil War. 
While many factors have contributed to the current social-political climate the War on Terror, 
started in 2001 in response to the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 
was the catalyst for a long series of events which has resulted in the destabilization of democracy 
in both the US and Europe. The War on Terror not only prompted multiple wars and 
fundamentally changed American life, but also stoked racial tensions and revived age-old 
xenophobic tendencies in American culture.  
In this dissertation, I argue that fear of terrorism is not simply a response to the threat of 
violence, but a reflection of racial, cultural, and other identity-based tensions and anxieties felt 
by traditionally powerful groups in the US (i.e. whites, men, Christians, etc.) who are facing a 
globalized world and a rapidly diversifying society which threatens their perceived status, power, 
and social domination. These anxieties are in large part the result of global structural changes 
occurring as a result of the forces of Globalization and the Digital Revolution and are frequently 
misattributed as a foreign or non-white threat to a traditional culture and way of life. Rather than 
emphasizing the real, measurable economic changes which have occurred in the US and other 
wealthy nations, some populist politicians have seized on these cultural anxieties and 
campaigned on issues of identity and belonging. The result is a populist narrative that blames 
perceived social problems on foreigners, whether it be Latin American immigrants, Muslims, or 
China, ignoring powerful domestic actors who hold more responsibility. 
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The ubiquity of mass media in the digital age stokes these anxieties to the benefit of elites 
who seek to expand their power and wealth. Mass media decides what is newsworthy and shapes 
how individuals view issues that society faces (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Entman 1993; 
McCombs and Shaw 1993; Glassner 2009; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Woods 2007, 2011). 
Members of the US public selectively consume propaganda which not only reinforces their 
beliefs but can also push them towards extremes (Slater 2007, 2015). In the case of this 
dissertation, I pay attention to two decades of propaganda disseminated through US news outlets 
portraying Muslims as a terrorist threat to US culture and society. The result of this is a fear of 
violent victimization at the hands of non-White foreigners, specifically “Muslims” and other 
minority groups, shaped by mass media content, which politicians capitalize on for their own 
gain. Popular narratives about Muslims and the terrorist threat directly contributed to the election 
of Donald Trump to the Presidency in 2016 and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. 
Both campaigns saw unprecedented distribution of misinformation in digital media (McCombie 
et al 2020), heated rhetoric about immigrants and refugees (Debarael et al 2019; Washington 
Report on International Affairs 2015), and revived the politics of fear (Altheide 2006, 2017) by 
invoking the threat of terrorism by the Islamic State group (Albertson and Gadarian 2016; 
Brogan et al 2020). Discussions of issues of immigration, refugees, and terrorism frequently 
involve racialized language. 
Race and ethnicity have long been used as a means of dividing people in the US (Feagin 
2007, 2013, 2015; Omi and Winant 2015). In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, 
political leaders seized on the public’s fear to build support for the wars in the Middle East, 
expansion of surveillance capabilities, stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and the creation 
of a robust drone warfare program. This was accomplished in part by playing on the US public’s 
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historical xenophobic tendencies, now focused on people of Middle Eastern, North African, and 
Central/South Asian backgrounds (i.e. “Muslims”). The recent wave of anti-Muslim sentiment in 
the US which developed out of this period, encouraged by political leaders and media outlets, 
culminated in the 2016 Presidential race in which Donald Trump famously called for a ban on 
Muslims entering the US. The present dissertation argues that public fear of terrorism is a proxy 
measure for racial and other identity-based anxieties and one of many perceived threats to the 
dominant culture in America posed by non-white foreigners. This is fueled by nearly two 
decades of propaganda efforts and media portrayals of terrorists as a foreign, Arab, Muslim 
threat to the US homeland and way of life. 
Specifically, I argue that members of the public develop and reinforce their perceptions 
of terrorism by consuming mass media and interacting with political parties, that fear of 
terrorism in the US is shaped by media coverage and attention from political elites as much as it 
is influenced by actual terrorist attacks, and that the content of news coverage of mass violence is 
racially biased, focusing on violence perpetrated by Muslims. I employ a mixed-methods design 
to address my research objectives, drawing on New Hampshire survey data, publicly available 
national polls, and broadcast news media stories about suspected terrorists and the propaganda 
efforts employed to capitalize on this fear. 
My dissertation research points to politics and mass media as the primary social 
institutions which shapes the public’s perception about issues such as terrorism. Mass media 
does this by setting agendas and deciding what is newsworthy, by framing events and providing 
the language and imagery used to understand what is happening in society, and increasingly by 
reinforcing previously existing beliefs through selective media exposure. Media effects, and 
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specifically the promotion of the fear of Muslims as a terrorist threat to Americans, have far 
reaching consequences in how the behavior of institutions and individuals have been shaped over 
the past 20 years. This includes the US wars in the Middle East, erosion of civil liberties 
domestically, and the decline of Western democracy. I also refute the notion that economic 
insecurity is the primary cause of support for anti-immigrant and anti-minority policies, instead 
asserting that support for these policies is primarily motivated by a perceived status threat. This 
position is supported by other recent scholarship (see Mutz 2018). 
The current research also examines power: the power of media and elites to shape 
conversations, to construct enemies, and to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. I 
conceptualize a model of power articulated by C. Wright Mills in The Power Elite (1956). Mills 
viewed power as being held by a class of people in the separate spheres of government, the 
military, and big business. While the goals of these spheres do not always align, they frequently 
do. More than this, membership in these spheres is not mutually exclusive, with a great degree of 
overlap. Similarly, the relationship between societal elites and mass media is not one of 
domination, but of separate but of shared goals. Neither societal elites nor mass media are having 
necessarily more power to influence the public than the others. The driving force of public 
opinion depends on a particular social context, i.e. in some situations politicians may be pushing 
their narratives, while in others media owners (who are also societal elites) may have more 
control. Beyond this, media legitimates power and the dominant social structures which support 
those in power. 
In chapter 2, I use data from Gallup’s Most Important Problem poll, and compare it with 
data from the Global Terrorism Database on terrorist attacks in the US, news media coverage 
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data from Lexis Nexis, and presidential addresses from the American Presidency Project. I 
examine the trends in these data sources using a qualitative time series approach to give context 
to the long-term national trends in the US public’s worry about terrorism as the most important 
problem facing the nation. This allows me to look at the long-term effect of media and political 
attention to terrorism on the public’s perceptions, while also accounting for terrorist violence that 
is occurring. In this chapter, I find that a larger share of the US public identify terrorism as the 
most important problem facing the US when mass media and political elites are devoting more 
attention to terrorism as a topic, regardless of the number of terrorist events which recently 
occurred in the US or the number of individuals killed or wounded in terrorist attacks in the US. 
I also find that economic insecurity factors, i.e. unemployment rates, are negatively associated 
with perceptions of terrorism as a social problem. Additionally, my analysis points to two key 
time periods which shaped discussions and perceptions of terrorism: the September 11, 2001 
attacks, and the ISIL-related attacks in Europe and North America in 2015 and 2016. While 
previous work such as David Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017) 
investigated the fear of terrorism in the years following 9/11, I seek to add to a new body of 
research into the social and political dynamics of the politics of fear leading up to and following 
the 2016 election. 
Then, in Chapter 3, I examine the content of news stories about suspected terrorists, by 
collecting data on the characteristics of terrorist attacks in the US and their suspected 
perpetrators, as available from the Global Terrorism Database. I then collect broadcast news 
transcripts through NexisUni by searching the suspects’ names and performing a quantitative 
content analysis approach. I hypothesize that suspected perpetrators of terrorist attacks, as 
defined by the GTD, who are Middle-Eastern/North African in origin, associated with radical 
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Islam, and foreign born are more likely to be called a terrorist by news media, even controlling 
for other characteristics of the attack. Tests using multi-level logistic regression techniques 
reveal that individuals associated with “radical Islam” are most likely to be framed as terrorists 
for the same behavior as non-Muslims. This demonstrates that the race/ethnicity/religion of the 
suspected terrorist is a key factor in how the public understands terrorism, rather than the 
violence itself. 
Following this, in Chapter 4 I address the public’s fear of a terrorist attack compared with 
the public’s fear of a mass shooting in the Granite State Poll. These intersecting types of mass 
violence have occupied much news airtime and political debate in recent years. I find that 
selective exposure to partisan mass media sources is associated with what respondents are more 
worried about. Listeners to New Hampshire Public Radio (NHPR) reported being more fearful of 
a mass shooting and listeners to Conservative Talk Radio (CTR) reported being more fearful of a 
terrorist attack, even when controlling for background characteristics and prior political beliefs. 
Additionally, respondents who watch WMUR non-partisan local TV news more frequently 
report being wore fearful of a mass shooting, but not a terrorist attack. If the public is simply 
worried about the violence of these events, then there should not be a statistically significant 
difference between reported fear/worry about a terrorist attack and reported fear/worry about a 
mass shooting. The differences which exist along political lines and are amplified by selective 
exposure to partisan mass media demonstrate that violence is not the only criterion by which 
individuals are estimating their risk of victimization, rather that fear is shaped also by 
interactions with social institutions, and suggests that the framing of violence as a  “Terrorist 
Attack” or a “Mass Shooting” evokes distinct meanings, images, and threats to respondents. 
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Taken together, the above data sets and analyses aim to link the fear of terrorism among 
individuals in the public more directly to the propaganda and institutional biases which have 
used and exacerbated these xenophobic tendencies in American society. Racial tensions have 
been a fact of American life since the founding of the nation, and newer immigrant groups often 
bear the brunt of hostility from the dominant majority. In the case of US Muslims, I do not find 
support for the popular hypothesis that economic insecurity is motivating racist sentiments and 
policies. Instead I, along with Mutz (2018), assert that anti-Muslim and anti-Immigrant sentiment 
and policies that propelled Trump’s 2016 campaign represent a perceived status threat to 
dominant American culture posed by non-white foreigners. This threat has been leveraged and 
exacerbated by powerful social actors seeking to enrich and benefit themselves rather than 
address the underlying inequalities in US society. 
Background 
Knowledge is constantly developed through a process of social interactions between 
individuals and institutions, commonly known as “the social construction of reality” (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966).  In the study of social behaviors such as crime and terrorism, this perspective 
aids our evaluations by emphasizing that: (1) any given issue has connected to it socially 
developed meaning (e.g. Islamic radical terrorists are a national security threat); (2) said 
meanings are constructed and reinforced in social interactions (e.g. news media portrayals of 
terrorism), and (3) these understandings assist in socially defining said issue as a “problem” in 
need of resolution (i.e. Islamic radical terrorism is a problem that threatens our way of life and 
must be addressed). 
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Mainstream criminology recognizes terrorism as a socially constructed concept and not a 
categorically objective act (see Turk 2004). With that in mind, I do not intend to explicitly or 
definitively characterize what terrorism is or isn’t in the content of this dissertation, a debate 
which is not likely to be settled easily. Instead, my focus is on how the general public reacts 
when terrorism is portrayed as a problem facing society, how suspected perpetrators of mass 
violence are portrayed as terrorists (or not) in US news media, and how selective news media 
exposure enhances individual beliefs about the risk of mass violence victimization. In short, this 
project is about the demonstrating that the effects of the “terrorism” label – including the 
messages surrounding the nature of the terrorist threat who is portrayed as a “terrorist” – is 
largely responsible for the public’s views about terrorism, and by extension Muslims, rather than 
the actual violence. 
The rest of this chapter provides an overview of key concepts and findings which are 
utilized throughout this dissertation research project. These include sociological approaches to 
the study of terrorism, literature on the fear of crime and fear of terrorism, literature on media 
effects, terrorism and the politics of fear, and the social construction of race. All of these are used 
to integrate the theoretical and empirical approaches of traditional sociological criminology, 
critical media analysis, and the racial formation perspective in examining the causes and 
consequences of the fear of terrorism in modern American society. 
Defining and Studying Terrorism 
From bombs in downtown Belfast, to the arson burning of ski resorts, to coordinated 
attacks in Paris and Brussels, terrorist violence has become a reality of life in the modern world. 
Despite the relatively low prevalence of terrorist type violence in the United States (see FBI 
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2005; LaFree et al 2009), following the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism emerged as the 
chief national security concern in the US and the world. How do we make sense of these 
seemingly random acts of violence? Terrorism has been referred to as the “conflict of our time”, 
and a form of violence which is increasing in prominence in the 21st century, while also rooted in 
history and social context (Black 2004; Smelser 2007; Turk 2004). 
Currently, the study of terrorism is constrained by a lack of definitional consistency about 
what constitutes a terrorist act and a terrorist group with some scholars arguing for some 
consistency in criteria, others using ideal-types of terrorism, and others still arguing that these 
debates are ultimately unfruitful (see Black 2004; Phillips 2015; Schinkel 2009; Smelser 2007; 
Turk 2004). The labelling of terrorism and terrorists is a highly politicized process in which 
institutions and individuals subjectively interpret events involving power dynamics, political 
agendas, and stereotyping of violence (ibid.). This has posed difficulties for researchers seeking 
to unravel the causes and consequences of terrorist violence and the mechanisms through which 
terrorism occurs. Practical issues aside, the inconsistencies and politicization of terrorist labelling 
speaks to the socially constructed nature of the problem. 
As such, classifying an act as terrorism is highly dependent on contextual factors (Turk 
2004). Though there is no one universally agreed upon definition of terrorism, most definitions 
agree on a basic concept. Terrorism is commonly classified as “violence or the threat of violence 
against persons or property to intimidate a government or civilian population in pursuit of a 
political, social, economic, or religious goal” (see FBI 2005). Additionally, terrorist violence 
frequently targets civilians outside the context of legitimate warfare and is intended to convey a 
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message and inspire fear in a group larger than the immediate victims (Black 2004; Rosenfeld 
2004; Schinkel 2009; Turk 2004). 
Because of the fluid nature of this definition, incidents of terrorism often overlap with 
hate crimes, organized crime, insurgencies, and other related behaviors. Moreover, perpetrators 
of terrorist-type violence often do not self-identify as terrorists. Instead, the label of “terrorist” is 
typically applied to individuals and groups after the fact (Turk 2004). Acknowledging that 
defining terrorism is difficult and that violence is socially constructed, sociological research has 
made progress in understanding the problem. 
In this dissertation, I rely on data from The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and 
consequently, adopt their definitions and standards of terrorism. The GTD is a popular open-
source database used by academics and policy researchers alike (Sandler 2011). The GTD 
defines terrorism as “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state 
actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (START 2019). Within this blanket definition, the GTD also specifies that the act 
must be intentional, must involve some level of violence or threat of violence against persons or 
property, and that perpetrators must be sub-national actors1. In addition, the GTD includes three 
criteria which can be required or not, allowing for researchers to specify the strictness of their 
definitions: 
1. The act must be aimed at pursuing political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
 
1 For more information, see the Global Terrorism Database Codebook at 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf 
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2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to 
a larger audience than the immediate victims. 
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. 
Like traditional crimes and other conflict behaviors, terrorism is a fundamentally 
sociological phenomenon. Terrorism is inherently a social interaction, involving multiple actors 
(perpetrators, victims, and audience) and a threat or act of violence carried out in pursuit of a 
goal beyond the immediate targets. Terrorist violence can be understood sociologically above 
and beyond the individual motivations and dispositions of the actors involved, embedded in 
social structure, and social/historical context. This is not to say that individuals do not matter in 
the sociological research on terrorism, rather that the role of the individual is conditioned by 
social reality. 
The causes and consequences of terrorism are inherently situated in the social and 
historical context in which terrorist events occur (Smelser 2007). In 2001, President George W. 
Bush declared a “war on terror” after the September 11th attacks. After the “war on crime” and 
“war on drugs”, the “war on terror” constitutes the third time that US politicians have ‘declared 
war’ on criminal behaviors since the mid-20th Century. This time the “war” is on a global scale, 
and was subsequently used to justify numerous policy, law, and social agendas including the 
USA Patriot Act and military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by US and coalition forces 
(LaFree 2009). Certainly, the creation of the war on terror was not arbitrary or whimsical, but a 
calculated response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the perceived risk of future attacks 
against the United States (ibid.). This illustrates that both the causes and consequences of 
terrorism are rooted in social conditions. 
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Emile Durkheim (1898) asserts that sociology is the empirical study of social facts – that 
is to say manners of acting, thinking, and feeling that are shaped by social forces external to the 
individual, which exert influence over members of a society and constrain behaviors within 
society. This approach has been the dominant way of doing sociology and criminology in North 
America, with over 60 percent of research conducted using quantitative, positivist approaches 
which compare trends between discrete groups, relying on a priori assumptions (LaFree and 
Freilich 2012). This approach has largely been adopted in the study of terrorism as well, as 
researchers apply statistical techniques used in the study of traditional crime (ibid). 
Conversely, Weber (1945) defines sociology as a science concerned with the interpretive 
understanding of social action, or behaviors of individuals which influence or are influenced by 
other actors and social situations. This line of thought assumes a complexity of explanations to 
any given social phenomenon, from which it has been argued that terrorism can be understood 
not merely as a single behavior with a single cause, but a type of action which arises as the result 
of the convergence of certain historical and social conditions (Smelser 2007). Some social 
theorists have also asserted that terrorism in its ideal type, another concept originated by Weber, 
is a form of collective violence which arises out of a specific set of social and structural 
conditions, where social and cultural distances are great, but technological advancements have 
closed the physical distances which made terrorist violence historically less likely (Black 2004). 
For example, the September 11th attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon are 
perhaps as close to this concept of terrorism as any, where civilians from one society attack 
civilians from a distinct society on the other side of the world using advanced modern 
technology (ibid). 
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 Concepts from sociology have been used in theorizing terrorism by researchers in several 
disciplines (Turk 2004), typically relying on theories of collective action (Smelser 2007). Other 
researchers have suggested that theories of crime and deviance can be usefully leveraged to 
illuminate the causes of terrorism (LaFree and Dugan 2004; Rosenfeld 2004). LaFree and Dugan 
(2004) argue that although there is a set of conceptual similarities between terrorism and crime, 
the presence of key differences is an obstacle to the direct application of criminological theory to 
terrorism. For instance, terrorism is not a specific crime that exists within the criminal statutes of 
many countries and therefore terrorists are typically prosecuted for the multiple crimes such as 
murder, arson, kidnapping or extortion that constitute their terrorist act (ibid.).  Additionally, 
unlike common crimes, definitions of terrorism typically conceptualize terrorism as a means to 
broader political and social ends (ibid.). 
Like other crimes, incidents of terrorism, perpetrators, and methods of terror are not 
equally distributed across societies. Rather, terrorism varies greatly from place to place, across 
time, and is embedded in the particular social/historical context (Black 2004; LaFree et al 2009; 
Phillips 2015; Rosenfeld 2004; Schinkel 2009; Turk 2004). The patterning of terrorism across 
time and space speaks not only to the social construction of terrorist violence but to the social, 
not individual, nature of terrorism which occurs as a result of social-structural conditions. For 
example, incidents of terrorism appear to cluster in places where political oppression and 
exclusion fall along social group divides, such as race, ethnicity, and religion, as well as in 
conflicts in which means and power are asymmetrically distributed (ibid).  
Terrorism also tends to occur in waves, in response to conflict cycles, and largely occurs 
around political and social conflicts which may involve other forms of collective action and 
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violence including protest, state repression, war, and insurgency (Schinkel 2009). Further, 
terrorist groups are constrained by social and situational conditions, typically attacking targets 
close to their operational base. This holds true even for high-profile groups such as Al Qaeda, for 
whom the overwhelming majority attacks occur against local, more immediate targets, and 
appear to be motivated more by local and regional grievances rather than by anti-Western 
ideologies as is popularly believed (LaFree et al 2009). Additionally, terrorists and terrorist 
groups may move in and out of terrorist behavior as situational factors change, switching to or 
from insurgent tactics to terrorist tactics, and escalating or desisting terrorism campaigns 
(Moghadam 2009). 
The lens of sociological theory and methods can be easily and effectively applied to the 
study of terrorism. Terrorism is socially constructed. It is not an absolute but defined by 
institutional forces and interpreted by individuals and groups (Turk 2004). Terrorism is also 
patterned behavior, not random or the result of individual psychological factors. Understanding 
terrorism as a sociological phenomenon requires linking contemporary events to core 
sociological thought, such as Durkheim’s concern with manners of acting, thinking, and feeling 
external to the individual, and Weber’s interpretive understanding of social action (Smelser 
2007). From this, terrorism is the result of structural conditions, social and historical contexts, 
and cannot be explained simply by individual dispositions or motivations. Sociologists consider 
the broader social patterns underlying terrorist violence rather than individual motivations or 
dispositions (Black 2004; Rosenfeld 2004). 
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Fear of Crime and Fear of Terrorism in Criminology 
Individuals’ perceived vulnerabilities due to gender, age, or race, have typically been 
shown to influence fear of crime victimization (see Henson and Reyns 2015 for a review), and 
likely influence fear of terrorism as well. However, terrorism is unique because victims are often 
chosen randomly and rarely know the perpetrator, it involves broader political, social, religious 
goals (other than personal gain), its rare occurrence, and the intent to cause fear beyond 
immediate victims (Turk 2004). The media is a key element to understanding not only how the 
“problem” of terrorism is being portrayed, but also where our biases lie as a society. 
Additionally, I argue, as other scholars have before, that media and political institutions are key 
to shaping perceptions of threat and that creative use of language and metaphors by political 
elites shapes the way other social institutions view terrorism (Altheide 2006, 2009; Shoon, 
Meltzer, and Reese 2008; LaFree 2009). 
Like the fear of crime, fear of terrorism can be understood on multiple levels of analysis 
such as perceived risk of victimization to the individual, perceived risk to the community, and 
even perceived risk to society as a whole. For some time, criminologists sought to explain the 
heightened fear of crime in the US, which has endured into recent years despite significant 
decreases in actual crime rates. Some scholars (Glassner 2009) have attributed this to increased 
media exposure of crime and continued attention to crime as a social problem by US political 
elites. Others have examined the fear of crime and perception of victimization risk among 
individuals. This literature has generally found that certain social characteristics such as age, 
race/ethnicity, and gender significantly influence these perceptions (see Henson and Reyns 
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2015), with older individuals and women most consistently reporting greater fear of crime 
victimization.  
Theories regarding fear of crime have attributed these findings to respondents’ perceived 
vulnerability and decreased ability to resist crime victimization, and fear of specific types of 
victimization, particularly fear of sexual assault among women which is reflected in a general 
fear of crime (ibid.). The theoretical mechanisms by which individuals perceive their 
vulnerability likely influences fear of terrorism, though the specific individual factors which 
influence these perceptions are likely different from the general fear of crime. For instance, it is 
illogical to presume that an individual’s fear of sexual assault would translate to a heightened 
fear of terrorism. Other factors, such as exposure to terrorism in news media and proximity to 
potential targets has been shown to influence perceptions of terrorism risk (Nellis and Savage 
2012; Woods et al 2008). 
Fear of terrorism can also be conceptualized as an issue of risk management similar to 
other national and global security issues (e.g. nuclear proliferation, climate change). Ulrich 
Beck’s Risk Society thesis (1992) posits that modern societies have produced a great number of 
risks, many of which exist as the result of the material reality of modernity such as the negative 
effects of industrialization. As a result, society has become preoccupied with these risks and the 
strategic management of these risks, many of which are attributed to human activity. Sociologists 
have used these ideas to help explain why, in a world with seemingly infinite risks, some are 
given more attention than others. This approach has been embraced by environmental 
sociologists, where the bulk of risk society scholarship lies, and has influenced terrorism 
researchers as well, though to an admittedly lesser extent. Any analysis of fear of terrorism 
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should take Risk Society into account, particularly when exploring how this fear is portrayed by 
media and politicians and interpreted by the public. Previous research has suggested that societal 
levels of risk perception are heavily influenced by societal elites, particularly those in the media 
(Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Clarke and Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007; 
Woods and Arthur 2014). 
Studying Media Effects 
The study of media effects on society and individuals has covered a wide range of topics 
including warfare, vaccines and other medical interventions, politics, climate change, 
immigration, crime, and terrorism to name a few. In this dissertation, I draw primarily on the 
traditions of critical media studies, a field of study dating back to the Frankfurt school in the 
early 20th Century (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1944). This field of scholarship examines our 
relationships to and interaction with indirect sources of information, or media, and how media 
serves to benefit powerful groups in society and reproduce systems of social inequality. Hermann 
and Chomsky (1988) more recently articulated a propaganda model of news media. David 
Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017) then takes us to the current day, 
examining how public fears are created and leveraged by social elites in mass media and politics 
to pursue political office, policy agendas, and make profits. Media effects have been shown to 
operate in three primary ways: 1. Agenda setting; 2. Framing events; and 3. Reinforcing spirals. 
1. Agenda Setting 
Mass media decides what is newsworthy and promotes certain topics as deserving of the 
public’s attention over others. This is known as Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993), a 
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theory which asserts that mass media drives large-scale trends in public opinions, attitudes, and 
beliefs. As an example, FOX News is a very influential media source for many Americans. If 
FOX News devotes a great deal of attention to illegal immigration, then according to Agenda 
Setting Theories, FOX News viewers are more likely to be concerned about illegal immigration 
than other potential issues. 
2. Framing Events 
Broadly speaking, Framing refers to the use of words, phrases, and imagery to describe 
and portray events to the public in a certain way. Consider the use of terms such as “illegal 
immigration” compared to “undocumented immigration”. The former is often accompanied with 
imagery of the southern US border and typically discussed in terms of illegal border crossings. It 
evokes a law enforcement narrative of how to deal with the issue as well, painting all illegal 
immigrants as criminals. The latter is a more sympathetic phrase used to describe migrants, 
discussed in terms of problems in the US immigration system. In fact, most undocumented 
immigrants entered the US legally and simply overstayed their visas (Warren 2019). Each of 
these phrases refers to the same sets of behavior, however the language, imagery, and ideas 
surrounding these phrases suggests different ways to view the phenomenon. By framing a topic 
in a certain way, using particular words, phrases, and images, mass media contributes to how the 
public perceives issues. 
Framing is a somewhat contentious topic among scholars, and consequently one of the 
most critically studied topics in communication literature. Entman (1993) described framing as a 
“fractured paradigm”. While some researchers do not go into detail to define what ‘frames’ and 
‘framing’ are, assuming that these are widely understood concepts (Entman 1993), others 
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interpret framing in different ways, even when the terms are explicitly defined. Some researchers 
see framing as a cognitive process and element of discourse (Gitlin 1980), others conceptualize 
frames as an internalized mental structure (Scheufele 1999), and further still, framing can refer to 
the substance of communication (Woods 2007). Though the exact definition of framing varies 
across disciplines, framing is theorized as a process frequently used by political elites and media 
sources to influence perceptions and shape the social world (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Herman 
and Chomsky 1988). In framing an issue, the use of fearful language or imagery can be used to 
persuade and gain support for social and political objectives (Altheide 2006, 1009, 2017; 
Herman and Chomsky 1988). Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life, 
particularly regarding terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. 
3. Reinforcing Spirals 
Recently, social scientists have turned their attention to the role of selected media exposure – 
i.e. choosing partisan news sources such as FOX News or MSNBC. The Reinforcing Spirals 
Model (Slater 2007, 2015) articulates how attitudes and beliefs are largely responsible for media 
choices, and also contribute to the development and maintenance of identities, attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors in a reciprocal fashion. Essentially, this model does not propose a strict cause and 
effect of attitudes/beliefs/behaviors, and media exposure/media effects, rather it argues that these 
tend to reinforce each other. 
The Structure of Mass Media and Society 
In the information age, mass media is more influential and more easily manipulated than 
ever before. The collection and dissemination of information through mass media outlets is used 
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to exert social influence and persuade people to behave in certain ways. While this is not a 
fundamentally new process, the scale of daily data collection and dissemination, and ubiquity of 
mass media exposure in modern, digitally connected societies is astounding. The average person 
is also no longer simply a consumer of mass media, but an active participant in mass media and 
even a producer of content. As scholars and as citizens, we have only begun to understand the 
effects of constant interconnectivity and bombardment of media messages on societies and 
individuals. Information has become both the most valuable commodity to the largest businesses 
– think Google, Facebook, and Amazon – but has also been weaponized by actors seeking to sew 
discord, spreading misleading or outright false information through the veneer of authenticity 
provided by mass media platforms (McCombie, Uhlmann, and Morrison 2020). 
Businesses, politicians, and governments using mass media to influence populations and 
spread potentially false or misleading information is not a new phenomenon. In many ways, the 
current political climate is rehashing decades old battles, and tech giants are primarily concerned 
with making profits, as any other business is. What is new is the structure of mass media, the 
scale and presence of digital media, and how individuals interact with mass media as an 
institution. At the dawn of internet age, hopeful tech entrepreneurs talked about an era of 
unprecedented understanding, empathy, and peace facilitated by instantaneous communication 
between anyone around the world who had an internet connection (Morozov 2012). At the very 
least, it was hypothesized that if a large portion of the population had access to the breadth of 
human knowledge and experience through the internet that society would become more 
informed, individuals would consider a wider range of sources and perspectives, and that critical 
evaluation of the information that we receive would become the norm (ibid.). It was even posited 
by the most hopeful that the internet, by providing free access to information, could defeat 
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authoritarianism around the world and usher in a new era of freedom. Instead, the opposite has 
occurred (ibid.). 
Media consumers did not embrace a broader range of opinions when given access to the 
wealth of human knowledge. Nor did they become more educated about issues that they and 
society face. In fact, many social scientists have documented an effect where individuals seek out 
news sources that support and confirm their previously held beliefs, while rejecting those that 
challenge their beliefs. The channels of information on the internet have become more restrictive 
rather than more open. This has been mirrored in traditional news media with the growth of 
partisan news outlets. Outlets such as FOX News, owned by billionaire Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corp., and conservative talk radio shows hosted by controversial figures such as Rush Limbaugh 
and Sean Hannity, are little more than propaganda machines (Conway, Grabe and Grieves 2004). 
In 2020, even these traditional news media sources contribute to the spread of biased or outright 
false information. 
Over the past thirty years, while a wealth of media sources permeates the average 
consumer’s landscape, they are controlled by relatively few entities. In the United States alone, 
ninety percent of television and film media is currently controlled by only six companies, 
compared with over thirty companies in the 1980’s (Lutz 2012). This enormous shift in 
homogenization is due to changes in the structure and laws of mass media which began in 
earnest following telecom deregulation in the 1990’s (McCabe 2016). The subsequent decades of 
mergers and acquisitions by the largest mass media companies have led to a news and 
entertainment media landscape that is increasingly dominated by a few points of view. Walt 
Disney alone controlled an estimated 38% of all North American Box office earnings in 2019 
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(Coyle 2019). In other words, while we have expanded the number of media outlets that can 
meet anybody’s preconceived notions, we have also simultaneously concentrated ownership of 
mass media into fewer hands and moved toward a less publicly-oriented model of news media 
production and consumption. 
Digital media, on the other hand, has been controlled by a few giant corporations for 
most of its’ history. Despite the openness and freedom of the internet, companies such as 
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter control a disproportionate amount of 
information that the average internet user encounters on a daily basis. These websites exert a 
great deal of control over the content that appears in people’s news feeds and search results, and 
at the same time offer little in the way of verification of information or fact checking. Ironically, 
although these companies have demonstrated repeatedly that they are capable of censoring 
content, they have facilitated the spread of false information, and in some cases, been complicit 
in its dissemination (Iosifidis and Nicoli 2020). This came to a head during the 2016 election 
cycle and gave rise to the “fake news” moniker (Moretto Ribeiro and Ortellado 2018; Tandoc, 
Jenkins, and Craft 2019). All the while, internet users’ information is constantly collected by 
both private and government entities (Bauman et al 2014; Munro 2018). 
In addition, nefarious actors have used the internet for personal gain at the expense of 
others, eroded the democratic institutions and rule of law in the US, propped up authoritarian 
regimes, and covered up crimes against humanity. A few examples of this include the election of 
Donald Trump to the US Presidency, mass surveillance conducted by US intelligence agencies 
under the veneer of counterterrorism, actions taken by authoritarian states such as Russia and 
Iran to suppress dissent and silence activists, and the genocide of minority groups in  China and 
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Myanmar. In addition, the spread of misinformation on the internet played a major role in the 
rise of the terrorist group Islamic State, the 2016 Brexit campaign and subsequent weakening of 
the EU, the 2016 election of President Trump and his subsequently disastrous policies at home 
and abroad,  the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, ascension of far-right parties and emboldening 
of neo-Nazis/white supremacists in both Europe and North America, the bolstering of 
authoritarian-style leaders in theoretically democratic societies such as Viktor Orban in Hungary, 
Erdogan in Turkey, Putin in Russia, and Trump in the United States, the weakening of the 
NATO alliance, global inaction on the issues of catastrophic climate change, and the resurgence 
of previously eliminated diseases such as measles in developed nations. Taken together, the 
structure of modern mass media, and its exploitation by nefarious actors, has contributed to 
nothing less than the undermining and collapse of Western Liberal Democracy and the post-Cold 
War social order. 
Terrorism and The Politics of Fear 
Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life, particularly regarding 
terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. In his 2006/2017 book Terrorism and the 
Politics of Fear, David Altheide documented the techniques and social processes by which 
political elites and news media constructed terrorism as the chief national security threat, relying 
on the public’s perceptions about danger, risk, and feelings of fear to gain support for policy 
measures such as the USA PATRIOT Act and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq 
Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017). This is considered the definitive work examining the nexus of mass 
media propaganda, political manipulation, and portrayals of terrorist violence. 
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In framing and packaging terrorism as a social problem for the US public, the use of 
fearful language or imagery has been used to persuade and gain support for social and political 
objectives (Chomsky and Herman 1988; Altheide 2006, 2009). For instance, David Altheide 
(2006) found that post 9/11 media coverage of terrorism closely resembles earlier coverage of 
crime. Both use fear of victimization and ethnocentric ideologies to reinforce ingroup-outgroup 
hostilities and employ a process of “othering”. This process involves construction of an inferior 
group by the dominant group through the establishment of symbolic boundaries and membership 
(Schwalbe et al. 2000). 
In the post-9/11 era, othering through discourses of fear and ethnocentrism have been 
central to building support for the war on terror (Kam and Kinder 2007). Mass media, however, 
is not the only social institution involved in the framing of terrorism and use of fear in social life. 
Political leaders often shape and define the problem initially. Media then filters and further 
interprets their statements and presents these re-constitutions to the public (Chomsky and 
Herman 1988). Media has presented fear inducing messages from politicians to promote many 
social, legal, and political agendas in the United States including the “War on Drugs” (Inciardi 
and McElrath 2015) and the USA PATRIOT Act (Altheide 2006). In this manner, leaders of 
social and political movements may invoke fear and construct moral panics which appeal to the 
values and beliefs of dominant social groups while also drawing on the group’s anxieties (Shoon, 
Meltzer, and Reese 2008). 
The War on Terror has left its mark on the US and the world. Through ongoing wars in 
the Middle East, changes in domestic law enforcement priorities, the reorganization of the US 
national security apparatus, more restrictive and harsher immigration laws and policies, the 
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erosion of civil liberties, resurgence of nationalist groups in US and Europe, increased hate crime 
targeting of “Muslims”, Brexit and election of Donald Trump in 2016. While mass media has 
devoted a great deal of attention to extremist violence over the past 20 years, other social issues 
such as climate change, growing inequality, and public health issues may pose greater threat to 
most Americans than terrorism. Yet news coverage of violence, particularly racially charged 
violence, sells newspapers, and gets viewers to keep tuning in. When the public is fearful of an 
issue such as terrorism, societal elites can, and do, take advantage of the public’s fear. Recently, 
Donald Trump proposed a ban on travel from Middle Eastern countries and building a wall along 
the southern US border to combat the perceived threat from non-white foreigners who are 
presumably coming to commit violent crimes in the US. 
Donald Trump’s “Muslim Ban” is not simply the action of one person, but a logical 
extension of a worldview promoted by mass media which equates terrorists with foreign, Middle 
Eastern, Muslims intent on striking the US homeland. The promotion of Muslims as a national 
security threat, simply because of their ethnicity, nationality, and religion, is based in long 
standing and systemic racism in the US. Biased media coverage constitutes a racial project which 
defines the “Muslim” race as the enemy, emphasizes some threats while minimizing others, and 
is tied to deeper issues of who belongs – who is American and who is not. It is no coincidence 
that a resurgence of white nationalism followed the largest refugee crisis since the second world 
war, which was portrayed as an invasion of Europe and North America by non-white Muslims. 
The Terrorism Label: Framing Mass Violence 
Terrorism, by most definitions, involves the use of violence to inspire feelings of fear or 
dread in a population larger than the immediate victims (see Global Terrorism Database 2017; 
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Turk 2004). Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism did not occupy the US public’s 
attention for prolonged periods of time, nor was it considered the chief domestic and foreign 
policy concern of the US. After the attacks, terrorism consistently occupied the list of top 10 
problems facing the US (Woods 2007). Following 2015 attacks in Paris linked to the so-called 
Islamic State group of Iraq and Syria (commonly referred to as ISIS) polls conducted by Gallup 
in December 2015 (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015) found that in the US, forty seven percent of US 
adults were worried about being a victim of a terrorist attack, close to the all-time high (Swift 
2015). Additionally, trust in government to protect US citizens against terrorist attacks reached 
an all-time low, with sixty seven percent of respondents believing that a terrorist attack on US 
soil was likely, and only fifty five percent of respondents had confidence that the US government 
could protect against future acts of terrorism (McCarthy 2015). 
Empirical research and official statistics show that incidents of terrorism on US soil are 
rare, typically committed by domestic actors rather than international, and only a minority of 
such attacks are associated with Islamic radicals (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009). Anti-US 
attacks by Islamic radical groups overwhelming occur against US interests abroad rather than on 
US soil (ibid). Nevertheless, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism has remained as 
a top issue concerning the US public (Swift 2015; Woods 2007), members of the general public 
report greater fear of terrorism victimization than other forms of mass violence (Swift 2015), and 
Muslims in the west continue to be targets of retaliatory hate crimes (Byers and Jones 2007) 2. 
One thing is clear, this is an enduring fear which does not fully represent the objective threat as 
measured by academic research and official statistics. 
 
2 For more information, visit the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics on Hate Crimes 1996-2016 at 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-publications#Hate 
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Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is used to convey a 
specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval (Kunda 1999). This 
specific threat has also been constantly framed as a “new” form of violence in US mass media 
(Norris et al. 2003). Similar to other crimes, terrorism is framed in a particular way in political 
and media communications. Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular sentiment 
associates terrorism almost exclusively with Islamic radicals, especially since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 
2011; Woods 2011). However, the majority of terrorist acts executed in the United States are 
committed by internal actors rather than foreign aggressors. The FBI classifies approximately 
two-thirds of all terrorist plots between 1980 and 2001 as “domestic.” That figure rose to 95 
percent between 2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005). 
The “terrorism” label has both broad and specific implications when it is applied. 
Altheide (2006) found that terrorism goes beyond a simple narrative, rather when an incident is 
labelled as terrorism, it becomes the “definition of the situation”. This framing of violence 
creates a sense that all Americans are potential victims of evil terrorists, and the military are 
portrayed as our protectors against terrorist violence. Terrorists are portrayed as faceless 
clandestine actors who strike from the shadows, as a foreign threat to our way of life, they use 
weapons of mass destruction, and are almost exclusively shown as Muslim radicals in the 
modern era (Kunda 1999; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 
2011, 2014). The threat of terrorism is therefore both vague and specific at the same time, 
portrayed as a threatening outgroup, or an “other” which demands a swift military response. 
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Terrorism, like most crimes, is also stereotyped as a masculine behavior. Female 
terrorists are portrayed as transgressing traditional gender boundaries (Berko, Erez, and Globakar 
2010). In news media female terrorists are depicted as exceptional cases (Nacos 2005) and 
portrayed as subverting their “natural” sexuality and role as mothers (Hamilton 2007). In short, 
depictions of female terrorists are shaped by notions of masculinity and gendered understanding 
of deviance which emphasize women as either passive participants or a rare exception (ibid), a 
bias which has been seen in the academic research into the gender-terrorism relationship 
(Jacques and Taylor 2008).  
Mass media coverage promoting the fear of terrorism is known to have negative effects 
both individuals and society (Altheide 2006; Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; 
Iglarsh 1987; Nellis and Savage 2012; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; Toohey and Taylor 2008). 
Many scholars assert that the risk of terrorism has been overstated in the U.S. by news media and 
other societal elites (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; McCarthy 2015; Papacharissi and 
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Swift 2015; Woods 2007, 2011). Since September 11, 
2001, terrorism has been ranked in the top 10 of Gallup’s “Most Important Problems” national 
survey (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015; Woods 2007).The effects of this heightened fear are not yet 
fully understood, however existing research has found that negative effects include changes in 
behavior, i.e. information seeking and avoidance (Nellis and Savage 2012), economic costs in 
reduced travel (Iglarsh 1987), support for questionable policy agendas such as the Iraq war 
(Altheide 2006; Wolfendale 2006), and a number of negative effects associated with increased 
anxiety (Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; Toohey and 
Taylor 2008) including post-traumatic stress and negative coping strategies (ibid.). This study 
may help identify who is most likely to experience these negative effects of terrorism on society, 
29 
and under which conditions fear is able to proliferate through the U.S. public. Potentially, 
findings could support targeted public policy efforts in the future. 
Additionally, scholars have also argued that stereotypes of Muslims as radicals and 
terrorists is harmful to minority populations (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 
2008). The stereotyping of Muslims in western media has also been used as a recruitment tool by 
violent organizations such as ISIL/ISIS (Stern and Berger 2015). US political discourse have 
demonized Muslims as a social problem (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; 
Norris et al 2003), promoting the image of Muslims as potential terrorists by describing terrorism 
almost exclusively in relation to Islamic radicals. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
attacks, hate crimes directed against Arab- and Muslim-Americans, or those perceived to be, rose 
dramatically. This change has been directly linked to the September 11th attacks by scholars 
(Byers and Jones 2007).  
Constructing “Muslims” as the Enemy 
Understanding how the US political and media elites frame terrorism is pertinent when 
radical groups such as ISIS, the so-called Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, are known to 
recruit members using the argument that Western powers – particularly the US – demonize, 
oppress, and alienate Muslims (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). A notable example of this 
is then candidate Donald Trump’s response to ISIL/ISIS inspired attacks in 2015: calling for a 
ban on all Muslims entering the US (Zurcher 2015). ISIL/ISIS is known to use media clips of US 
politicians such as Donald Trump discussing ISIS, the Middle East, and Islam in recruitment and 
propaganda materials (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). Theoretical and empirical research 
has also shown that individuals who join radical organizations often experience feeling of 
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alienation, isolation, and resentment towards a mainstream society which rejects and stigmatizes 
them (Cottee 2011; Hamm 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Sageman 2004). 
Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation Theory (1986, 1994, 2015) provides the basis of 
analyzing the fear of terrorism and the framing of terrorism as “Muslim” violence as a racial 
project. It is a long-established social fact that racism is embedded in US social institutions. This 
bias is reflected in popular beliefs about crime and violence, and institutional behavior. This 
dissertation research explores the fear of terrorism in US society through the lens of institutional 
racism. While the September 11th attacks changed American’s awareness of terrorism, racialized 
perceptions of crime and suspicion of foreigners have existed in the US for a long time. Fear of 
terrorism then is in large part a measure of racial tension in the US. Fear of terrorism is also a 
surrogate for fear, distrust, and animosity that that Americans have about foreigners, particularly 
non-white foreigners, beyond any objective risks posed by terrorist attacks. The perceptions that 
the US public have about terrorism are shaped by both pre-existing beliefs about non-white 
foreigners (on a social-psychological level) and by social institutions (on a macro-level), namely 
mass media and political leadership. Additionally, Racial Threat Theory (Blalock 1967) suggests 
that minority groups pose a threat to the majority when they increase in size and compete for 
political power and economic resources. The majority group uses various methods of social 
control, both legitimate and illegitimate, to reinforce dominance over minority groups. 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, political leaders seized on the 
public’s fear to build support for the continuing wars in the Middle East, expansion of 
surveillance capabilities, stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and the creation of a robust 
drone warfare program. This was accomplished in part by playing on the US public’s historical 
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xenophobic tendencies, which was now attentive to people of Middle Eastern, North African, 
and Central/South Asian backgrounds (i.e. “Muslims”). The recent wave of anti-Muslim 
sentiment in the US which developed out of this period, encouraged by political leaders and 
media outlets, culminated in the 2016 Presidential race in which Donald Trump famously called 
for a ban on Muslims entering the US. The present dissertation argues that public fear of 
terrorism is a proxy measure for racial anxieties and one of many perceived threats to the 
dominant culture in America posed by non-white foreigners. This is fueled by nearly two 
decades of propaganda efforts and media portrayals of terrorists as a foreign, Arab, Muslim 
threat to the US homeland and way of life. 
Conflating race with religion and nationality has a long history in the US. I argue, as have 
others, that Islamophobia in Western societies is racial in nature, rather than a primarily religious 
discrimination (Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Taras 2013). This is 
prominently on display in the changing U.S. Census categories. Over time, the US Census 
denoted Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and other nationalities as distinct “races" and called "Hindu" 
a race in 1920, 1930, and 1940, illustrating the muddled nature of our racial thinking (Pew 
Research Center 2020). Islamophobia also plays on historical constructs of Orientalism similarly 
to how Jews were portrayed in Europe and the US in the early 20th Century (Skenderovic and 
Späti 2019). and Islamophobic attitudes are more prevalent in those who favor Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (Beck and Plant 2018). Muslims are also viewed less favorably and deserving 
of legal protections than other religious minorities in the west (Meer and Modood 2009). Some 
scholars have linked new racialization, such as Muslim racialization in the US and Europe, to 
increases in the movement of population groups globally, which prompts reactions from 
dominant social groups in destination countries to maintain status (Gans 2017).  
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Similar arguments have been made in Samuel Huntington’s controversial book The Clash 
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), which articulates an argument that in 
the post-Cold War world is characterized by civilizations which share a common cultural 
heritage rather than nations-states. Furthermore, according to his analysis, Western civilizations 
(which includes primarily The United States and Europe) are declining in importance, influence, 
and power. The future of global politics, as Huntington sees is, will be characterized by struggles 
between the eight great civilizations, primarily focused on the conflicts between Western, 
Islamic, and Sinic (Chinese) civilizations. 
Perhaps the most prominent, and controversial, cultural argument within academic and 
policy circles as well as the general public is the role of Islamic extremism in explaining 
terrorism. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 terrorism has almost exclusively been 
associated with radical Islam in Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular opinion, 
despite mainstream academic research showing a diversity in terrorist groups (Altheide 2006, 
2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2011). Nevertheless, 
scholars have proposed that certain cultural forces – such as radical Islam - may make groups 
more likely to engage in terrorist violence during a conflict. 
Outline of the Following Chapters 
The following chapters use three related datasets to examine the influence that media and 
politics exert on public perceptions of terrorism and mass violence. I also address the social 
construction of race, and the “Muslim” race more specifically. Table 1.1, below, provides an 
outline of the questions, data, samples, methods, and measures in the following chapters.  
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First, in Chapter 2, I examine public opinion data over time to assess how occurrence and 
characteristics of terrorism events, media coverage, and other macro-level factors influence 
changes in public perception of terrorism as a problem facing the US. I find that, at least in 
bivariate analyses, public concern about terrorism is not related to occurrence of violence, but to 
the amount of attention given to terrorism by news media and politicians. I then work to 
deconstruct the terrorist frame/label by analyzing how suspected perpetrators of mass violence 
are labelled as “terrorists” by the US news media. While the other data sets both found strong 
evidence of media effects on public opinion, this dataset examines racial/ethnic biases in the 
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content of news reporting on terrorism. I find that the “terrorist” label is applied based on a 
suspect’s race/ethnicity, and/or religious/ideological affiliation, even when controlling for 
characteristics of the attack such as weapons used and number of casualties. Finally, I analyze 
the relationship between political beliefs and selective media exposure on members public 
perceptions of their risk of mass violence victimization in a representative NH survey. I find that 
controlling for sociodemographic factors, lifestyle factors, and prior political beliefs, individuals 
who selectively consumer partisan media are more likely to report elevated levels of worry about 
victimization in a terrorist attack compared to a mass shooting. 
In the following chapters, examine a social issue which has become particularly salient in 
the 21st Century: Terrorism. This is a risk which has been promoted as a grave threat by the 
media and political elites (Altheide 2006, 2009; Woods 2007); threat that is feared by Americans 
not because they are likely to experience it, but due to the foreignness of the perpetrators and the 
extreme consequences of this violence (Black 2004; LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009; Woods 
2011), a typology of violent behavior that is welded to specific groups and ideologies in our 
minds following a galvanizing event (Nagar 2010; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; Powell 2011), 
and a phenomenon which has fundamentally altered the institutional structure of the United 
States, if not the entire world, over the past 19 years (Altheide 2006, 2017; Kam and Kinder 
2007; LaFree 2009; Woods and Arthur 2014). In short, this project examines the causes and 
consequences of the fear of terrorism as a fear of “Muslims” in the United States. Specifically, I 
focus on the fear of terrorism in the tumultuous social period in the US leading up to the 2016 
Presidential election. I do so with three data sources and methods. These data sources are drawn 
from national public opinion polls from Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP), broadcast 
news transcripts from NexisUni and the Fall 2017 wave of the Granite State Poll (GSP). I expand 
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on current research by examining the fear of terrorism from the intersecting perspectives of 
criminological theory, critical media studies, and racial formation theory.  
In terms of broader impact and policy implications, this research addresses the role of 
mass media coverage on fear of terrorism, which is known to have negative effects to individuals 
and society. Scholars have also argued that stereotypes of Muslims as radicals and terrorists is 
both harmful to minority populations (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008), 
and can be used as a recruitment tool by violent organizations such as ISIS (Stern and Berger 
2015). I attempt to better understand how US news media portrayals of terrorism perpetuate bias 
against Muslims, while suggesting how these depictions can be modified to increase security of 
minority groups and counter extremist narratives.  
In conclusion, this dissertation examines the fear of terrorism in the US as a reflection of 
racial and other identity-based anxieties which is framed and communicated to the general public 
via mass media and leveraged by politicians to achieve power. In modern society, there are many 
risks, and terrorism is only one of them. In the case of the terrorism, the September 11, 2001 
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. constitute a galvanizing event which fundamentally 
altered the perception of terrorism as a problem in the United States, both within US institutions 
and individual perceptions. The subsequent media coverage and politicking around terrorism 
amplified historic xenophobic attitudes in the US and contributed to the racialization of Muslims 
as a group that poses an existential threat to the US way of life. This has had far reaching 
consequences not only for the US, but the entire world, and contributed to the collapse of the 
post-Cold War social order. 
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CHAPTER II. MEDIA, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION OF 
TERRORISM AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THE US 
 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a central discussion in US and 
global politics. Members of the US public have reported heightened fear of terrorism following 
these attacks, and concerns of terrorism as one of the top problems facing the United States have 
endured well past the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (Swift 2015; Woods 
2007). Combatting these groups has been the primary justification for the US-led wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US forces in the Middle East (LaFree 2009).  
The rise to prominence of the group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL to in 2014, 
and attacks carried out by ISIL-trained groups in Europe and ISIL-inspired individuals in the US, 
reignited public concerns of terrorist violence in the US. In combination with the refugee migrant 
crisis in the Middle East and Europe precipitated by the escalation of the Syrian and Iraqi Civil 
Wars, this culminated in then-candidate Donald Trump proposing a “total ban” on Muslims 
entering the United State following the ISIL-Inspired San Bernardino, CA attack in December 
2015, and the eventual signing of Executive Order 13769 in January 2017. Many scholars have 
argued that the threat posed by terrorist groups to the US homeland is overstated, and that the 
fear of terrorism has been intensified by continued attention from mass media and politicians 
(Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; LaFree 2009; Woods 2007, 2010). 
This chapter explores the agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993) role of mass media 
and political elites by examining the relationship between mass media and political elite attention 
to “Terrorism” as a topic, and the US public’s perception of Terrorism as a social problem facing 
the US. Specifically, I hypothesize that increased coverage of and attention to “terrorism” by 
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politicians and mass media will be associated with increased worry about terrorism as a problem 
facing the US, even when accounting for actual terrorist violence. I do this with a mixed-method 
analysis of Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey, the newspaper articles about “terrorism” 
from Pro-Quest, and Presidential public remarks about “terrorism” from the American 
Presidency Project. Additionally, I examine other factors which may influence public opinion 
such as the number of terrorist attacks in the US, casualties resulting from terrorist attacks in the 
US, and the unemployment rate. Finally, I explore specific events which coincide with “peaks” 
in the trends of public worry about “Terrorism” as the Most Important Problem facing the US. 
Politicians and mass media both play a central role in shaping the discussion surrounding 
terrorism and influencing public opinion (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Woods 2007). In these 
conversations, Islamic radical groups such as Al Qaeda have dominated the thoughts of 
politicians and media narratives alike (Kunda 1999; Norris et al 2003; Papacharissi and Oliveira 
2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2011, 2014). Consequently, “radical Islam” and 
“terrorism” have become practically interchangeable terms in the US discourse (ibid). 
Combatting these groups has also been the primary justification for the US-led wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US forces in the Middle East (LaFree 2009). 
Background 
The relationship between the media, politics, and the public has been explored in many 
different disciplines and perspectives. Three works have been particularly influential in critical 
media studies and sociology: Edward Hermann and Noam Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent: 
The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), Barry Glassner’s The Culture of Fear: Why 
Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things (2000, 2009), and David Altheide’s Terrorism and 
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the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017). Taken together, these works assert that 1. Mass media is profit-
driven and functions as propaganda and manipulates public opinion; 2. Politicians and mass 
media incite fear by overstating risks and directing the public’s attention to particular topics; and 
3. Politicians capitalize on fear to win office and pursue policy objectives. Altheide (2006, 2009) 
examined this process in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, highlighting how the 
fear of terrorism was instrumental in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and related 
legislation, restructuring of the US federal government, the continuing occupation of 
Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The second edition of Terrorism and the Politics of 
Fear (2017) also examines the emphasis on terrorism in the 2016 Presidential campaign, and 
support for then-candidate Trump’s proposed ban on Muslim’s entering the US. 
Additionally, terrorism has been increasingly tied to domestic law enforcement issues 
(LaFree 2009) and immigration policy (Woods and Arthur 2014). And while Islamic radical 
groups are portrayed as primarily having anti-US grievances, criminological research suggests 
that they may have more significant local or regional grievances than those that they are 
purported to have against the United States (LaFree Yang, and Crenshaw 2009; Stern 2009). 
Moreover, most terrorist attacks occur in close geographical proximity to the operational base of 
the group. This means that the overwhelming majority of attacks against US interests by groups 
such as Al Qaeda occur abroad, not on US soil (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009). Among 
terrorist groups with alleged anti-US stances and grievances, only 3 percent of attacks carried out 
actually targeted US interests (ibid). 
Currently, through a variety of methods, the literature has established that after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 terrorism has been portrayed as the chief national security threat 
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by US policymakers and media outlets (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; Papacharissi and 
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Norris et al 2003; Powell 2011; Woods 2007, 2011; Woods and 
Arthur 2014). Additionally, this body of literature has found that “terrorism” has become almost 
exclusively associated with Islamic radicals, and that counterterrorism policy has increasingly 
been discussed alongside domestic law enforcement and immigration policy (ibid). Survey data 
and some peer reviewed studies have also demonstrated that gender, age, media exposure, and 
geographical location are all significant predictors of individuals’ fear of terrorism (Brück and 
Müller 2010; Nellis 2009, Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 2008). Additionally, previous 
studies have suggested that societal elites and media coverage of terrorism may influence 
perceptions of risk more than actual terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime 
(Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007). 
Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is used to convey a 
specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval (Kunda 1999). This 
specific threat has also been constantly framed as a “new” form of violence in US mass media 
(Norris et al. 2003). Similar to other crimes, terrorism is framed in a particular way in political 
and media communications. Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular sentiment 
associates terrorism almost exclusively with Islamic radicals, especially since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 
2011; Woods 2011). However, the majority of terrorist acts executed in the United States are 
committed by internal actors rather than foreign aggressors. The FBI classifies approximately 
two-thirds of all terrorist plots between 1980 and 2001 as “domestic.” That figure rose to 95 
percent between 2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005). 
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The “terrorism” label has both broad and specific implications when it is applied. 
Altheide (2006) found that terrorism goes beyond a simple narrative, rather when an incident is 
labelled as terrorism, it becomes the “definition of the situation”. This framing of violence 
creates a sense that all Americans are potential victims of evil terrorists, and the military are 
portrayed as our protectors against terrorist violence. Terrorists are portrayed as faceless 
clandestine actors who strike from the shadows, as a foreign threat to our way of life, they use 
weapons of mass destruction, and are almost exclusively shown as Muslim radicals in the 
modern era (Kunda 1999; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 
2011, 2014). The threat of terrorism is therefore both vague and specific at the same time, 
portrayed as a threatening outgroup, or an “other” which demands a swift military response. 
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model – Influence of Violent Events on Politics, Mass Media, and 
Public Opinion 
 
Based on previous literature, I propose a theoretical model in which a violent event 
occurs, is discussed by politicians and mass media (the content of which is dependent on 
characteristics of the attack, suspect, and victims), and is then communicated to the public, 
influencing their perceptions of risk, visualized in figure 2.1. The public gets most of their 
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information about violent events from mass media. A violent event may be deemed terrorism 
under particular circumstances (e.g. if the suspect is Muslim). The public learns about events, 
and the language used to describe events, from mass media. Politicians may also draw attention 
to events and offer their own interpretations. This is typically mediated by mass media, however 
in the digital age politicians may also communicate directly with supporters. Information flow is 
broader now than ever before, and many people are directly or indirectly informed by internet 
sources that politicians and traditional mass media outlets don’t control. In many cases, internet 
sources can respond very quickly to spread rumors, which traditional mass media and others may 
pick up. Misleading and false information can spread more widely than later corrections. Social 
media companies such as Google and Facebook, which are increasingly used as primary news 
sources for Americans (Mitchell, Holcomb, and Weisel 2016), have made attempts to mediate 
the flow of information on their platforms with varied degrees of success. The success of the 
Russian Intelligence US election interference campaigns of 2016 in spreading misinformation to 
the Us public demonstrate the pitfalls of relying on social media for accurate information about 
world events (McCombie, Uhlmann and Morrison 2020). Ultimately, both traditional mass 
media and digital outlets act as a “filter” between events, politics, and the public with some more 
able to tailor the message presented to the public than others. 
Data and Methods 
In this chapter, I analyze public opinion and perceptions of terrorism as a problem facing 
the US using monthly observations from a variety of data sources. I employ descriptive and 
bivariate statistics analyses, and qualitative interpretation of data and graphics. All data used in 
this chapter are either (a) publicly available, or (b) available through UNH Library subscription. 
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All data will either be available to the general public, reported in aggregate form, or sufficiently 
anonymized by the original organization. This data does not require and IRB application per 
UNH Policy. Table 2.1 reports variables and relevant descriptive statistics. 
Table 2.1 Description of Variables – Monthly Observations 
 
Terrorism as Most Important Problem: Percent of Respondents Identifying “Terrorism” as the Most 
Important Problem Facing the US from Gallup’s Most Important Problem Poll (N = 258) 
Range: 0-24.24 
Mean: 3.77 
Std. Dev.: 5.32 
Skewness: 1.91 
 
Terrorist Attacks in US: Number of terrorist attacks in the US 1995-2016 from the Global Terrorism 
Database (N = 264) 
Range: 0-13 
Mean: 1.99 
Std. Dev.: 2.36 
Skewness: 2.03 
 
Terrorism casualties in US: Number of US terrorism casualties 1995-2016 from the Global Terrorism 
Database (N = 264) 
Range: 0-17840 
Mean: 74.38 
Std. Dev.: 1098.90 
Skewness: 16.10 
 
Newspaper Articles about “Terrorism”: Mean number of US newspaper articles about “terrorism” 
across six major US newspapers 1995-2016 from ProQuest (N = 264) 
Range: 14-1180.33 
Mean: 116.13 
Std. Dev.: 130.32 
Skewness: 4.98 
 
Presidential Remarks about “Terrorism”: Number of Presidential public remarks about “terrorism” 
1995-2016 from American Presidency Project (N = 259) 
Range: 0-53 
Mean: 10.93 
Std. Dev.: 7.92 
Skewness: 1.86 
 
Unemployment Rate: Percent of workers counted as “unemployed” 1995-2016 from US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (N = 264) 
Range: 3.8-10 
Mean: 5.92 
Std. Dev.: 1.66 
Skewness: 1.08 
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Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP) In September 1935 Gallup began asking 
American citizens about the “most important problem” facing the nation and the question has 
appeared on almost 200 Gallup surveys since (Smith 1985).  According to Smith (1985:264), 
“the most important problem question provides a grand overview of social change, describes 
history from the perspective of the participants, and helps to define distinct historical periods and 
identify turning points.” Although the wording has varied, the MIP question has asked, “What 
are your chief worries these days – what things bother or upset you the most? What do you fear 
the most?” or “What bothers you or angers you the most about America today?” Respondents 
are then asked to rank-order a list of possible problems in both foreign and domestic affairs. 
Included in the list of domestic problems are economic issues ranging from inflation and 
unemployment to job concerns, trade, and labor (Smith 1985). The MIP variable records the 
average yearly percentage of individuals ranking economic concerns as the most important 
problem facing the US. Figure 2.2 graphs the monthly percent of respondents selecting terrorism 
as the most important problem. This graph shows a mean of 3.8 percent of respondents reporting 
terrorism as the most important problem facing the US. This figure also shows a skew of 1.9 
with a minimum of 0 percent, and a maximum of 24.2 percent reporting terrorism as the most 
important problem facing the US. The high spike in late 2001-early 2002, of course, reflects the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon 9/11. A secondary spike in 
2016 reflects high-profile ISIL-related attacks in Paris, France, San Bernardino, California, and 
Brussels, Belgium. 
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Figure 2.2 Monthly Percent of Respondents Saying Terrorism is the Most Important 
Problem Facing the US (Gallup) 1995-2016 
 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collects detailed information about terrorist 
incidents, and currently includes over 100,000 incidents worldwide. Data is collected on the 
perpetrators, attack type, weapons used, target, location, date, casualties, and more. This also 
includes a description of the event, and up to three news stories referencing the incident. Figure 
2.3 graphs the number of terrorist attacks per month in the US from 1995-2016. This graph 
shows averages of 1.99 attacks, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 13 attacks in a month. 
From this graph, more terrorist attacks occurred between 1995 and 2003, terrorist attacks 
decreased in frequency from 2004 to 2014, and dramatically increased again in 2015-2016. 
Figure 2.4 graphs the number of terrorism casualties – both fatalities and wounded – per month 
in the US from 1995-2016 using an ordinal measure for ease of interpretation. This graph shows 
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a mean of 74.4 terrorism casualties in the US per month. The number of terrorism casualties in 
the US per month is extremely skewed at 16.1, with a minimum number of casualties of 0 and a 
maximum 17,840 terrorism casualties in a month: September 2001.The second highest casualty 
terrorist event is the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Other notable, high-casualty terrorist attacks 
in the Us include: the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing; the 2009 Fort Hood shooting; the 
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; 2015 San Bernardino ISIL-Inspired attacks; and 2016 Pulse 
Nightclub shooting. 
Figure 2.3 Number of Terrorist Attacks in the US 1995-2016 (Global Terrorism Database) 
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Figure 2.4 Number of Terrorist Attack Casualties in the US (Ordinal) 1995-2016 (Global 
Terrorism Database) 
 
ProQuest and Nexis Uni Are search engines that allow users to search print news articles and 
broadcast transcripts from around the world. Sampling is possible by searching for keywords in 
broadcast transcripts. Monthly counts of news article about terrorism in newspapers such as the 
New York Times, Washington Post, Fox News, etc. can provide an estimate of how much 
attention news organizations are devoting to terrorism. Figure 2.5 graphs the number of 
newspaper articles about “Terrorism” per month from 1995-2016 for six major US newspapers: 
The New York Times; Washington Post; Los Angeles Times; Chicago Tribune; Wall St. Journal; 
and the Boston Globe. The mean number of articles per month for all six papers is 116.1, with a 
minimum of 14 and maximum of 1180.3 mean articles per month. A spike in reporting is seen 
starting in 1995, especially in the NY Times, representing coverage of the 1995 Oklahoma City 
Bombing. The largest spike corresponds with the September 11, 2001 attacks. The spike in 
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articles in the Washington Post during 2012/2013 primarily reflects increased news coverage of 
the 2012 Benghazi attacks and subsequent congressional hearings, as well as coverage of the 
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing. The subsequent, smaller spike in late 2015 reflects coverage of 
the ISIL-relates Paris and San Bernardino attacks. 
Figure 2.5 Number of Newspaper Articles About “Terrorism” 1995-2016 (ProQuest: NY 
Times, Washington Post, LA Times, Chicago Trib., Wall St. Journal, Boston Globe) 
 
The American Presidency Project is a publicly accessible collection of over 110,000 
communications transcripts including letters, documents, and public remarks made by the 
President of the United States. Time periods of document coverage range from 1789 to present 
day (Woolley and Peters 2019). The dataset was founded as a collaborative project by John T. 
Woolley and Gerhard Peters of the University of California, Santa Barbara. The number of 
presidential remarks discussing terrorism during a certain time period can provide an estimation 
of how much attention political institutions are devoting to terrorism. Figure 2.6 graphs the 
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number of Presidential public remarks about “terrorism” from 1995-2016. This graph shows a 
spike during President Clinton’s tenure reflecting the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and 1996 
Centennial Olympic Park Bombing. President Bush’s term shows a particularly large spike 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks, with a subsequent spike reflecting the 2004 Beslan 
School Siege and his 2004 reelection campaign. President Obama’s tenure saw spikes in 2009 
which correspond to shooting at military recruitment centers in Arkansas, the National Holocaust 
Museum shooting, the FT Hood shooting, and attempted underwear bombing of an airliner. 
Additional spikes in 2011 correspond with the killing of Osama bin Laden by Seal Team Six in 
2011, the rise to prominence of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and the 2015 Paris and San 
Bernardino ISIL-related attacks. 




The Unemployment Rate data for each month is sourced from the US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. Officially, the unemployment rate is a measure of persons actively seeking gainful 
employment as a percentage of all workers in the United States. As defined by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, “persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively 
looked-for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not 
working and were waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had been temporarily laid off 
are also included as unemployed. Receiving benefits from the Unemployment Insurance (UI) 
program has no bearing on whether a person is classified as unemployed.” (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2019). Figure 2.7 graphs the US unemployment rate from 1995-2016, showing a mean 
of 5.92 percent, minimum of 3.8 percent and maximum of 10 percent unemployment in each 
month. This graph also shows prominently the 2008 recession, which is responsible for the 10 
percent unemployment rate high. 
Figure 2.7 US Unemployment Rate 1995-2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
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Analysis 
Based on the graphics produced in Figures 2.2-2.7, Terrorism as the Most Important 
Problem appears to be most influenced by the September 11, 2001 attacks, and increases again 
following the ISIL-Related attacks in Europe and North America in 2015. News coverage of 
“terrorism” and Presidential remarks about “terrorism” follow a similar pattern. The number of 
terrorist attacks in the US increased slightly from 1995-2000, declined from 2001-2005, and 
began to increase again around 2013. The number of terrorism casualties (including dead and 
wounded) rose from 1995 to 2001. This has a first peak in the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, 
which resulted in over 500 casualties, and then a second peak in the September 11, 2001 attacks 
with nearly 3000 fatalities, and thousands more wounded directly and indirectly. Terrorism 
casualties and the overall number of incidents in the US dropped dramatically after 2001 until 
about 2014. After 2014, casualties and incidents began to increase again as US politics became 
increasingly contentious, and the Islamic State (ISIL) group began to inspire terrorist attacks 
around the world. While this partly mirrors overall violent crime statistics in the US, anti-police 
and ISIL-related attacks spiked in 2015 and 2016. Not included in this data set is a subsequent 
spike in White Nationalist/White Supremacist terrorist attacks in 2017 and 20183. 
Prior to the Oklahoma City Bombing, Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey was not 
coded for “Terrorism” as an answer. Following this attack, researchers began to include 
“Terrorism” as an option. From 1995 to 2000, only two small spikes in July 1996 (from 0% to 
3.4%) and September 1998 (0.1% to 3.4%) occurred. These correspond to the Centennial 
Olympic Park Bombing in Atlanta, GA, and the bombings of US Diplomatic Facilities in East 
 
3 For more information, visit the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2018 Hate Crime Statistics reports at 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018  
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Africa by Al Qaeda. The biggest spike in Terrorism as the Most Important Problem Occurred 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Between August 2001 and March 2003, the percent of 
respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important problem increases from approximately 
0 percent to 24.24 percent, marking the highest observed increase in US history. Perception of 
Terrorism as the Most Important Problem declined after March 2003, with a few notable spikes. 
Between August 2007 and January 2015, Terrorism as the Most Important Problem 
remained under 5 percent monthly, with the exception of a spike to 5.13 percent in January 2010, 
following an attempted airline bombing using explosives smuggled in underwear. In 2015, the 
public’s attention returned to terrorism following the rise of the groups Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant. Following attacks in Paris and San Bernardino in November and December 2015, 
Terrorism as the Most Important Problem increased again to approximately 16 percent. 
Table 2.2 reports correlation coefficients between variables (Pearson’s r) and statistical 
significance. Bivariate statistics reveal support for the proposed path model. Terrorist incidents 
in the US are somewhat positively and significantly correlated with Presidential remarks 
(r=.122), but not Terrorism as MIP. Terrorism casualties in the US are strongly positively and 
significantly correlated with both Newspaper articles (r=.507) and somewhat positively 
correlated and significant with Presidential remarks (r=.136) but not Terrorism as MIP. 
Terrorism as the MIP is strongly positively and significantly correlated with Newspaper articles 
(r=.650) and Presidential remarks (r=.634), and somewhat negatively and significantly correlated 
with the Unemployment rate (r= -.148). Additionally, to account for delays between events and 
changes in public opinion, Terrorism as MIP with a 1-month lag was also examined. With a 1-
month lag, Terrorism as MIP is strongly positively and significantly correlated with Newspaper 
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articles (r=.722) and Presidential remarks (r=.646). Due to non-normality in measures and 
differences between predicted values and observed values, more sophisticated statistical and 
Time-Series analyses such as ARIMA are not possible at this time. Figures 2.8-2.12 visually 
compare trends and correlations in terrorism as the most important problem and independent 
variables. 
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) with Statistical Significance 















(1 mo. lag) 
Num. US Terror 
Attacks 
1.0 - - - - - 
Num. US Terror 
Casualties 
.144 1.0 - - - - 
Num. Presidential 
Remarks 
.122* .136* 1.0 - - - 
Num. Newspaper 
Articles 
.116 .507*** .64*** 1.0 - - 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-.223*** .034 -.159* -.053 1.0 - 
TerrorMIP (1 mo. 
lag) 
.060 .088 .646*** .722*** -.153* 1.0 
 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
Figure 2.8 visually depicts the correlations shown in Table 2.2. The low correlation 
coefficients between Terrorism as the Most Important Problem and the number of terrorist 
attacks in the US, as well as number of terrorist casualties in the US is demonstrated by the lack 
of clear trend lines in either correlation. Those that do have significant correlation coefficients 
with Terrorism as the Most Important Problem – the number of presidential remarks about 
terrorism, number of newspaper articles about terrorism, and the unemployment rate, do show 
scatterplot relationships. However, the scatterplot also shows that these relationships, even when 
relatively linear, are oddly shaped. Even the highest correlation coefficient between Terrorism as 
the Most Important Problem and Mean Number of Newspaper Articles (r=.722; p<.001) shows 
several outliers in the scatterplot. 
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Figure 2.8 Scatterplot Matrix of Variables 
 
Figures 2.9 through 2.13 graph trend lines of terrorist incidents in the US, terrorist 
casualties in the US, newspaper articles about “terrorism”, presidential remarks about 
“terrorism” and the unemployment rate against the percent of US adults identifying “terrorism” 
as the most important problem facing the US monthly from 1995-2016. These graphs also 
visually show the strength of associations between measures. For example, both Figures 2.9 and 
2.10 show weak, not statistically significant correlations of the number of terrorist attacks 
(r=.060) and number of terrorist casualties in the US (r=0.88), respectively, with the percent of 
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respondents who identify “terrorism” as the most important problem facing the US. These weak 
relationships suggest that the US public is not simply responding to the occurrence of terrorist 
events, or the lethality of terrorist events when they report how concerned they are about 
terrorism. 
 




Figure 2.10 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and US Terrorism Casualties (Ordinal) Overlay 
 
  
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show support for the agenda setting power of mass media and 
political elites. Elite cues, as shown here through newspaper articles and presidential public 
remarks, are the most highly correlated with the percent of respondents identifying “terrorism” as 
the most important problem facing the US. Graphed in Figure 2.11, the mean number of 
newspaper articles across six major US newspapers has a very strong positive correlation of .722 
which is statistically significant (p<.001). This means that as the number of newspaper articles 
per month about “terrorism” increases, so does the percentage of respondents identifying 
“terrorism” as the most important problem increase.  
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Figure 2.11 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Mean of Newspaper Articles Overlay 
 
Similarly, Figure 2.12 graphs the number of Presidential public remarks about 
“terrorism” against the percent of respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important 
problem facing the US, showing a statistically significant (p<.001), fairly strong positive 
correlation (r=.646). Essentially, as the number of Presidential public remarks about “terrorism” 
increases, so to do the percent of respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important 
problem facing the US. Much of this may be accounted for by the large spikes following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, however these correlations do find evidence to support the key role 
that societal elites and mass media outlets play in shaping the public’s perceptions about 
terrorism. Interestingly, as shown previously in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.8, the number of 
newspaper articles about “terrorism” and the number of Presidential public remarks about 
“terrorism” are fairly strongly and positively correlated with each other (r=.64, p<.001) as well. 
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As one increases, so does the other. This lends some support to the path model proposed in 
Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.12 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Number of Presidential Remarks Overlay 
 
 Figure 2.13 graphs the monthly US unemployment rate against the percent of respondents 
identifying “terrorism” as the most important problem facing the US from 1995-2016. These 
measures have a statistically significant and negative relationship (r=-.153, p<.0%) albeit the 
correlation coefficient is weak. This means that as the unemployment rate increases, the percent 
of respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important problem decreases. This is likely 
the result of immediate economic concerns associated with high unemployment overriding all 
other perceived social problems. Once our ability to put food on the table is threatened, all other 
concerns are secondary, as day to day survival takes precedence. The 2007/2008 global 
economic recession likely contributed to the relatively low percent of respondent’s identifying 
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“terrorism” as the most important problem between 2007 and 2014, despite counterterrorism 
remaining a priority for the US government during this period. 
Figure 2.13 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Unemployment Rate Overlay 
 
Again, Figure 2.14 graphs the percent of respondents indicating “terrorism” as the most 
important problem facing the US from 1995-2016, with markers added relating spikes in the 
trend line to specific incidents which occurred around the same time. Fourteen key events which 
correspond to peaks in the trend were identified from the Global Terrorism Database. These 
include: the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing; the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park Bombing; the 
1998 US Embassy Bombings in Kenya; the September 11, 2001 attacks, the build up to the 2003 
US invasion of Iraq, the 2004 Beslan School Siege; the 2005 7/7 London Bombings; the five-
year anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks; the 2010 attempted underwear bombing; the 
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; the beginning of US airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq in 2014, the 
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2015 Charlie Hebdo Attack; 2015 Paris Attack by ISIL, and 2015 San Bernardino Attack by 
ISIL-inspired individuals. 
Figure 2.14 Terrorism as MIP and Major Events 
 
Discussion 
Of the fourteen events which correspond to peaks in the trend line of the percent of 
respondents who identify “terrorism” as the most important problem facing the US, ten are 
terrorist attacks. The most notable of these attacks are the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al 
Qaeda, and the 2015 ISIL-Related attacks in Paris, France and San Bernardino, CA. All but two 
attacks were carried out by Islamic Radicals. Two were carried out by far-right 
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organizations/individuals. Below is a description of the ten terrorist events which are associated 
with peaks in the graph in Figure 2.14. 
On the morning of April 19, 1995, the deadliest domestic terror attack in the US occurred 
when a truck bomb of more than 300 pounds of fertilizer-based explosives detonated outside the 
Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, OK. The OKC Bombing, as it is commonly 
known, resulted in 168 fatalities and approximately 650 wounded (see GTD Incident 
199504190004). Timothy McVeigh was eventually convicted of the bombing, saying the 
bombing was in retaliation for what he perceived as government overreach in its handling of the 
Branch Davidian standoff at Waco, TX, and the standoff at Ruby Ridge, ID. McVeigh, who was 
known to associate with individual of various far-right ideologies, was executed for the bombing 
in 2001. The bombing resulted in renewed attention to terrorism by academics and the US 
Government and Law Enforcement agencies. Just over a year after the bombing, President 
Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act into law. The law was partly 
designed to give law enforcement agencies greater authority in counterterrorism investigations 
and also adopted harsher punishments for individuals convicted of terrorism. 
In July of 1996, Eric Rudolf, a member of the far-right organization Army of God planted 
and detonated a pipe-bomb at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, GA. The bombing 
resulted in the death of 1 victim and wounding of an additional 111, including several law 
enforcement officers (see GTD Incident 199607270003). Authorities famously mistook the 
individual who found and reported the explosive device for the perpetrator. Eric Rudolf was 
apprehended years later in North Carolina, and subsequently convicted of the bombing. 
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In August of 1998, Al Qaeda operative conducted coordinated attacks against the US 
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya was attacked by suicide 
bombers who detonated a truck bomb outside. The truck bomb killed 12 Americans claimed the 
lives of 224 victims in total. It is estimated that an additional 4000 people were wounded in the 
attack. The attack in Tanzania also involved a vehicular bomb. Suicide bombers detonated 
explosives outside the US Embassy in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 people and wounding 
85 more (see GTD Incidents 199808070002, 199808070003). 
On the Morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the terrorist organization 
Al Qaeda, mostly from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, hijacked four planes with the intent of crashing 
them into the World Trade Center in New York, The Pentagon Arlington, VA, and the US 
Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. Three of the four attacks were successful. The planes 
bound for New York destroyed the World Trade Center, killing approximate 2,770 people, and 
wounding over 21,000 more victims. The plane bound for Arlington was successful in striking 
the Pentagon, which resulted in approximately 190 fatalities and another 106 wounded. The 
fourth plane, bound for Washington D.C., was forced down over Shanksville, PA and resulted in 
at least 44 deaths and 9 additional wounded. Commonly known as the September 11, 2001 
attacks, or simply 9/11 attacks, the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda are the deadliest terrorist 
incidents in history (see GTD Incidents 200109110004, 200109110005, 200109110006, 
200109110007). The effects of the 9/11 attacks on both the US and the world are profound and 
continue nearly twenty years later. Most notably, the USA PATRIOT Act and related legislation 
are still largely in effect today, and the Global War on Terror has resulted in the continued 
presence of US Troops in Middle Eastern conflicts. 
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In September of 2004, a large group of Chechen and Ingush rebels, estimated to be 
between 30 and 35 in number, seized control of a school in Beslan, Russia. The suspects took 
approximately 1200 children, parents, and teachers hostage in the school gym. The standoff and 
subsequent confrontation with Russian police and military forces resulted in at least 344 deaths 
and over 727 additional wounded (see GTD Incident 200409010002). 
In July of 2005, Al Qaeda operatives carried out a series of attacks commonly known as 
the London 7/7 Bombings. Four suicide bombers detonated explosives aboard four different 
trains in London at approximately the same time. These attacks killed 56 People and wounded at 
least 784 more (see GTD Incidents 200507070001, 200507070002, 200507070003, 
200507070004). These bombings were the deadliest terrorist attacks in the UK since the end of 
the Northern Ireland conflict in 1998. 
Attempted Underwear Bombing. 25 December 2009. A Nigerian national associated with 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attempted to detonate an explosive device on 
Northwest Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. The explosive device failed; however, an 
intervening passenger was wounded in an altercation (see GTD Incident 200912250024). The 
attempted bombing was subsequently used as justification for use of controversial body scanners 
in US airports. 
A series of attacks from 15-19 April 2013 in Massachusetts commonly known as the 
Boston Marathon Bombing were carried out by bothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The 
brothers were immigrants from the Dagestan region of Russia, a predominantly Muslim area that 
was highly impacted by the Chechen wars. The initial incident involved setting off improvised 
explosives near the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, killing 3 and wounding at least 132 
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others. The brothers later killed an MIT police officer, and a subsequent bombing attempt was 
thwarted by police. A gunfight between police and the suspects resulted in the death of 
Tamerlan, Tsarnaev and 16 additional injuries. One of the responding officers later died from 
wounds sustained. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was apprehended after surrendering to police shortly 
thereafter (see GTD Incidents 201304150001, 201304150002, 201304180001, 201304190009). 
Responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack of January 2015 was claimed by Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and carried out by two assailants who were born and raised in 
France: Cherif and Said Kouachi. The attack was carried out as revenge for the paper’s depiction 
of the Prophet Muhammad in a political comic and resulted in11 deaths and another 11 wounded, 
including the suspects (see GTD Incident 201501070001).  
On November 13th, 2015, a series of coordinated attacks were carried out in Paris, 
France, and the Paris suburb Saint Denis. A total of 13 assailants trained by the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, killed 137 people and wounded at least 413 more in eight highly 
organized attacks. This included a suicide bombing at Comptoir Voltaire restaurant, a bombing 
and shooting in Bataclan concert hall which killed 93 and wounded 217, as well as shootings at 
the terrace of La Belle Equipe bar Cafe Bonne Biere, Le Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge 
restaurants, all in Paris, and three suicide bombers at a football (soccer) match in the Paris suburb 
of Saint Denis near the Stade de France. This was the deadliest series of terrorist attacks ever in 
France and was intended as retaliation for US led allied airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria 
(see GTD Incidents 201511130002-201511120009). 
San Bernardino attack by ISIL-Inspired individuals Syed Rizwan Farook, a US-born 
Pakistani-American and Tashfeen Malik, a naturalized US citizen from Pakistan used firearms 
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and explosives in an assault against coworkers which ended in a pursuit and shootout with 
police. 16 people were killed in the incident, including the suspects, and another 17 were 
wounded in the attack (see GTD Incident 201512020012). The ISIL-Related attacks in Paris and 
San Bernardino prompted Donald Trump’s proposal of a “Muslim Ban” to combat terrorism. 
The data analyzed in this chapter generally support the previous theoretical and empirical 
literature examining the relationship between mass media and public perceptions of terrorism. It 
does appear that mass media coverage and attention from politicians has the strongest correlation 
with Terrorism as the Most Important Problem. This supports both the Agenda Setting and Elite 
Cues theories of media effects and public opinion. I also find support for theories which assert 
that societal elites and media coverage of terrorism influences perceptions of risk more than 
actual terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime (Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and 
Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007). 
Additionally, qualitative evidence examining trends in the public perception of terrorism 
as the most important problem facing the US points to the importance of key events in shaping 
public opinion. The two major spikes in the data following the September 11, 2001 attacks and 
2015 ISIL-Related attacks demonstrate that first, public perceptions of terrorism in the US were 
permanently altered following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and second, 
that the public does appear to respond with greater fear and worry to attacks carried out by 
Radical Islamic groups than those carried out by individuals and groups with other ideologies. 
In the case of the most important problem, I find evidence that both the President and 
prominent news outlets exert an influence on the public’s perception of social problems facing 
the US, and that they influence each other. Politics and mass media are key in telling us what a 
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social problem is and controlling the broad conversation. This supports both a model of power 
articulated nu Mills (1956) and Hermann and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model of mass 
media. This states that media is used by social elites that build support for policy objectives 
among the public. This was written as a rebuttal to the popular notion that mass media is often at 
odd with politics and able to hold politicians accountable. In the modern era, mass media has 
largely not held the current administration accountable for their disastrous policies. In fact, one 
could argue that almost all mass media outlets prefer a Trump Presidency because it directly 
increases their viewership and revenue. Trump sells newspapers and gets people to tune in to the 
news. 
Additionally, I do not find support for the economic threat hypothesis (Blalock 1967). 
Instead, based on recent research such as Mutz (2018), status threat is likely driving the fear of 
terrorism and associated anti-Muslim sentiments. Interestingly, I find that the public is less 
concerned about terrorism during economically challenging times. If economic insecurity does 
amplify feelings of racial threat, it does not do so in an easily measurable way, at least not with 
the data that is currently available. Immigration research has additionally found that anti-
immigrant politics are pursued in both good and bad economic times, and that social institutions 
are primarily responsible for engendering anti-immigrant attitudes (Tichenor 2002). This is 
supported by other research which has found that fears and concerns about labor market 
competition are not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Heinmueller et al 2015). 
This analysis does have limitations, namely in that the data cannot be analyzed with more 
sophisticated regression or time-series techniques as it is currently available. Therefore, it is not 
able to formally test hypotheses about these relationships, or control for the influence of multiple 
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variables. Other data sources may perhaps be better able to assess the theories outlined in this 
and previous works. At the end of this analysis, it can be said that it does appear that public 
opinion on issues such as terrorism is most influenced by mass media coverage and attention 
from political elites. This is further supported by data analyzed in other parts of this project. The 
following chapter examines the content of news media stories about terrorist events, focusing on 
news media’s role in framing evets. I add to the existing literature on the framing of terrorism by 
examining how terrorist suspects are portrayed on US television news. Then, I examine the 
influence that selective exposure to partisan mass media has on individual members of the public 
and their worry about victimization in either a terrorist attack or a mass shooting. 
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CHAPTER III. QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF BROADCAST 
NEWS MEDIA FRAMING OF SUSPECTED TERRORIST 
PERPETRATORS 
 
Why are some people labelled as terrorist and others are not, even when they commit the 
same acts? The overall focus of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which socially 
constructed meanings applied to similar behaviors at different times and places affect the 
public’s perceptions of mass violence. What it is, how it affects individuals and society, how 
individuals and social institutions respond to perceived violence all differ greatly by which label 
is used to describe the incident. More specifically, this dissertation examines the role that mass 
media plays in shaping our ideas and beliefs about violence. 
The previous chapters demonstrated that mass media shapes public perception by setting 
agendas and drawing attention to certain topics as newsworthy and that elite cues do reflect 
differences in opinion among members of the public. The following chapter finds that selective 
partisan media exposure can amplify one’s existing beliefs in a measurable way. This chapter is 
focused on the content of those media messages and examines how mass media frames terrorism 
and contributes to how the public conceives of terrorism. Specifically, to add to the body of 
literature on the topic of media framing of terrorism, I assess whether media coverage is racially 
biased in its framing of terrorist suspects in a quantitative content analysis of broadcast news 
transcripts from NexisUni. With data from the Global Terrorism Database, I find that when 
controlling for characteristics of the attacks such as weapons used and number of people killed, 
that Muslim suspects are more likely to be labeled terrorists. In short, Muslims suspects are more 
likely to be framed or labelled as terrorists by news media for the same behavior. 
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Max Weber’s (1945) concept of the “Ideal Type” as a proverbial yardstick for understanding 
social action has a particular utility in understanding why some acts of mass violence are labelled 
as “terrorist attacks” and why other, similar acts of mass violence are not labelled as “terrorist 
acts”. The ideal type of a terrorist attack is perhaps best exemplified by the September 11, 2001 
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon carried out by the al Qaeda organization. This 
attack involved civilian, sub-state actors from one society and culture inflicting extreme violence 
on other civilians in another society and culture (Black 2004). These attacks occurred far outside 
the norms of conventional warfare, were conducted by covert actors, and based on 
communication from al Qaeda leadership, were intended to strike fear into the population of the 
United States. When using this concept of the ideal type to analyze media content, it can be 
presumed that a suspect is more likely to be labelled as a “terrorist” when he or she more closely 
conforms to the constructed ideal type of what a terrorist attack is and/or who a terrorist is: i.e. a 
Middle Eastern, Muslim male. 
Race and ethnicity have long been used as a means of dividing people in the US (Feagin 
2006, 2013; Omi and Winant 2015). In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, 
political leaders seized on the public’s fear to build support for the continuing wars in the Middle 
East, expansion of surveillance capabilities, stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and the 
creation of a robust drone warfare program. This was accomplished in part by playing on the US 
public’s historical xenophobic tendencies, which was now attentive to people of Middle Eastern, 
North African, and Central/South Asian backgrounds (i.e. “Muslims”). The recent wave of anti-
Muslim sentiment in the US which developed out of this period has been encouraged by 
opportunistic political leaders and media outlets. The present dissertation argues that public fear 
of terrorism is a proxy measure for racial, cultural, and other identity-based anxieties and one of 
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many perceived threats to the dominant culture in America posed by non-white foreigners. This 
is fueled by nearly two decades of propaganda efforts and media portrayals of terrorists as a 
foreign, Arab, Muslim threat to the US homeland and way of life. 
When a mass violence event occurs in the US, most people will learn about the event through 
mass media. Mass media does not only report on events, but also offers interpretations of events 
and contributes to individuals’ views. The other analyses present in this dissertation both found 
that media effects play a significant role in the public’s perceptions of mass violence. The earlier 
studies addressed two important aspect of media effects: agenda setting – or how topics become 
“newsworthy” and reinforcing spirals – or how selective media exposure can strengthen pre-
existing views. This portion of the study focuses on another critical piece of media effects: 
framing - i.e. the use of words, phrases, and images to portray particular messages. Specifically, I 
examine the content of broadcast news media to determine who is portrayed as a terrorist. 
In this project, I argue that among suspected perpetrators of terrorism in the US, 
individuals who are Middle Eastern, foreign born, or associated with radical Islam are more 
likely to be framed or labelled as terrorists by US news media, controlling for characteristics of 
the event. The terrorist label is embedded with racialized meaning. In effect, terrorism is treated 
interchangeably with “Muslim” violence.  If fear of terrorism is reflective of fear of “Muslims”, 
then among suspected perpetrators of terrorist violence, individuals who are “Muslim” – i.e. 
Middle Eastern or associated with Radical Islam – are more likely to be framed or labelled as 
terrorists by news media. Previous literature has not looked specifically at how individual 
suspects are portrayed, instead focusing on groups and ideologies. This research has focused 
almost exclusively on newspapers, while most people get their news from television. Previous 
70 
treatment of the connection between radical Islam, race, and ethnicity has also been flawed. 
While many have examined the connection between Islam and portrayals of terrorism, race, 
ethnicity, and religion have been treated as interchangeable in this literature. I argue that this 
may not be the case – i.e. appearing to be Middle Eastern is just as important – if not more – than 
an alignment with radical Islam, or the individual’s immigration status.  
Background 
Terrorism, by most definitions, involves the use of violence to inspire feelings of fear or 
dread in a population larger than the immediate victims (see Global Terrorism Database 2019; 
Turk 2004). After the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism has frequently occupied the list of 
top 10 problems facing the US (Woods 2007) and remains a top issue that the US public wants 
the Government to address. Following 2015 attacks in Paris linked to the so-called Islamic State 
group of Iraq and Syria (commonly referred to as ISIS of ISIL) polls conducted by Gallup in 
December 2015 (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015) found that in the US, forty seven percent of US 
adults were worried about being a victim of a terrorist attack, close to the all-time high (Swift 
2015). Additionally, trust in government to protect US citizens against terrorist attacks reached 
an all-time low, with sixty seven percent of respondents believing that a terrorist attack on US 
soil was likely, and only 55 percent of respondents had confidence that the US government could 
protect against future acts of terrorism (McCarthy 2015). 
Empirical research and official statistics often paint a different picture about the risk of 
terrorism than what is popularly believed. This research shows that incidents of terrorism on US 
soil are rare, typically committed by domestic actors rather than international, and only a 
minority of such attacks are associated with Islamic radicals (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 
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2009). Anti-US attacks by Islamic radical groups overwhelming occur against US interests 
abroad rather than on US soil (ibid). Nevertheless, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
terrorism has remained as a top issue concerning the US public (Swift 2015; Woods 2007), 
members of the general public report greater fear of terrorism victimization than other forms of 
mass violence (Swift 2015), and Muslims in the west continue to be targets of retaliatory hate 
crimes (Byers and Jones 2007) 4. One thing is clear, this is an enduring fear which does not fully 
represent reality. Below, I discuss the research questions which guide this analysis, the broad 
contributions of the study, the theoretical background, and the research design of each part of 
this dissertation. 
Media coverage on fear of terrorism is known to have negative effects to individuals and 
society (Altheide 2006; Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; Iglarsh 1987; Nellis and 
Savage 2012; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; Toohey and Taylor 2008). The War on Terror has been 
used to justify disastrous policies domestically and abroad – including the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Many scholars assert that the risk of terrorism has been overstated in the U.S. by news 
media and other societal elites (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; McCarthy 2015; Papacharissi 
and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Swift 2015; Woods 2007, 2011). Since September 
11, 2001, terrorism has been ranked in the top 10 of Gallup’s “Most Important Problems” 
national survey (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015; Woods 2007).The effects of this heightened fear 
are not yet fully understood, however existing research has found that negative effects include 
changes in behavior, i.e. information seeking and avoidance (Nellis and Savage 2012), economic 
costs in reduced travel (Iglarsh 1987), support for questionable policy agendas such as the Iraq 
 
4 For more information, visit the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics on Hate Crimes 1996-2016 at 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-publications#Hate 
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war (Altheide 2006; Wolfendale 2006), and a number of negative effects associated with 
increased anxiety (Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; 
Toohey and Taylor 2008) including post-traumatic stress and negative coping strategies (ibid.). 
This study may help identify who is most likely to experience these negative effects of terrorism 
on society, and under which conditions fear is able to proliferate through the U.S. public. 
Potentially, findings could support targeted public policy efforts in the future. 
Additionally, scholars have also argued that stereotypes of Muslims as radicals and 
terrorists is harmful to minority populations (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 
2008). The stereotyping of Muslims in western media has also been used as a recruitment tool by 
violent organizations such as ISIL/ISIS (Stern and Berger 2015). US political discourse have 
demonized Muslims as a social problem (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; 
Norris et al 2003), promoting the image of Muslims as potential terrorists by describing terrorism 
almost exclusively in relation to Islamic radicals. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
attacks, hate crimes directed against Arab- and Muslim-Americans, or those perceived to be, rose 
dramatically. This change has been directly linked to the September 11th attacks by scholars 
(Byers and Jones 2007).  
Understanding how the US political and media elites frame terrorism is pertinent when 
radical groups such as ISIS, the so-called Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, are known to 
recruit members using the argument that Western powers – particularly the US – demonize, 
oppress, and alienate Muslims (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). A notable example of this 
is then candidate Donald Trump’s response to ISIS inspired attacks in 2015: calling for a ban on 
all Muslims entering the US (Zurcher 2015). ISIS is known to use media clips of US politicians 
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such as Donald Trump discussing ISIS, the Middle East, and Islam in recruitment and 
propaganda materials (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). Theoretical and empirical research 
has also shown that individuals who join radical organizations often experience feeling of 
alienation, isolation, and resentment towards a mainstream society which rejects and stigmatizes 
them (Cottee 2011; Hamm 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Sageman 2004). I attempt to 
better understand how US news media portrayals of terrorism perpetuate bias against Muslims, 
while suggesting how these depictions can be modified to increase security of minority groups 
and counter extremist narratives. 
Framing Theory 
My research project takes a minimalist approach to framing, as articulated by Woods 
(2011). ‘Frames’ can be described as “identifiable characteristics of mass-mediated news content 
that are of interest to scholars. While frames may have a range of causes and effects, they exist 
first of all as words, images and symbols that appear on paper and in other media. News frames 
may be found in a variety of communication outlets. Taking many different forms, they may 
appear as phrases such as ‘the cold war’, single words such as ‘communist’, images such as a 
photo of the Berlin Wall or particular patterns or styles in which words, phrases and images 
appear in news content (Woods 2011, p. 201).” With this research, I apply this concept by 
examining the use of certain “frames”, i.e. the words, images, and symbols used to portray a 
particular message. I focus on how, when, and why particular frames such as “Terrorism” and 
“Mass Shooting” are used by US news media and understood by the general public. 
Framing is a somewhat contentious topic among scholars, and consequently one of the 
most critically studied topics in communication literature. Entman (1993) described framing as a 
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“fractured paradigm”. While some researchers do not go into detail to define what ‘frames’ and 
‘framing’ are, assuming that these are widely understood concepts (Entman 1993), others 
interpret framing in different ways, even when the terms are explicitly defined. Some researchers 
see framing as a cognitive process and element of discourse (Gitlin 1980), others conceptualize 
frames as an internalized mental structure (Scheufele 1999), and further still, framing can refer to 
the substance of communication (Woods 2007). Though the exact definition of framing varies 
across disciplines, framing is theorized as a process frequently used by political elites and media 
sources to influence perceptions and shape the social world (Chomsky and Herman 1988). 
The importance of framing in studies of news media has been articulated from scholars in 
many disciplines. David Altheide (2006; 2009) documented how political elites and news media 
constructed terrorism as the chief national security threat, relying on the public’s perceptions 
about danger, risk, and feelings of fear to gain support for policy measures such as the USA 
PATRIOT Act and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Benford and Snow (2000) 
argue that framing processes are an essential aspect of social movement formation. Chomsky and 
Herman (1988) articulated a propaganda-model of news media and asserted that media framing 
is frequently used to influence public opinion and used as a tool by political elites to further 
specific political goals.  
In framing an issue, the use of fearful language or imagery can be used to persuade and 
gain support for social and political objectives (Chomsky and Herman 1988; Altheide 2006, 
2009). Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life, particularly regarding 
terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. For instance, David Altheide (2006) found that 
recent media coverage of terrorism closely resembles previous coverage of crime. Both use fear 
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of victimization and ethnocentric ideologies to reinforce ingroup-outgroup hostilities and employ 
a process of “othering”. This process involves construction of an inferior group by the dominant 
group through the establishment of symbolic boundaries and membership (Schwalbe et al. 2000).  
In the post-9/11 era, othering through discourses of fear and ethnocentrism have been central to 
building support for the war on terror (Kam and Kinder 2007). Mass media, however, is not the 
only social institution involved in the framing of terrorism and use of fear in social life. Political 
leaders often shape and define the problem initially. Media then filters and further interprets their 
statements and presents these re-constitutions to the public (Chomsky and Herman 1988). Media 
has presented fear inducing messages from politicians to promote many social, legal, and 
political agendas in the United States including the “War on Drugs” (Inciardi and McElrath 
2015) and the USA PATRIOT Act (Altheide 2006). In this manner, leaders of social and 
political movements may invoke fear and construct moral panics which appeal to the values and 
beliefs of dominant social groups while also drawing on the group’s anxieties (Shoon, Meltzer, 
and Reese 2008). 
Racialization of Muslims 
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, increased attention to “Muslims” a previously 
overlooked group of recent immigrants has resulted in the racialization of a diverse group of 
people, who mostly originate in the Middle East and North Africa. Racialization refers to the 
social process by which new racial/ethnic groups are defined and set apart from other groups 
(Omi and Winant 1986, 1994, 2015). In this way, the defining of groups from the Middle East, 
North Africa, and South Asia as racialized “Muslims”, and the framing of Terrorism as 
“Muslim” violence constitutes a “Racial Project” as defined by Omi and Winant (1986, 1994, 
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2015). Racial projects are the activities that assign meaning to race, how racial constructs and 
ideas are used in language, thought, imagery, and interactions, and the process by which racial 
constructs and ideologies are reified and situated within social structures. Essentially, racial 
projects connect socially constructed meanings of race to the organization of society and day to 
day life along racial lines (ibid.) 
I argue, as have others, that Islamophobia in Western societies is racial in nature 
(Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Taras 2013). Some scholars have linked 
racialization to increases in the movement of population groups globally, which prompts 
reactions from dominant social groups in destination countries to maintain status (Gans 2017). 
Others have linked Islamophobic attitudes to specific political orientation in the US, specifically 
those who favor right-wing authoritarianism (Beck and Plant 2018). Additionally, scholars have 
found that Islamophobia plays on historical constructs of Orientalism, similar to how Jews were 
portrayed in Europe and the US in the early 20th Century (Skenderovic and Späti 2019).  
In the case of US and European Muslims, much of the increase in Islamophobia has 
occurred since the 1990’s, especially following the 9/11 attacks (Skenderovic and Späti 2019), 
when national security and law enforcement agencies around the world struggled to grapple with 
the fallout of those attacks (Nebhan 2017). Islamophobia is fundamentally a racial process 
(Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Constadine 2017; Garner and Selod 2015; Taras 2013), even 
if the intricacies of race, ethnicity, religion, racialization, and racism involved with Islamophobia 
are difficult to disentangle (Taras 2013), and not always based on skin color (Dunn, Klocker, and 
Salabay 2007; Galonnier 2015; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015). Despite the difficulties in 
disaggregating the intersection of race, ethnicity, and religion when studying Islamophobia other 
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scholars have emphasized that racialization theory is a good way to understand it (Garner and 
Selod 2015). 
While constructions of race and racism are central to Islamophobia, the relationship is 
complex, due to the diversity of Muslims in the real world. Anti-Muslim rhetoric plays on 
negative stereotypes of Islam, as well as perceptions of threat and inferiority (Dunn, Klocker, 
and Salabay 2007). The racialized perceptions that Muslims do not belong are not necessarily 
based on skin color, but many ethnic markers (ibid.) Additionally, Muslims are viewed less 
favorably and deserving of legal protections than other religious minorities in the west (Meer and 
Modood 2009). Instead they perceived more as a threat than a disadvantaged group (ibid.). 
Studies indicate that Muslims of many skin colors and nationalities experience discrimination 
across Western societies including the US (Galonnier 2015; Herda 2018; Mansson McGinty 
2020; Selod 2019), the UK (Moosavi 2015), Canada (Wilkins 2018), Ireland (Carrand Haynes 
2015), and Australia (Dunn, Klocker and Salabay 2007). 
Even white privilege appears to be unable to fully override Islamophobia (Selod 2015). 
While studies have found that whiteness can lend Muslim converts respectability, it is precarious 
in the face of the association between Islam and race (Moosavi 2015). This can also vary on 
social contexts. A study by (Galonnier 2015) comparing the experiences of white converts to 
Islam in the US and France found that French and American converts report different 
experiences with race, implying that the racialization of Muslims and the meanings attached to 
the intersection of race and religion vary in different social contexts. 
The Terrorism Label: Framing Mass Violence 
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Currently, through a variety of methods, the literature has established that after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 terrorism has been portrayed as the chief national security threat 
by US policymakers and media outlets (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; Papacharissi and 
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Norris et al 2003; Powell 2011; Woods 2007, 2011; Woods and 
Arthur 2014). Additionally, this body of literature has found that “terrorism” has become almost 
exclusively associated with Islamic radicals, and that counterterrorism policy has increasingly 
been discussed alongside domestic law enforcement and immigration policy (ibid). Survey data 
and some peer reviewed studies have also demonstrated that gender, age, media exposure, and 
geographical location are all significant predictors of individuals’ fear of terrorism (Brück and 
Müller 2010; Nellis 2009, Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 2008). 
Additionally, previous studies have suggested that societal elites and media coverage of 
terrorism may influence perceptions of risk more than actual terrorism incidents, similar to news 
coverage of crime (Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; 
Woods 2007). Furthermore, mass violence events with a higher number of casualties receive a 
greater amount of media attention (Lankford and Madfis 2018). White offenders are seldom 
discussed in terms of their race in news coverage of mass shooting events (Mingus and Zopf 
2010). However, news coverage over-emphasizes the race/ethnicity of non-white offenders 
(Chuang 2012; Mingus and Zopf 2010) and frames them in terms of their “foreignness” (ibid.) 
These studies do leave some substantial gaps. For example, these studies have mostly 
focused on narratives and how terrorism is linked ideologically driven portrayals groups. Little 
empirical research has explicitly investigated how individuals are portrayed as terrorists or non-
terrorists in mass media, and this research has overwhelmingly used analyses of print newspapers 
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to the neglect of other sources. These studies also typically equate race/ethnicity, 
religion/ideology, and foreignness or rely on one measure, i.e. adherence to the Muslim religion, 
as a proxy for all three concepts. I assert that this may be over-simplifying the relationship, 
although I also acknowledge that these concepts are difficult to disentangle in the real world. 
Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is used to convey a 
specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval (Kunda 1999). This 
specific threat has also been constantly framed as a “new” form of violence in US mass media 
(Norris et al. 2003). Similar to other crimes, terrorism is framed in a particular way in media 
communications. Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular sentiment associates 
terrorism almost exclusively with Islamic radicals, especially since the attacks of September 11, 
2001 (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 
2011). However, the majority of terrorist acts executed in the United States are committed by 
internal actors rather than foreign aggressors. The FBI classifies approximately two-thirds of all 
terrorist plots between 1980 and 2001 as “domestic.” That figure rose to 95 percent between 
2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005). 
The “terrorism” label has both broad and specific implications when it is applied. 
Altheide (2006) found that terrorism goes beyond a simple narrative, rather when an incident is 
labelled as terrorism, it becomes the “definition of the situation”. This framing of violence 
creates a sense that all Americans are potential victims of evil terrorists, and the military are 
portrayed as our protectors against terrorist violence. Terrorists are portrayed as faceless 
clandestine actors who strike from the shadows, as a foreign threat to our way of life, they use 
weapons of mass destruction, and are almost exclusively shown as Muslim radicals in the 
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modern era (Kunda 1999; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 
2011, 2014). The threat of terrorism is therefore both vague and specific at the same time, 
portrayed as a threatening outgroup, or an “other” which demands a swift military response. 
Media is the primary institution that conveys messages about risk to the public (Altheide 
2006, 2009), and television is still the preferred news medium for most Americans (Mitchell and 
Weisel 2016), with over half of US adults reporting that they often get news from television 
sources. The first part of this study will examine how suspected perpetrators of terrorism are 
portrayed in US news media using quantitative content analysis techniques. Specifically, I first 
generate a sample of terrorism suspects from a list of terrorism incidents in the United States 
with identifiable perpetrators as defined by the Global Terrorism Database. Then, with that list 
of names, I sample broadcast news transcripts from Lexis Nexus Academic that discuss the 
suspect and then code transcripts for use of the “terrorism” label, i.e. assigning a 0/1 value to a 
transcript. This allows me to test hypotheses about whether characteristics of the attack or the 
suspect predict the labelling of terrorism using multilevel modelling techniques, i.e. mixed-
effects logistic regression. Incidents are used as a clustering variable, and transcripts are the unit 
of analysis. I hypothesize that controlling for characteristics of an attack, a suspect’s ethnicity, 
immigration status, and religious/ideological affiliation will significantly predict use of the 
terrorism label by broadcast news programs. Additional coding is done for the number of times 
“terrorist” or “terrorism” are used in a transcript, whether a transcript mentions race, ethnicity, 
religion, or national origin of the offender. 
Previous research has found that since the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism has been 
associated almost exclusively with Radical Islam in the US news media (Altheide 2006, 2009; 
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Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2011). Inaccurate stereotypes 
regarding terrorism and terrorists have dominated political discussions and mass media, as well 
as public perceptions. A number of empirical studies in conjunction with official statistics have 
demonstrated that elements of Islamophobia, i.e. fear of Muslims as a constructed “other”, play 
an increasingly prominent role in shaping US discourse. A content analysis of US news coverage 
of terrorist incidents since 9/11 showed that media outlets consistently tried to attribute terrorist 
incidents to radical Islamic terrorist, even if this was not actually the case (Powell 2011). 
Additionally, previous studies have suggested that media coverage of terrorism may influence 
perceptions of risk more than actual terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime 
(Altheide 2006, 2009; Woods 2007). 
Another content analysis looked at US news media portrayal of politically violent groups 
that mostly target civilians across the globe (Nagar 2010). They found that Islamic groups were 
more likely to be labeled as terrorist groups, and that conservative-leaning sources are more 
likely to use this frame. Interestingly, they did not find a significant difference in rates of 
portrayal of terrorism before and after 9/11, suggesting that framing of terrorism over time in US 
news media has relied on the same stereotypes of terrorism. In contrast, a mixed-methods study 
compared framing of terrorism in two US based and two UK based newspapers showed that 
terrorism is consistently associated with al Qaeda, the September 11th attacks, national security, 
and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). 
 An experimental study by Woods (2011) tested the social-psychological effects of news 
media framing of terrorism, finding that news stories that associated terrorism with radical Islam 
resulted in higher perceived threat, increased fear, and feelings of dread than stories about 
82 
terrorism alone. In fact, terrorism not linked with radical Islam did not have any significant effect 
on perceptions of threat. A frame incorporating both radical Islamic terrorism and the threat of a 
nuclear attack provoked the highest level of fear and dread. This suggests that not only are 
incidents involving Islamic terrorism perceived as more threatening, but also that the type of 
attack and the scale of the attack also importantly influences the public’s perceptions and 
media’s framing of violence as terrorism. 
Data and Methods 
This study addresses when the “terrorist” frame is applied to suspects/perpetrators of 
mass violence, focusing only on incidents which occurred in the United States. To investigate 
this, I employ a quantitative content analysis of broadcast news transcripts from 1992-2016, 
exploring why certain violent perpetrators are framed as terrorists. Media is a key social 
institution in communicating risks to the public (Altheide 2006, 2009; Glassner 2009; Woods 
2007) and how violence is framed can influence the public’s perception of danger (Woods 2011). 
Sampling is limited to US media sources and will focus on incidents of mass violence considered 
terrorism by the Global Terrorism Database, an open source academic collection of terrorist 
incidents around the world from 1970-2018 run by the University of Maryland. This database 
includes a wide range of violent incidents such as mass shootings, bombings, arson, vehicular 
attacks, chemical/biological/nuclear attacks, etc. (GTD 2019). Incidents are coded to capture a 
variety of information on the incident including type of attack, casualties, characteristics of the 
suspect, and transcripts are coded for use of framing words such as ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’, 
whether the transcript discusses the suspects race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin. 
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A quantitative content analysis is not particularly different from a survey. In a traditional 
survey, the researcher creates a questionnaire and checks boxes based on the respondents’ 
answers to questions. In quantitative questionnaires, these questions are close-ended, and 
answers are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. In quantitative content analysis, the 
researcher creates a questionnaire using the same strategies and standards that they would use for 
any other survey. However, in this case the researcher checks boxes in the questionnaire based 
on the content of a document or communication (see Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 2005). 
Using a suspect-based approach to investigate media frames essentially means that search 
terms reference a particular individual who is believed to be involved in a terrorist attack. For 
example, search terms follow this style by using terms such as “Timothy McVeigh” or “Rizwan 
Farook”. Currently, most studies of framing terrorism have focused on the processes of 
developing frames – i.e. the social construction of the terrorism frame and the processes and 
motivations for framing terrorism in a particular way. Alternatively, studies of how the terrorism 
frame is deployed have focused on when groups/organizations and general ideological 
motivations are framed as terrorism by news media. Expanding the framing of terrorism 
literature, my content analysis focuses on the social characteristics of specific offenders rather 
than a group or organizational analysis. Moreover, this study examines the characteristics of 
attacks, such as weapons used, and targets chosen and their effect on how violence is framed as 
terrorism – or not. This study also incorporates a new data source – broadcast news transcripts - 
as previous studies tend to focus only on major newspapers. This is particularly important, as in 
the 21st century, newspaper readership has significantly declined and most people get their news 
from television, with social media rapidly increasing as a primary news source (see Mitchell, 
Gottfried, Barthel, and Shearer 2017; Mitchell, Holcomb, and Weisel 2017). Analysis uses 
84 
mixed-effects logistic regression techniques to model the effects of suspect race/ethnicity place 
of birth, and religious/ideological affiliation on the use of the term(s) “Terrorism” “Terror 
Attack(s)”, or “Terrorist(s)” in broadcast news transcripts, while controlling for characteristics of 
the attacks and the transcripts. 
Data Sources 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collects detailed information about terrorist 
incidents, and currently includes over 100,000 incidents worldwide. Data is collected on the 
perpetrators, attack type, weapons used, target, location, date, casualties, and more. This also 
includes a description of the event, and up to three news stories referencing the incident. 
Sampling cast the widest net possible while still using strict criteria for inclusion. This not only 
provides us with a variety of attacks which differ greatly in style and execution, but also provides 
a firm null  
The GTD defines terrorism as “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by 
a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation” (START 2017). Within this blanket definition, the GTD also specifies that the 
act must be intentional, must involve some level of violence or threat of violence against persons 
or property, and that perpetrators must be sub-national actors5. In addition, the GTD includes 
three criteria which can be required or not, allowing for researchers to specify the strictness of 
their definitions: 
1. The act must be aimed at pursuing political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
 
5 For more information, see the Global Terrorism Database Codebook at 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf 
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2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to 
a larger audience than the immediate victims. 
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. 
It is evident that this definition can include many incidents which are not clearly defined as 
terrorism. One of the main problems researchers of terrorism face is the ambiguous nature of the 
variable, which frequently overlaps with hate crimes, organized crime, and insurgencies. For the 
purposes of this research, only incidents which occurred within the United States from 1992-
2016, which meet all terrorism criteria, and are considered “successful” attacks6 were sampled. 
These search criteria include diverse incidents from the1995 Oklahoma City bombing, to the 
2009 Fort Hood Shooting, to the September 11th Hijackings.  
Nexus UNI (hereafter NU) Is a collection of published documents which can be search and 
retrieved for use in academic research. Lexis Nexus Academic allows users to search print news 
articles and broadcast news transcripts from around the world. Sampling is possible by searching 
for keywords in broadcast news transcripts section, focusing on major network and cable news 
programs, such as NBC, CNN, FOX News, etc. 
Sampling 
Sampling for the second phase of this study will occur in two stages and involves a 
hybrid cluster sampling and stratified sampling technique. The first stage involves sampling from 
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The first stage also records clustering variables such as 
incident and suspect characteristics. To be included in the analysis, and incident must: 1. Have 
 
6 For more information on advanced search criteria, see the Global Terrorism Database at 
www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
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occurred in the United States between 1992 and 2016; 2. appear in the GTD; 3. have resulted in 
at least one casualty; 4. meet all three GTD criteria for classification as “terrorism”, 5. include 
description(s) of an identifiable suspect(s). This sampling stage yielded 57 incidents with 65 
suspects for inclusion. The second sampling stage involves searching suspects’ names in Nexus 
Uni (NU), and then recording transcripts in a stratified according to seven broadcast news 
organizations. To be included in the final sample, a suspect’s name must appear in at least one 
broadcast news transcript from a major network – i.e. ABC, CBS, CNN, FOX, MSNBC, NBC, 
and PBS – returned by the NU search engine. Transcripts are then coded for their use of the 
“terrorism” frame. It is notable that the September 11, 2001 attacks were intentionally excluded 
from this analysis. Some sociologists have argued that these attacks now constitute the “ideal 
type” of terrorism (see Black 2004, Weber 1945). Table 3.1 below describes variables collected 




Table 3.1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Incident Characteristics Suspect Characteristics Transcript Characteristics 
Number of People Killed (mean = 
6.32, SD = 22.90, range = 0-168, 
skewness = 6.46) 
 
Primary Weapon Type 
Firearms (coded 1, 61.40%) 
Explosives/Incendiary (coded 2, 
19.30%) 
Vehicle (coded 3, 5.26%) 
Melee (coded 4, 10.53%) 
Other (coded 5, 3.51%) 
 
Year (range = 1992-2016) 
Susp. Race/Ethnicity 
White (coded 1, 52.31%) 
Black (coded 2, 18.46%) 
MENA (coded 3, 27.69%) 
Asian (coded 4, 1.54%) 
 
Susp. Place of Birth 
US Born (coded 0, 70.77%) 
Foreign Born (coded 1, 29.23%) 
 
Susp. Ideology 
Radical Islam (coded 1, 47.69%) 
Far-Right (coded 2, 43.08%) 
Far-Left (coded 3, 6.15%) 
Other (coded 4, 3.08%) 
 
Sex 
Male (coded 0, 95.38) 
Female (coded 1, 4.62) 
News Organization 
ABC (coded 1, 17.63%) 
CBS (coded 2, 18.27%) 
CNN (coded 3, 20.19%) 
FOX News (coded 4, 12.50%) 
MSNBC (coded 5, 10.26%) 
NBC (coded 6, 12.82%) 
PBS (coded 7, 8.33%) 
 
About Incident 
No (coded 0, 14.42%) 
Yes (coded 1, 85.58%) 
 
Expert Guest 
No (coded 0, 59.94%) 
Yes (coded 1, 40.06%) 
 
Use of Terror Frame 
No (coded 0, 47.12%) 
Yes (coded 1, 52.88%) 
 
N = 57 N = 65 N = 312 
 
Bivariate Analysis 
Bivariate analyses used to test association of variables found that many measures do appear 
to be associated with the use of the “terror frame” in broadcast news transcripts. Figures 3.1 
through 3.6 chart these relationships. Chi-squared and Pearson’s r test results are reported as 
well. Figures 3.1-3.3 examines the relationship between characteristics of the attack and use of 
the terror frame. All variables showed statistically significant relationships. Specifically, the type 
of weapon used in the incident (p<.001) is significantly associated with use of the terror frame in 
a Chi2 test. It appears that attacks using explosives, vehicles, and melee attacks are discussed 
with the terror frame more frequently. Additionally, both the number of people killed in the 
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incident (r=.16, p<.01) and the year in which the incident took place (r=.17, p<.01) are weakly 
and positively correlated with use of the terror frame. This means that incidents which result in a 
higher number of deaths and incidents which occurred more recently are more frequently 
discussed with the terror frame in broadcast news transcripts. 









Figure 3.3 Use of Terror Frame by Incident Characteristics (Year) 1992-2016 
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Figures 3.4-3.6 charts the relationship between characteristics of the transcripts 
themselves and use of the terror frame, which are used as control variables in multivariate 
models. Results of Chi2 tests are reported. Whether the transcript is about the incident or not 
about the incident (p<.05) – i.e. less than 10% of transcript discusses the incident – is 
significantly associated with use of the terror frame. Specifically, it appears that when transcripts 
are about the incident, they more frequently use the terror frame. Whether or not the transcript 
featured and expert guest (p<.001) is also significantly associated with use of the terror frame. 
Differences in use of the terror frame by news organization (p=.243) was also tested but does not 
reveal a significant relationship. 
 




Figure 3.5 Use of Terror Frame by Transcript Characteristics (Expert Guest) 1992-2016 
 
 




Figures 3.7-3.9 chart characteristics of suspects and the use of the terror frame in 
broadcast news transcripts. The results of Chi2 tests are reported. The suspect’s race/ethnicity 
(p<.001) is significantly associated with use of the terror frame. Specifically, it appears that the 
terror frame is used more frequently when suspects are Black and Middle Eastern/North African 
(MENA). The suspects place of birth (p<.001) is also significantly associated with use of the 
terror frame. Specifically, it appears that foreign born suspects are discussed with the terror 
frame more frequently than US born suspects. Finally, the suspect’s ideological affiliation is also 
significantly related to use of the terror frame (p<.001). Specifically, transcripts more frequently 
us the terror frame if the suspect has a Radical Islamic ideology/motivation compared to Far-
Right, Far-Left, and Other ideologies. 
 




Figure 3.8 Use of Terror Frame by Suspect Characteristics (Place of Birth) 1992-2016 
 
 




Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Analysis (Multilevel Modelling) 
This analysis uses mixed-effects logistic regressions with a random intercept on the 
incident in order to estimate the effect of predictor variables on use of the terrorist/terrorism 
frame in broadcast news media transcripts. Because of the complicated, clustered nature of the 
data, a traditional logit model is not sufficient to estimate effects. Logistic regression is 
commonly used in social research and is appropriate for models which use a categorical 
dependent variable such as use of terrorism. These models report the logged odds (L) of the 
likelihood of a particular category of the dependent variable being selected. 
Li = ln[P(yi = 1)/P(yi = 0)] 
The logged odds that y = 1 for the ith observation are subsequently estimated as a linear 
function of independent variables. β0 represents the model’s Y-intercept, while β1X1i ; β2X2i  ; etc. 
represent X-variable predictors. This portion of the model describes the fixed-effects, or the 
value of Y as a function of X1, X2, etc. effects that are the same for all groups. The addition of the 
random intercept U0j term allows for the possibility that the mean level of y is systematically 
higher or lower among some groups. 
Li = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i  + … + βmXmi + U0j 
Null Hypothesis: All attacks can be considered terrorism by GTD definitions- therefore, 
controlling for incident characteristics, we should not expect to find significant differences in use 
of the terrorist frame in broadcast news media. 
Alternative Hypothesis: Controlling for characteristics of the incident and differences 
between transcripts, characteristics of the suspects such as race/ethnicity, place of birth, and 
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ideological affiliation will significantly predict use of the terrorist frame in broadcast news 
media. 
Essentially, this is to say that based on previous scholarship, I expect to find significant 
bias in news transcripts use of the “terrorism frame” based on the suspects’ apparent 
race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideological affiliation, even when accounting for factors such 
as the number of people killed, the type of weapon used when the incident occurred. Specifically, 
I hypothesize that transcripts will be more likely to use the “terrorism frame” is the suspect is 
ethnically Middle Eastern/North African (MENA), foreign born, or associated with radical Islam 
compared to suspects who are White, US born, and associated with other ideologies – for the 
same behaviors. 
Results 
This analysis attempts to disentangle the related measures of suspect race/ethnicity, place of 
birth, and ideological affiliation. This proves to be a difficult task, and post results analyses 
reveal the need for a re-coding of race/ethnicity and ideology variables. Table 3.2 presents multi-
level logistic regression results. Table 3.3 presents a crosstabulation of binary race/ethnicity and 
ideology measures, which are then used to recode race/ethnicity and ideology into a three-
category variable, which is used to compare suspects who are not MENA, but associated with 
Radical Islam, and people who are MENA and associated with Radical Islam to other suspect 
who are neither MENA or associated with Radical Islam. 
First, I begin with the analysis in Table 3.2, which shows results from 4 different mixed-
effects logistic regressions. Models test whether the suspect’s characteristics, especially 
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race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideological affiliation, significantly predict use of the terror 
frame in broadcast news transcripts, even when controlling for characteristics of the incidents 
and transcripts. Model 1 tests the suspect’s race/ethnicity, Model 2 tests the suspect’s place of 
birth, Model 3 tests the suspect’s ideological affiliation, and Model 4 tests all variables together. 
Incident ID numbers are used a grouping variable (N = 312; Groups = 57). Figures 3.4-3.6 




Table 3.2 Predictors of Use of Terror Frame in Broadcast News Transcripts: Mixed-
Effects Logistic Regression with a Random Intercept – Odds Ratios Reported 
 Model 1 - OR(SE) Model 2 - OR(SE) Model 3 - OR(SE) Model 4 - OR(SE) 
About 2.67(1.44) 2.44(1.31) 2.48(1.28) 2.63(1.40) 
Year 1.08(0.04)* 1.08(0.04)* 1.06(0.03) 1.05(0.03) 
Expert Guest 6.47(2.49)*** 6.70(2.61)*** 7.01(2.77)*** 7.06(2.79)*** 
Num. Killed 1.03(0.03) 1.05(0.05) 1.02(0.02) 1.03(0.02) 
Weapon Used     
Firearms - - - - 
Explosives 4.56(3.18)* 2.15(1.56) 2.74(1.60) 2.17(1.34) 
Vehicle 18.81(19.38)** 13.69(15.18)* 8.92(7.77)* 9.08(8.05)* 
Melee 6.97(6.34)* 10.22(9.73)* 2.66(1.95) 2.21(1.73) 
Other 5.24(7.01) 2.90(4.14) 26.15(39.63)* 34.51(57.20)* 
Susp. Race     
White - - - - 
Black 5.03(3.38)* - - 0.84(0.76) 
MENA 8.41(5.11)*** - - 0.39(0.35) 
Asian 0.28(0.52) - - 3.21(5.80) 
Susp. Nat’l     
US Born - - - - 
Foreign Born - 5.74(3.54)** - 1.13(0.59) 
Susp. Ideology     
Radical Islam - - - - 
Far-Right - - 0.07(0.03)*** 0.04(0.03)*** 
Far-Left - - 0.06(0.05)*** 0.04(0.03)*** 
Other - - 0.01(0.02)** 0.01(0.01)** 













1.07(0.28) 1.27(0.28) 0.64(0.29) 0.60(0.30) 
LR Test vs 
Fixed Effects 
.000 .000 .073 .097 
 N = 312 
Groups = 57 
N = 312 
Groups = 57 
N = 312 
Groups = 57 
N = 312 
Groups = 57 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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In model 1, the year in which the incident occurred, appearance of an expert guest, weapon 
type and race/ethnicity of the suspect are all statistically significant predictors of the use of the 
“terrorism frame”. With each additional year, the odds that a transcript will use the terrorism 
frame increase about 8 percent (multiplied by 1.08, p<.05) showing that the terrorism label is 
more commonly used in recent years. The inclusion of an expert guest in a broadcast news 
transcript increases the odds that the terrorism frame will be used in a transcript by 547 percent 
(multiplied by 6.47, p<.001) compared to transcripts that do not include an expert guest. The 
number of people killed did not significantly predict use of the terrorism frame. The type of 
weapon used did significantly predict use of the terrorism frame. Compared to attacks which 
primarily used firearms, an attack that used explosive or incendiary weapon(s) increased the odds 
of using the terrorism frame by 365 percent (multiplied by 4.56, p<.05), an attack which used 
vehicle(s) increased the odds of using the terrorism frame by 1781 percent (multiplied by 18.81, 
p<.01), and melee attacks increased the odds of using the terrorism frame by 597 percent 
(multiplied by 6.97, p<.05). Other attacks did not significantly predict use of the terrorism frame. 
Finally, the suspect’s apparent race/ethnicity did significantly predict use of the terrorism frame. 
Compared to transcripts about white suspects, transcripts about Black suspects increase the odds 
of using the terrorism frame by about 403 percent (multiplied by 5.03, p<.05), and transcripts 
about MENA suspects increase the odds of using the terrorism frame by about 741 percent, 
(multiplied by 8.41, p<.001). 
In model 2, the effect of suspects’ place of birth is assessed along with control variables 
instead of suspects’ race/ethnicity. Again, year is a significant predictor of use of the terrorist 
frame (p<.05), adding an additional year increases the odds of transcripts using the terrorism 
frame by 1.08. Also, having an expert guest on the transcript increases the odds of using the 
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terror frame by about 570 percent (multiplied by 6.70, p<.001). Neither whether the transcript is 
about the incident or the number of people killed had statistically significant effect in model 2. 
The type of weapon used again predicted use of the terrorism frame. Compared to attacks using 
firearms, vehicular attacks increased the odds of using the terrorist frame by about 1269 percent 
(multiplied by 13.69, p<.05), and melee attacks increased the odds of using the terrorist frame by 
about 922 percent (multiplied by 10.22, p<.05). Neither explosive/incendiary attacks or other 
attacks were significantly different from firearm attacks in model 2. Finally, compared to 
suspects who are US-born, suspects who are foreign-born increase the odds of transcripts using 
the terrorism frame by about 474 percent (multiplied by 5.74, p<.01). In both model 1 and model 
2, the group-level random effects, in this case incidents, are statistically significant. This means 
that in these models, there are significant differences between incidents not explained by the 
variables included in the models. 
Model 3 tests the effect of suspects’ ideological affiliation on use of the terrorism frame 
along with control variables. In model 3, whether the transcript is about the incident, the year 
that the incident took place in, and the number of people killed in the incident do not 
significantly predict use of the terror frame. The presence of an expert guest on a transcript is 
still significant (p<.001), increasing the odds of the transcript using the terror frame by about 601 
percent (multiplied by 7.01). The weapon used also still significantly predict use of the terror 
frame. Compared to firearm attacks, vehicular attacks (multiplied by 8.92, p<.05) and other 
attacks (multiplied by 26.1, p<.05) both increased the odds of transcripts using the terrorism 
frame. Explosive/incendiary attacks and melee attacks did not significantly predict use of the 
terror frame compared to firearm attacks in model 3. Suspect ideology did significantly predict 
use of the terror frame. Compared to suspects with radical Islamic ideologies, suspects with far-
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right ideologies (multiplied by 0.07, p<.001), far-left ideologies (multiplied by 0.06, p<.001), 
and suspects with Other ideologies (multiplied by 0.01, p<.001) all decreased the odds of the 
terror frame being used by broadcast news transcripts. Figures 3.10-3.12 chart the probabilities 
of a transcript using the “terrorism” frame by suspect characteristics in models 1-3. Interestingly, 
when accounting for suspect ideology, the group-level random effects are no longer statistically 
significant. 
Figure 3.10 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Suspect Race/Ethnicity 
with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 1) 
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Figure 3.11 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Place of Birth with 95% 
Confidence Intervals (Model 2) 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Suspect Ideology with 95% 
Confidence Intervals (Model 3) 
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Model 4 then combines all variables tested in models 1 through 3, assessing the effect of 
suspects’ race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideology on use of the terrorism frame together with 
control variables. In model 4, the presence of an expert guest increases the odds of transcripts 
using the terror frame by about 606 percent (multiplied by 7.06, p<.001). The type of weapon 
used also significantly predicts use of the terror frame. Compared to firearm attacks, both 
vehicular attacks (multiplied by 9.08, p<.05) and Other attacks (multiplied by 34.51, p<.05) 
increased the odds of use of the terror frame. Explosive/incendiary attacks and melee attacks 
were not significantly different from firearm attacks in model 4. Additionally, whether the 
transcript was about the incident, the year in which the incident occurred, and the number of 
people killed in the incident are not statistically significant in model 4. As for suspect 
characteristics, when race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideology are all included together, the 
only variable which significantly predicts use of the terrorism frame is suspects’ ideology. 
Suspects with radical Islamic ideologies are more likely to have the terrorist label used in a news 
transcript, and this mediates the effects of the suspects’ race/ethnicity and place of birth. 
Specifically, compared to suspects with radical Islamic ideologies, suspects with far-fight 
ideologies (multiplied by 0.04, p<.001), far-left ideologies (multiplied by 0.04, p<.001), and 
Other ideologies (multiplied by 0.01, p<.001) all decrease the odds of transcripts using the 
terrorism frame, net of all other variables. Again, when accounting for suspect ideology, the 
group-level random effects are no longer statistically significant. Essentially, accounting for 
ideology/religion makes all the difference, and there are no longer significant differences 
between incidents beyond what is accounted for in the model. 
The mediation of both the effect of race/ethnicity and place of birth is unexpected, however 
due to the high overlap in these categories, i.e. all MENA suspects are also associated with 
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radical Islam, the independent effects of these variables could be masked in this multivariate 
relationship. Sensitivity to model specification is addressed by refining how measures are 
estimated in regression models. Two additional analyses were performed as well: a 
crosstabulation using “streamlined” binary variables for race/ethnicity (1 = MENA; 0 = Other), 




The crosstabulation results reveal that the suspect’s race/ethnicity and ideology significantly 
related (Chi2=112.32, p<.001). In particular, the table notes that all 78 cases where the suspect is 
MENA are also associated with Radical Islam. The number of cases involving not-MENA 
suspects are split between ideologies of radical Islam (N = 72) and other ideologies (N = 162), 
and cases involving suspects associated with radical Islam are almost evenly split between 
MENA (N = 78) and suspects of other race/ethnicities (N = 72). The absence of cases in the 
MENA/Not-Radical Islam category (N = 0) is likely concealing any independent effect that the 
suspects’ race/ethnicity may have on use of the terrorism label by broadcast news media when 
suspect ideology is also accounted for in the regression analyses in Table 3.2. In short, the 
operationalization and specification of race, ethnicity, and religion/ideology is particularly tricky. 




Radical Islam Total  
Not-MENA 
 
162 72 234  
MENA 
 
0 78 78  
Total 
 
162 150 312  
Pearson Chi2 = 112.32 p<.001  
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Discussion 
The overall focus of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which socially constructed 
meanings applied to similar behaviors at different times and places affect the public’s 
perceptions of mass violence. What it is, how it affects individuals and society, how individuals 
and social institutions respond to perceived violence all differ greatly by which label is used to 
describe the incident. Who is a terrorist? Based on previous literature, the “terrorist” is portrayed 
most commonly as a “Muslim” man who is foreign, appears Middle Eastern, and is motivated by 
radical Islamic ideology. 
There is research suggesting that characteristics of the attack may influence whether or 
not an event is labelled as terrorism, for which I find mixed support. This chapter does not 
necessarily find support for studies that have suggested that mass violence events with a higher 
number of casualties receive a greater amount of media attention (Lankford and Madfis 2018). 
At least, I find that events with greater casualties are not more likely to be called terrorist attacks. 
Interestingly, I find support for Altheide’s (2006; 2017) finding that the use of “experts” is a key 
part of communicating the terrorist threat to the public. In this chapter, I find that when a news 
program features an “expert” guest, the incident is more likely to be framed as terrorism. There is 
also a suggestion in the literature that terrorists are perceived as using explosives or 
unconventional weapons (Woods 2011), for which I also find some support. Specifically, when 
suspects use weapons other than firearms, they are more likely to be labelled as terrorists. 
Western societies and the antagonism felt toward Islam and Muslims is racial in nature 
(Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Taras 2013). I find support for the 
assertions that in the case of US, much of the increase in Islamophobia has occurred since the 
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1990’s, especially following the 9/11 attacks (Skenderovic and Späti 2019), and that 
Islamophobia is racially based (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Constadine 2017; Garner and 
Selod 2015; Taras 2013). The interaction of race, ethnicity, religion, racialization, and racism 
involved with Islamophobia are difficult to disentangle (Taras 2013), and I do find support for 
this. In my analysis, race/ethnicity, birthplace, and religion/ideology are all significantly 
associated with use of the terrorist label in news transcripts. Interestingly, these measures seem 
to act as a proxy for the construct of “Muslim”. Despite the difficulties in disaggregating the 
intersection of race, ethnicity, and religion when studying Islamophobia, I agree with scholars 
who assert that racialization theory is appropriate way to understand the framing of Muslims as 
terrorists (Garner and Selod 2015). 
The strongest findings in this chapter are that the application of the terrorist label is 
racially biased. Some research has found that in mass murder events, white offenders are seldom 
discussed in terms of their race in news coverage (Mingus and Zopf 2010). News coverage also 
over-emphasizes the race/ethnicity and “foreignness” of non-white offenders (Chuang 2012; 
Mingus and Zopf 2010). I do find support for this in my analyses of broadcast news transcripts. 
Non-white and foreign-born suspects are more likely to be labelled as terrorists, than white and 
US-born suspects. However, whiteness does not shield a suspect from the “terrorism” label if 
they are associated with Islam. This chapter finds evidence that “Muslims” have been racialized 
in the US – though this is not based entirely on nationality or skin color. Islamophobia plays on 
historical constructs of Orientalism, similar to how Jews were portrayed in Europe and the US in 
the early 20th Century (Skenderovic and Späti 2019). White privilege appears to meet its limit 
when an individual is associated with Islam, which has also been found by other researchers 
(Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015). 
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Both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern Muslims are more likely to be called 
terrorists than their non-Muslim counterparts. The effect is larger for non-Middle Eastern 
Muslims. This could be due to an implicit assumption that Middle Eastern suspects are 
“terrorists”, whereas suspects of other racial/ethnic backgrounds could have been committing 
another type of crime – hence clarification is needed. These suspects are Muslim, ergo they are 
still terrorists in the eyes of the public, despite lacking the Middle Eastern appearance. Another 
explanation is that Middle Eastern suspects may be presumed to have a motivation for 
committing terrorism. However non-Middle Eastern suspects engaging in the same behavior 
might be considered particularly abnormal – again requiring clarification from news media 
reporting on the incidents. 
It is true that whites and non-whites clearly have different lived experiences and media 
constructions in the US. Consequently, we should understand the “Muslim” lived experience to 
be distinct from whiteness as well, at least in popular discourse, regardless of skin color. The 
data analyzed in this chapter provides evidence that “Muslims” are not considered to meet the 
cultural standards of “whiteness” in the US today. Analysis of media coverage of terrorism 
suspects reveals that even when a white person adopts Muslim ethnic markers, they find 
themselves facing the same media construction as a non-white Muslim.  
Additionally, I assert that markers of “Muslim” racialization include an association with 
terrorism. Prior research demonstrated that when a mass shooter is white, media rarely discusses 
their race. Consequently, when a mass shooter is non-white, media over-emphasizes the 
suspect’s race in their reporting. There are precedents for defining religious groups as “races” in 
US history, particularly when considering how Jews were portrayed in the early 20th Century. I 
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find parallels in social trends primarily occurring in the early 21st Century, to “Orientalism” of 
earlier eras in this chapter. Other research found that while white converts to Islam can still 
benefit from greater respect in society, their whiteness is precarious, and they can lose some of 
the benefits of their whiteness. My research finds that, at least in news reporting about terrorism 
suspects, association with Islam essentially “revokes” a suspect’s whiteness. 
The case of conspiracy theories about President Obama’s religion and birthplace provide 
a very visible example of the racialization of Muslims and Islamophobia is in. Race was a 
constant factor in Obamas candidacy and Presidency (Fraser 2009). President Obama is often 
cited as the first Black President (ibid.). Although his father was a black Kenyan, he can equally 
claim white parentage from his mother. Narratives about Obama’s race shifted throughout his 
campaign and Presidency but always portrayed a “foreignness” that was presumed to be 
threatening to white voters. During the 2008 Presidential campaign, a right-wing conspiracy 
theory emerged that Barack Obama was secretly Muslim (Layman et al 2014). This is easily 
disproven, as Barack Obama to practice a Christian faith, and was also controversially his 
association with Reverend Jeremiah Wright (McKenzie 2011). Another far-right conspiracy 
theory which gained traction during Obama’s Presidency claims that Obama was not born in the 
United States (Hughley 2012), also known as the Birther movement. These conspiracy theories 
about race and foreignness endure, despite plain evidence that Obama is a Christian, and natural 
born citizen. These claims, however, do not come from a place of good faith (Hughley 2012). 
President Obama’s multiracial heritage is largely the unspoken motivation for these conspiracy 
theories which were embraced by conservatives (Hughley 2012; Layman et al 2014). 
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The previous chapter demonstrated the agenda setting power of the President and news 
media. I found that the public is more concerned about terrorism as a problem when more 
Presidential remarks and news media stories discuss terrorism as a topic. This chapter 
demonstrates that the content of those news stories is racially biased, and more likely to portray 
“Muslims” as terrorists than non-Muslims for the same behavior. The following chapter analyses 
how selective exposure to media messages influences an individual’s fear of a terrorist attack 
compared to a mass shooting, assuming that the labels have different connotations and racial 
meaning attached to them. 
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CHAPTER IV. COMPARING PUBLIC FEAR OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
TO PUBLIC FEAR OF MASS SHOOTINGS 
 
During the 2016 Presidential Campaign the threats and realities of extreme violence in the 
United States – particularly terrorist attacks and mass shooting incidents – took a prominent role 
in candidates’ policy platforms. My dissertation investigates whether members of the public are 
more likely to worry about a terrorist attack or a mass shooting based on their media 
consumption habits and political beliefs. I also specifically account for indicators that are known 
to be associated with individuals’ fear of violent crime victimization. Specifically, I use data 
from the Fall 2017 Granite State Poll to test how selective exposure to partisan mass media 
predicts individuals’ expressed fears of being victimized in either a terrorist attack or a mass 
shooting, while controlling for individual characteristics, including background factors, and prior 
political leanings. I argue that fear of terrorism and fear of mass shootings is not only a response 
to violence, but also to the politics, messages, and meanings that surround events of extremist 
violence. 
The rise to prominence of the group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL in 2014, and 
attacks carried out in 2015 and 2016 by ISIL-trained individuals in Europe and ISIL-inspired 
individuals in the US reignited public concerns of terrorist violence in the US. In combination 
with the refugee migrant crisis in the Middle East and Europe precipitated by the escalation of 
the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars, terrorism, immigration, and gun violence emerged as wedge 
issues during the 2016 US election cycle (Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2016). This 
culminated in then-candidate Donald Trump proposing a “total ban” on Muslims entering the 
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United State following the ISIL-Inspired San Bernardino, CA attack in December 2015, and the 
eventual signing of Executive Order 13769 in January 2017.  
Throughout the 2016 Presidential campaign, Donald Trump espoused a view that foreign 
terrorist organizations, immigrants broadly, and Muslims in particular, are a threat to the US 
homeland and the American way of life. Winning the Presidency using racially charged language 
equating Muslims and other non-White immigrants as dangerous criminals and leveraging the 
US public’s fear of victimization in ISIL-inspired attacks, the Trump administration has 
subsequently pursued many controversial policies in the US and abroad under the guise of 
combatting terrorism and enacting immigration control. These policies include the “Muslim 
Ban” and southern border wall. 
Conversely, candidate Hillary Clinton emphasized gun control policies as a means to curb 
mass shootings, an issue which became central to the democratic candidate’s platform (Albertson 
and Kushner Gadarian 2016; Brogan et al 2020). Incidents of mass violence which occurred 
during the 2016 campaign season – such as the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, FL and 
attack on police officers at a Black Lives Matter rally in Dallas, TX – provoked very different 
responses from candidates Trump and Clinton according to news sources at the time (Chozick et 
al 2016; Nelson, Lind, and Golshan 2016). This culminated in the 2016 Democratic Convention, 
which included victims of the Orlando shooting speaking on gun control policy. Clearly, each 
candidate conceptualized the danger facing US society in 2016 differently and thus 
communicated distinct messages about the threat posed by violent extremists to the US public. 
They also proposed opposing solutions to combatting the alleged problem(s), i.e. a “Muslim 
Ban” versus and “Assault Weapon” ban.  
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These divergent views on the nature of extremist threats – and the solutions to fighting 
them – are not new but have been promoted to the US public through mass media outlets for 
decades. Political elites and news media both play a central role in shaping the discussion 
surrounding incidents such as terrorism or mass shootings, and subsequently influencing public 
opinion (Altheide 2006, 2009; Woods 2007). In media conversations about terrorism, Islamic 
radical groups such as Al Qaeda have dominated the thoughts of politicians and media narratives 
alike (Kunda 1999; Norris et al 2003; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; 
Woods 2011, 2014). Consequently, “radical Islam” and “terrorism” have become practically 
interchangeable terms in the US discourse (ibid). Combatting these groups has been the primary 
justification for the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US 
forces in the Middle East (LaFree 2009). All of this came to a head again in 2016. 
In this chapter, I examine the effect that this politicking around mass violence – and the 
promotion of particular in partisan mass media – have on the US public, who play an important 
role in selecting the country’s leadership? To assess this question, I include measured of 
individuals’ vote cast in the 2016 Presidential election (i.e. Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton), 
and how frequently individuals watch local TV news, listen to National Public Radio, and listen 
to Conservative Talk Radio to predict how worried respondents are about victimization in a 
terrorist attack or in a mass shooting. Additionally, I account for background characteristics of 
sex and age which have previously been shown to predict individuals’ fear of violent crime 
victimization, as well as lifestyle factors of gun ownership and religious attendance. 
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Terrorism and the Politics of Fear 
The traditional fear of crime literature has consistently found that certain sociodemographic 
factors are associated with fear of crime victimization – i.e. women and older people are more 
fearful of crime than men and younger people (Akers et al 1987, Callanan and Teasdale 2009, 
Franklin and Franklin 2009, Henson and Reyns 2015, Lagrange and Ferraro 1989, Rader and 
Haynes 2011, Reid and Konrad 2004, Smith and Torstensson 1997, Stafford and Galle 1984, 
Warr 1984). Although these findings are consistent in the empirical literature, theoretical 
explanations about these findings are still debated. It has been proposed that women and older 
people feel less able to defend themselves against violent crime, and therefore feel more 
vulnerable and report being more fearful (Henson and Reyns 2015, Smith and Torstensson 1997, 
Warr 1984). Additionally, some scholars have asserted that women in particular are fearful of 
sexual assault and related crimes, and therefore express more fear about crime generally (see 
Henson and Reyns 2015, Reid and Konrad 2004), although this explanation is rejected by some 
scholars (Franklin and Franklin 2009). Finally, it has been proposed that through gender 
socialization women are more likely to express emotions such as fear and are therefore more 
likely to articulate fear of crime (Rader and Haynes 2011). The fear of crime literature has also 
examined the role of community factors, gun ownership, and media consumptions in predicting 
fear of crime (Adams and Serpe 2000, Callanan 2012, Carvalho and Lewis 2003, Chiricos, 
Padgett, and Gertz 2000, Custers and Van den Bulck 2011, Glassner 2009, Hartnagel 1979, 
Kohm 2009, Holbert, Shah and Kwak 2004, Williams and Dickinson 1993). 
This literature is not sufficient to explain fear of a terrorist attack or fear of a mass shooting. 
Women and older people may be less able to resist or defend themselves in these events, but only 
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marginally compared to others when considering terrorist attacks and/or mass shootings. Because 
of the extreme and unpredictable nature of this violence, and the frequent public settings, it is 
unlikely that factors such as sex or age would greatly influence a victim’s ability to protect 
themselves. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that mass violence perpetrators are more 
likely to select women or older people as targets due to this perceived vulnerability. Some 
exceptions may exist with recent “incel” attacks, however these occurred after the Fall 2017 
survey data used in this study. 
In general, humans are not adept at assessing risks objectively. This is especially true for 
high-impact, low-probability events (Woods 2007). On the other hand, discrepancies between 
public perceptions and objective risks as assessed by experts has been observed on a multitude of 
issues. The general public often lacks information about topics, or even rejects evidence that 
disagrees with core beliefs. In some cases, experts may be distrusted by segments of the public. 
This has been demonstrated in research about public trust in the science of vaccines and climate 
change. Public perceptions of crime rates and prevalence of violent offenses are also frequently 
out of line with what official statistics reflect, terrorism and mass shootings being misunderstood 
in a similar vein. 
To fully understand the fear of terrorism and the fear of mass shootings, I turn to David 
Altheide’s (2006, 2017) Terrorism and the Politics of Fear, which outlines the social process by 
which politicians and mass media create propaganda and leverage the public’s assumptions about 
risk and danger to pursue and win political office, enact policy objectives, and sell products. This 
work forms the theoretical backbone of this project. The existing literature in this area has 
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focused mostly on media effects, however quantitative investigations of the public’s views and 
behaviors in response to mass media and politics have not been extensively studied. 
Defining and Measuring Terrorism and Mass Shootings 
There is debate about whether incidents of mass violence such as terrorist attacks and mass 
shootings have increasing in frequency and severity in the US in recent years. According to a 
study done by the FBI, the number of “active shooter” events increased by an average of 16 
percent annually in the US between 2000 and 2013 (Blair and Schweit 2014). Data available 
from the Global Terrorism Database also show approximately a 32 percent average annual 
increase in the number of terrorist incidents in the US from 2001 to 2017 (START 2019). 
However, it is important to note that the overall trajectory of violent crime rates in the US over 
the past 50 years has been downward – including gun violence and terrorist events7. The 
discrepancy in results found between studies and datasets are often the results of inconsistencies 
in the definitions and measurement of “terrorist attacks” and “mass shootings”. 
No single, firm definition or set of criteria for measuring either terrorist events or mass 
shootings that is widely agreed upon. Additionally, incidents of mass violence vary greatly from 
one place to another. For example, despite the amount of news coverage devoted to terrorism 
over the past 20 years, terrorist events are relatively rare occurrences in the US. Conversely, 
terrorist events occur in comparatively higher frequency in Europe, and relatively are common 
occurrences in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Beyond this, mass media 
coverage of violent crime has increased inversely to violent crime rates in the US (Altheide 
 
7 For more information, see the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) at 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr and the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  
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2006, 2017; Glassner 2009). It appears that mass media over-emphasizes the prevalence and 
severity of extremist mass violence in the US. Violent events such as terrorist attacks or mass 
shootings can dominate news cycles for weeks or months (ibid.). In an interconnected media 
environment, it is nearly impossible to escape depictions of extreme violence. 
While definitional criteria of terrorist attacks and mass shootings are not mutually exclusive, 
i.e. many terrorists commit mass murder with firearms, there are some distinctions between 
them. For example, terrorist attacks can be carried out with a variety of weapons, definitions of 
terrorism do not require a minimum fatality threshold, and many mass shooters do not have clear 
motivations. However, I argue that terrorism and mass shootings share common characteristics 
which make them appropriate for a comparison of public perception. Terrorism and mass 
shootings are both typically conceptualized as extreme stranger violence, involving mass murder, 
and usually occur in a public place (see GTD, RAND definitions). While this is not always the 
case, and definitional ambiguity dominates academic discussions, the messages that the general 
public receive about terrorism and mass shootings are similar in this respect. The risk of 
victimization in a terrorist attack or mass shooting is also extremely low, occurring relatively 
infrequently, and only representing a small proportion of deaths in the U.S. annually (see 
Kockanek 2019). Despite this, news media gives a good deal of attention to these events. 
Both concepts share a degree of definitional ambiguity. Definitions of terrorism typically rely 
on motivational factors to determine if a violent act is “terrorism” or not. Many of these 
definitions describe terrorism as violence in pursuit of a political, social, economic, or religious 
goal; occurring outside the context of legitimate warfare; targeting mostly civilians; conducted 
by sub-state actors; and intended to influence a larger audience than the immediate victims. 
116 
Technical definitions such as this are typically developed by governments, individual agencies, 
and academics for a variety of purposes including prosecuting offenders, crafting public policy, 
and conducting scholarly research. 
Mass shootings have a similar definitional ambiguity. In some ways, these definitions are 
more specific, i.e. specifying a weapon type, however in others there is disagreement about the 
criteria for an event to qualify as a mass shooting. A 2015 report from the RAND corporation on 
definitions and measurement of mass shootings in the United States notes that while the FBI 
defines mass murderer as someone who kills four or more people in a single incident, not 
including themselves, it does not define a mass shooting (Smart 2015). Instead, several 
organizations and researchers have offered their own definitions of mass shooting which often 
draw on the FBI definition of mass murder (ibid.). What is not agreed upon in defining mass 
shootings is the number of people who are killed or wounded (some definitions only count 
fatalities, some include all casualties), whether to include the attacker in fatality counts, the 
motivations of the attackers (e.g. some include gang violence and domestic violence), and the 
venue of the attack (i.e. only counting events which occur public versus anywhere). This 
ambiguity makes studying trends in mass shootings very difficult, as different data sources will 
often lead to different conclusions about where, when, how frequently, and ultimately why these 
events occur8. 
Additionally, the academic and policy research on terrorism and mass shootings, where most 
of these definitional debates play out, do not play a significant role in the general public’s 
understanding of what a terrorist incident/mass shooting is, what trends and patterns exist in 
 
8 For more information, read the full report from RAND Corp. at https://www.rand.org/research/gun-
policy/analysis/essays/mass-shootings.html  
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mass violence, and what risk individuals face (Altheide 1006, 2009; LaFree 2009; Turk 2004; 
Woods 2007). Members of the general public are not widely seeking out academic research on 
mass violence to investigate, weigh evidence, and form their perceptions, rather they rely 
primarily on news media to get information about terrorism and mass shooting events (ibid.). 
Media attention to both terrorism and mass shootings has increased since 2000, while research 
on the number of terrorist and mass shooting events has not clearly shown an increase in 
incidents or fatalities. Conversely, several studies have found a link between news media 
consumption and worry or fear of crime, including mass violence (Callanan 2012; Chiricos, 
Padgett, and Gertz 2000; Custers and Van den Bulck 2011; Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004; 
Lowe and Galea 2017; Nellis and Savage 2012; Williams and Dickinson 1993). 
Although data sources disagree on exact numbers, by most measures the risk of victimization 
in a terrorist attack and the risk of victimization in a mass shooting is comparatively similar in 
the United States (see Smart 2018; START 2017). Both terrorist attack and mass shooting events 
have a low probability of affecting us as individuals, but a have high impact on victims when 
they do occur (Woods et al 2008). Social Psychological research has found that individuals often 
have difficulty evaluating the risk of low probability, high impact events, sometimes 
overestimating their likelihood, sometimes under-estimating (Woods et al 2008). While exact 
estimates on the number of people killed in terrorist attacks and mass shootings in the U.S. every 
year vary by data source (Smart 2018), both are far from the leading cause of accidental death, 
dwarfed by traffic fatalities (Olaisen et al 2019), falls (ibid.), prescription opioid overdoses 
(ibid.), suicide (Kochanek et al 2019), and even outnumbered by people killed by police officers 
(Tate et al 2020). Some scholars estimate that the likelihood of an individual dying violently – at 
least for citizens of wealthy, developed nations – is lower today than at any previous point in 
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human history (Pinker 2011). However, when a terrorist attack or mass shooting occurs, it can 
dominate news cycles for weeks or even months, likely altering public perceptions of the risk of 
violent death (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017). 
Taking the similarities into account, it is reasonable to expect that individuals would report 
similar feelings of fear for both terrorist attacks and mass shootings. However, I hypothesize that 
this is not the case, and that individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics such as gender and 
age, lifestyle factors such as gun ownership, and interaction with social institutions such as 
religion and politics, and selective mass media consumption patterns all influence whether 
someone is more worried or fearful about victimization in both terrorist attacks compared to a  
mass shootings. That is to say, I assert that your politics and media consumptions habits can 
predict what you are worried about. 
Despite this, mass media, which is the primary source of information about these events for 
most Americans (Altheide 1006, 2009; Turk 2004; Woods 2007), frames terrorism and mass 
shootings in distinct terms. This means that the labels of “terrorism” or “terrorist” and “mass 
shooting” or “mass shooter” are constructed around unique meanings, language, and imagery. 
These meanings convey a different threat to the general public. Research on the framing of 
extremist violence shows that the associated meanings extend to the presumed motivations of the 
offender, e.g. religious motivations such as radical Islam (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and 
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2007, 2011) vs individual motivations such as 
mental illness (Wilson, Ballman, and Buczek 2016), the characteristics of the offender, e.g. a 
radical, Muslim man (see Chapter 3) vs a troubled, White adolescent (Mingus and Zopf 2010), 
and how to respond to the presumed threat, i.e. national security response (Altheide 2006, 2009; 
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LaFree 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Norris et al 2003; Powell 2011; 
Woods 2007, 2011; Woods and Arthur 2014) vs law enforcement (Lawrence and Birkland 2004; 
Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass 2016; Vizzard 2015) or public 
health response (Birkland and Lawrence 2009; Wilson, Ballman, and Buczek 2016). 
Mass media content, political discussion, and popular attitudes associate terrorism with 
Islamic radicals (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 
2011; Woods 2007, 2011). Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is 
used to convey a specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval 
(Kunda 1999). In a content analysis of media coverage of politically violent groups, Nagar 
(2010) found that Islamic groups were more likely to be labeled as terrorist groups in US news 
media, especially among conservative-leaning sources. Similarly, Powell (2011) found that 
media outlets consistently tried to attribute terrorist incidents to radical Islamic terrorists, even if 
this was not actually the case, in a content analysis of US news coverage of terrorist incidents 
since 9/11. Additionally, in another content analysis Woods and Arthur (2014) found that after 
9/11, a variety of “foreign” threats, including terrorism, garnered increasingly negative framing 
in US news coverage, including immigration from non-white countries. 
Mass shootings, on the other hand, are typically portrayed in a different light. Silva and 
Capellan (2019) identify four different types of mass shooters covered in mass media: rampage 
shooters, disgruntled employees, school shooters, and lone-wolf terrorists. Mass shooters have 
frequently been portrayed as disaffected adolescents (Muschert 2007; Silva and Capellan 2019) 
and were even framed as juvenile superpredators in the 1990’s (Muschert 2007). News coverage 
rarely highlights the race of a mass shooter, so long as they are white (Mingus and Zopf 2010). 
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However, when an offender is non-white, news coverage over-emphasizes their race (Chuang 
2012; Mingus and Zopf 2010) and conveys messages about their foreignness to the public (ibid.). 
Additionally, mass shootings are frequently discussed in term of mental illness (Wilson, 
Ballman, and Buczek 2016) and gun policy (Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and 
Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass 2016; Vizzard 2015). 
Fear of Crime, Fear of Terrorism, Fear of Mass Shootings 
Traditionally, criminological theories of the fear of crime have emphasized individuals’ 
perceptions of vulnerability (Henson and Reyns 2015; Smith and Torstensson 1997; Warr 1984). 
This includes factors such as: suitability as a target, ability to physically resist victimization, and 
social/cultural messages about risk of victimization. This has mostly been studies in the context 
of “street crime” or interpersonal violence. Terrorist attacks and mass shootings, in contrast to 
interpersonal violence, often involve the targeting of civilians in public places, mass violence 
events are very difficult to predict, and the victims are selected by happenstance (Black 2004). 
Compared to street crimes such as robbery, terrorism and mass shootings rarely involve an 
economic motive, but are instead linked to ideology. While it is conceivable that some of the 
factors which influence fear of victimization in “street crimes” and interpersonal crimes, the very 
different reality of how and why these crimes takes place suggests that other factors may be more 
influential. 
Currently, most research firms such as Gallup and Pew or news organization surveys 
represent most research about how the public understands and interprets mass violence events. 
These polls are rarely reported beyond descriptive statistics, are often only available in aggregate 
form, and frequently have relatively small samples for their target population. There are also 
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several peer-reviewed studies which rely on survey data to analyze fear of terrorism. Findings in 
these studies have been largely consistent with previous research on fear of crime, while also 
casting doubts on dominant theoretical explanations. 
The fear of crime literature has consistently found sex and age to be significant and robust 
predictors of fear of crime victimization (Akers et al 1987; Callanan and Teasdale 2009; Franklin 
and Franklin 2009; Henson and Reyns 2015; Lagrange and Ferraro 1989; Rader and Haynes 
2011; Reid and Konrad 2004; Smith and Torstensson 1997; Stafford and Galle 1984; Warr 
1984). This literature has found that women and older respondents are more likely to report 
experiencing fear of victimization and also report higher levels of fear than male and younger 
respondents (ibid.). The dominant theoretical explanation of this relationship rests on the self-
perceived physical vulnerability of the respondent, rather than a statistical likelihood of 
victimization (ibid.). That is to say, women and older people worry about crime more not 
because they are necessarily likely to be victims, but because they perceive that they are more 
suitable targets and less able to physically resist victimization (Henson and Reyns 2015; Smith 
and Torstensson 1997; Warr 1984). The notable exception and debate of this finding is that 
women are more worried about becoming victims of sexual assault and related offenses than 
men, which is also reflected in statistics (see Henson and Reyns 2015; Reid and Konrad 2004). 
Some scholars assert that women’s greater fear of victimization reflects a fear of sexual assault 
(Reid and Konrad 2004). Others reject this notion (Franklin and Franklin 2009), overestimation 
of the gender-fear of crime gap (Callanan and Teasdale 2009; Snedker 2012), or a social learning 
theory approach in which women, through social interaction, learn a gendered fear of crime 
(Rader and Haynes 2011). 
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Many other factors have been linked to fear of crime, or conversely, reduced vulnerability to 
fear of crime, particularly location, and community contexts (Adams and Serpe 2000; Carvalho 
and Lewis 2003; Hartnagel 1979, Kohm 2009) and mass media consumption habits (Callanan 
2012; Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz 2000; Custers and Van den Bulck 2011; Glassner 2009; 
Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004; Williams and Dickinson 1993) For example, Adams and Serpe 
(2000) find that social integration to one’s community can reduce the fear of crime victimization. 
Media consumption has been shown to distort views of crime rates (Callanan 2012, Glassner 
2009), amplify perceptions of risk/vulnerability (Custers and Van den Bulck 2011) and increase 
fear of crime (Callanan 2012; Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz 2000; Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004; 
Williams and Dickinson 1993). General fear of crime also influences individuals’ susceptibility 
to moral panics around particular crimes, such as terrorist attacks or mass shootings (Schildkraut 
and Stafford 2015). 
Owning weapons such as firearms is perhaps one way that individuals may attempt to 
remedy perceived vulnerability to criminal victimization. Essentially, firearm ownership may act 
as a protective factor against fear of crime victimization. By owning a firearm, the individual 
may believe that they are better able to physically defend themselves from victimization (Strobe, 
Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Turchan, Zeoli, and Kwiatkowski 2017; Warner and Thrash 
2020). Or they may believe that gun ownership will act as a deterrent to criminal victimization 
(Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004). Alternatively, those who are most fearful of violent 
victimization may be most likely to own a gun. Either way, firearm ownership and percieved risk 
of victimization are likely related. 
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Then again, gun culture in the United States may influence people’s views about violent 
crime. Individuals who own guns frequently own multiple firearms and are more likely to be 
involved in organization that promote gun rights (Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017). 
Specifically, because mass shootings are often followed by politicians talking about gun control 
policies (Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and 
Elsass 2016; Vizzard 2015), gun owners may base their opinions on mass shootings on this 
political belief (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2017). Alternatively, individuals may purchase 
firearms to defend themselves against a perceived threat from a mass shooting (Stroebe, Leander, 
and Kruglanski 2017; Turchan, Zeoli, and Kwiatkowski 2017). 
Previous research has suggested that when mass violence is framed as “terrorism”, the 
general public reports more fear and anxiety than when mass violence is not framed as terrorism 
(Swift 2015; Woods 2011). Characteristics such as gender, age, media exposure, and 
geographical location are all statistically significant predictors of an individual’s fear of 
victimization in a terrorist attack (Brück and Müller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 2012; 
Woods et al 2008). Specifically, women are more fearful than men of both crime and terrorism 
(ibid.) Women who fear terrorist victimization also engage in more coping strategies, such as 
avoiding perceived risky situations and locations and seeking more information about terrorism 
(Nellis and Savage 2012). Age has been another consistent predictor of both fear of crime and 
fear of terrorism (Brück and Müller 2010; Nellis 2009, Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 
2008). Specifically, older individuals are more fearful than younger individuals (ibid.). 
A Michigan study by Woods et al (2008) also found that proximity to a perceived terrorist 
target influenced fear of terrorism, particularly among lower socioeconomic status individuals 
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and racial minorities experienced. Additionally, previous studies have suggested that societal 
elites and media coverage of terrorism may influence perceptions of risk more than actual 
terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime (Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and Chess 
2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007). Additionally, research has suggested that the 
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, race, class, and 
geographic location influence an individual’s perception of terrorism victimization risk (Brück 
and Muller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 2008). Public opinion 
surveys have found similar patterns (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015). 
News media outlets often assume that audiences prefer stories about perpetrators of mass 
murder (Lankford and Madfis 2018; Levin and Wiest 2018). An experimental study by Levin 
and Wiest (2018) found that respondents are generally more interested in stories featuring heroic 
bystanders than perpetrators. However, they also found that individuals in their 40s and more 
fearful individuals were most interested in stories about mass murder (ibid.). A meta-analysis of 
research conducted in the aftermath of mass shooting incidents found that not only do directly 
affected communities experience negative psychological outcomes in the wake of mass shooting 
events, but communities that are not directly affected can also experience increases in social fear 
and negative effects on perceived safety (Lowe and Galea 2017). 
Politics, Identity, and Selective Mass Media Exposure 
While there is frequently a link between one’s political leanings and religious affiliation, 
some researchers assert that religious and political beliefs are closely linked, and the result of 
underlying psychological orientations (Friesen and Ksiazkiewicz 2015). Religious attendance 
can have a small effect on political participation (Ammann 2015), although once politically 
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active, individuals’ political behavior is not impacted by changes in religiosity (ibid.). Religiosity 
can also limit individuals’ ability to acquire and process some types of political information, 
particularly when it contradicts their closely held beliefs (Gaskins 2019). 
Attending religious services can serve many social functions. One this religion does is 
provide a frame of reference for understanding world events. If terrorism is framed as a religious 
conflict, i.e. one of Islam vs Christianity, then it is possible that this may influence a religious 
individuals’ perceptions of terrorism and how it relates to them personally. Additionally, many 
mass violence events have occurred at places of worship. Individuals who attend religious 
services regularly may perceive themselves to be at greater risk of victimization. Alternatively, 
individuals who see places of worship as potential terrorism targets may engage in avoidant 
behavior, not attending regularly. 
Studies have also demonstrated bias against Muslims in US public attitudes. US respondents 
prefer that foreign aid is given to Christian-majority countries over Muslim-majority countries 
(Blackman 2018; Thomas 2004). A 2011 study of public attitudes of Muslims in the US suggests 
that Muslims are perhaps the least trusted group by highly religious Americans, and considered 
the definitive outsider group (Hinze, Mencken, and Tolbert 2011). Conservative Christians in 
particular are more likely to hold negative views of groups with religious differences (Yancy, 
Eisenstein, and Burge 2017). Another study found that Christians were more likely to have low 
levels of respect for Islam (Pevey and McKenzie 2009) compared to other groups. While this 
study also found that increased contact with Muslims generally improves attitudes towards 
Muslims and Islam, the opposite is true for Evangelicals, who show lower respect for Islam with 
increased contact (ibid.). Some scholars have even gone as far as arguing that adherents to 
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certain religious sects in the US, such as a plurality of white Evangelicals, share a worldview of 
white Christian supremacy (Gorski 2017). Interestingly, measures of religious affiliation have 
been shown to have an associate with the number of hate groups in a geographic area (Goetz, 
Rupasingha, and Loveridge 2012). 
Mass media influences the public in many ways. The primary theoretical explanations which 
offer insight into the influential role of American news media discuss Agenda Setting, Framing 
Events, and Reinforcing Spirals. Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993) describes how 
news media shapes public perceptions of events by deciding what is newsworthy – promoting 
certain topics over others as deserving of the public’s attention. Theories of elite cues suggest 
that individuals form opinions based on cues given by societal elites with whom they identify. 
Additionally, media outlets can portray events in various ways with the use of certain words, 
phrases, and imagery. This is known as Framing. 
Framing generally refers to the process by which mass media uses words, phrases, images, 
and symbols to portray a particular message. For example, the phrase “the cold war” and pictures 
of the Berlin wall are used to communicate ideas about global power relations during the late 
20th century. I focus on the impact of specific frames such as “Terrorist Attack” and “Mass 
Shooting” as used by US news media. Framing is a somewhat contentious topic among scholars, 
and consequently one of the most critically studied topics in communication literature. Entman 
(1993) described framing as a “fractured paradigm”. While some researchers do not go into 
detail to define what ‘frames’ and ‘framing’ are, assuming that these are widely understood 
concepts (Entman 1993), others interpret framing in different ways, even when the terms are 
explicitly defined. Some researchers see framing as a cognitive process and element of discourse 
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(Gitlin 1980), others conceptualize frames as an internalized mental structure (Scheufele 1999), 
and further still, framing can refer to the substance of communication (Woods 2007). Though the 
exact definition of framing varies across disciplines, framing is theorized as a process frequently 
used by political elites and media sources to influence perceptions and shape the social world 
(Chomsky and Herman 1988). 
The importance of framing in studies of news media has been articulated from scholars in 
many disciplines. David Altheide (2006; 2009) documented how political elites and news media 
constructed terrorism as the chief national security threat, relying on the public’s perceptions 
about danger, risk, and feelings of fear to gain support for policy measures such as the USA 
PATRIOT Act and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Benford and Snow (2000) 
argue that framing processes are an essential aspect of social movement formation. Chomsky and 
Herman (1988) articulated a propaganda-model of news media and asserted that media framing 
is frequently used to influence public opinion and used as a tool by political elites to further 
specific political goals. In framing an issue, the use of fearful language or imagery can be used to 
persuade and gain support for social and political objectives (Chomsky and Herman 1988; 
Altheide 2006, 2009). Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life, 
particularly regarding terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. Most recently, an 
emerging area of scholarship based on a theory known as the Reinforcing Spirals Model 
examines the interaction between deeply held beliefs and selective mass media exposure. 
Attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are typically thought to influence the selection of media 
content and the attention paid to that content. The Reinforcing Spirals model proposed by Slater 
(2007, 2015) elaborates a theory of how pre-existing beliefs and selective media exposure 
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mutually influence each other in positive feedback loops or reinforcing spirals. Essentially, 
Slater (2007, 2015) argues that over time, these feedback loops can play an important role in 
social identity formation and maintenance, as well as reinforcement attitudes and behaviors for 
political, religious, or lifestyle groups in society (ibid.). The reinforcing spirals model acts as a 
framework to understand how both media content and selective media exposure contribute to the 
development and maintenance of attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, and behavioral outcomes 
associated with these as well (Slater 2007, 2015). 
Theories of media effects such as Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993) and Framing 
Theory (Entman 1993, Gitlin 1980, Scheufele 1999) propose that attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors 
are shaped by interactions with social institutions such as mass media. The Reinforcing Spirals 
Model (Slater 2007, 2015) model also holds that this relationship is not one way, nor is it a 
simple model of cause and effects. In this model social identity and deeply held beliefs, such as 
political affiliation or religious beliefs, interact with selective media use habits to reinforce each 
other. Typically, this is conceptualized as identity/beliefs and media use supporting each other, 
i.e. individuals choose media sources that support their beliefs and this confirmation strengthens 
their identity and attachment. In some cases, the reinforcing spiral can lead media consumers 
down a proverbial rabbit hole, amplify their pre-existing beliefs, and push individuals to more 
radicalized views over time. 
The media consumer in the 21st century has a broader choice of platforms to learn the news 
of the day. While television remains the favored news source for most Americans (Mitchell, 
Holcomb, and Weisel 2016), online news and social media sites are quickly gaining ground, 
having already surpassed other traditional news sources such as newspapers and radio (ibid.). In 
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some ways, the rapidly changing media landscape allows for exposure to a broader range or 
perspectives. At the same time, it is easier than ever for individuals to seek out information that 
confirms their previously held beliefs. 
Since the 1970s, American politics experienced increasing polarization on racial, cultural, 
and social welfare issues (Layman et al 2006), and an increasingly compartmentalized media 
environment may play a role. Several studies have documented Wicks et al (2014) found that 
conservatives favor conservative talk radio, FOX news, and Christian radio and TV and news 
sources, while liberals favor PBS and Facebook. It is important to note that while NPR and PBS 
consumers skew toward liberal political orientation, their news coverage is decidedly non-
partisan, unlike conservative news sources. A study of news media consumption by political 
ideology from a 2008 survey found that differences in preference do exist, however rejected the 
notion that a large portion of any group actively avoids information that contradicts their belief 
systems (Weeks et al 2016). 
A recent review of four panel surveys (Stromback and Shehata 2019) found support for a 
reciprocal relationship between political leanings and certain types of TV news. They also 
acknowledge that the research in this area remains unsettled. Bolin and Hamilton (2018) find 
support for the reinforcing spirals model when examining issues of climate change and public 
opinion. Additionally, studies have found that conservatives are more prone to the effects of 
reinforcing spirals than liberals (McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 2014). 
An early study of the effects of conservative talk radio additionally found that listeners to 
particular programs such as Rush Limbaugh, held views that were further right than their views 
before they started listening to CTR (Jones 2002). 
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Some studies have found less consistent results. Beam et al (2016) did not find evidence for 
greater polarization among Facebook news users. Additionally, Mort (2012) finds that not all 
conservative talk radio hosts share the same outlook, finding differences in content and views 
expressed between so called “fiscal conservatives” such as Hannity and Limbaugh, and so called 
“culture warriors” such as Ingraham and Savage. However, in recent data collected by Pew 
Research, conservatives were found to be distrustful of most mainstream news sources, with the 
exception of FOX News. In contrast, liberals were shown to be more trusting of a wider range of 
news sources (Jurkowitz, Mitchell, Shearer, and Walker 2020). Other research has found that 
conservative media exposure lowers acceptance of the science of climate change, whereas the 
opposite was found regarding non-conservative media use (Feldman et al 2014). 
Based on bivariate analyses and existing literature, several operational hypotheses are tested 
in logistic regression analyses in Table 4.2. These hypotheses are described below. In table 4.2, 
statistical significance in two-tailed hypothesis tests are indicated by one star at the .05 level, two 
stars at the .01 level, and three stars at the .001 level. Statistical significance at the .10 level is 
indicated by a cross “+”. Multivariate logistic regression results reported in Table 4.2 include 
Census survey weights calculated by the UNH Survey Center. First, I look at bivariate 
relationships between both kinds of fear, and the background factors mentioned in previous 
section. Then, multivariate analysis (logit regression) will be used to more formally test the 
hypotheses listed earlier, while checking for spurious effects. 
Hypothesis 1: Net of other variables, background characteristics of sex, age, gun ownership, and 
religious attendance will significantly predict fear of victimization in a terrorist attack and fear 
of victimization in a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 1a: Net of other variables, female respondents will be significantly more worried 
about victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Net of other variables, older respondents will be significantly more worried 
about victimization in a terrorist attack and younger respondents will be significantly more 
worried about victimization in a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 1c: Net of other variables, gun owning respondents will be significantly less worried 
about victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 1d: Net of other variables, respondents who attend religious services more frequently 
will be significantly more worried about a terrorist attack and a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 2: Net of other variables, Donald Trump voters will be significantly more worried 
about victimization in a terrorist attack and less worried about a mass shooting compared to 
Hillary Clinton and Other voters. 
Hypothesis 3: Net of other variables, selective media consumption will significantly predict fear 
of victimization in a terrorist attack and fear of victimization in a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 3a: Net of other variables, respondents who watch WMUR News more frequently will 
be significantly worried about victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 3b: Net of other variables, respondents who listen to NHPR more frequently will be 
significantly less worried about victimization in a terrorist attack and significantly more worried 
about victimization in a mass shooting. 
Hypothesis 3c: Net of other variables, respondents who listen to conservative talk radio more 
frequently will be significantly more worried about victimization in a terrorist attack and 
significantly less worried about victimization in a mass shooting. 
Data and Measures 
Data for this study was collected from the Fall 2017 Granite State Poll. The Granite State 
Poll is a quarterly, state-wide New Hampshire public opinion survey conducted by the UNH 
Survey Center. It is a representative phone survey using random digit dialing to ask questions of 
approximately 500 respondents on each quarterly iteration (UNH Survey Center 2017). These 
questions are typically a mix of background information, political opinions, and other items 
suggested by researchers or clients. On the Fall 2017 poll, I was able to include a question about 
mass violence with two versions: one about “a mass shooting”, the other about “a terrorist 
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attack”. One question was asked to a half of the respondents, the second to the other half in the 
Fall 2017 survey. Question wording is given below. 
“How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a mass shooting? 
– very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not worried at all” 
“How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a terrorist attack? 
– very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not worried at all” 
Table 4.1 below contains information on variables of interest including definitions, coding 
practices, and category percentages. Each respondent was randomly assigned only one version of 
a question about their fear of themselves or someone they know becoming a victim of mass 
violence. Version A asks about fear of victimization in a terrorist attack, Version B ask about 
fear of victimization in a mass shooting. Only a small proportion of respondents reported being 
“very worried” about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack (6.05%) or a mass shooting 
(5.04%). A substantially larger proportion of respondents reported being “somewhat worried” 
about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack (27.02%) or a mass shooting (31.78%). Binary 
variables for both Version A and Version B are coded to reflect respondents who reported being 
either “Somewhat Worried” or “Very Worried” about victimization in a terrorist attack (33.47%) 
or a mass shooting (37.11%). These versions were created to use logistic regression techniques. 
Due to the relatively small sample size results are somewhat sensitive to model specification. In 
a previous version, Ordered Logistic Regression was used, and the results were not 
fundamentally different from the current analysis. However, the binary variable appears to better 
capture the measured relationships. 
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Respondents were asked about several background indicators, some of which are used in this 
analysis. Approximately half of the sample is female (50.79%), the age of respondents is 
between 18 and 92 with a mean of 52.32 and standard deviation of 17.7, and most respondents 
either have completed a college degree (36.4%) or pursued postgraduate education (22.4%), with 
the rest having completed some college (24.4%) and a minority having only completed high 
school or less (16.8%). An ordinal measure of age is used in this analysis for two reasons: 1, it 
allows inclusion of respondents who refused to answer this question, increasing sample size 
slightly; and 2, it is used to compare age groups to one another. Additionally, nearly half the 
sample does not attend religious services ever (46.84%). Those who do tend to either go less than 
1-2 times per month (26.48%), or every week (18.58%), with only a small proportion attending 
1-2 times per week (8.10%). Moreover, nearly half of respondents own a firearm or have one in 
their household (45.19%). 
The Granite State Poll also asks respondents about their political leanings, including party 
affiliation and who they voted for in the 2016 Presidential election. Respondents’ voting patterns 
in the 2016 presidential election were similar to national results. More than a quarter of 
respondents voted for Donald Trump (26.88%), the largest proportion of respondents voted for 
Hillary Clinton (44.07%), and the remainder voted for other candidates such as Gary Johnson or 
Jill Stein, did not vote, were not eligible, didn’t know, or refused to answer (29.05%). 
The Fall 2017 Granite State Poll also asked respondents about their media consumption 
habits, including local TV news, NHPR, and conservative talk radio. Over a third of respondents 
reported watching WMUR news every day (36.11%), while the remainder watched several times 
a week (16.47%), occasionally (27.98%), or never (19.44%). NHPR is popular with respondents 
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as well, with about two-thirds of respondents listening either every day (21.48%), several times a 
week (15.08%), or occasionally (29.56%), and only one-third never listening (33.93%). 
Conservative talk radio has a much smaller audience, and the majority of respondents reported 
never listening (75.99%). Of those who do listen to conservative talk radio, only a small 
proportion listed every day (5.95%), with the remainder listening several times a week (5.16%) 
or occasionally (12.90%). 
Analyses use both bivariate analyses comparing fear within and across groups, i.e. Chi-
squared tests, t-tests, and multivariate tests using logistic regression techniques. These strategies 
are used to estimate effects of sociodemographic factors on fear of a terrorist attack and fear of a 
mass shooting comparatively. The dependent variable (DV) is self-reported fear – measured on 
a four-point Likert scale: “very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not worried at all” 
with a half sample asked about their fear of victimization in a “Terrorist Attack”, and the other 
half asked about their fear about victimization in a “Mass Shooting”. Independent variables 
include the respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. sex, age, education) habits 
(religious attendance, gun ownership), political orientation (political party affiliation, voted in 
2016 Presidential election) and media consumption habits (watch WMUR News, listen to NHPR, 
listen to conservative talk radio). 
I hypothesize that sociodemographic factors such as sex, age, education, news consumption 
habits, religiosity, and political leanings will significantly predict fear of terrorist attack and fear 
of mass shootings. Specifically, I expect the biggest differences in reported fear to fall along 
political lines – with Democrats/Clinton voters being more fearful of mass shootings, and 
Republicans/Trump voters being more fearful of terrorist attacks. 
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Table 4.1 Variable Definitions (Survey Weighted) 
 
(DV Version A) Fear of Terrorist Attack: How 
worried are you that you or someone you know 
will become the victim of a terrorist attack? 
N = 245 
Somewhat/Very worried 
(coded 1; 33.43%) 
Not too worried/Not worried at all 
(coded 0; 66.57%) 
(DV Version B) Fear of Mass Shooting: How 
worried are you that you or someone you 
know will become the victim of a mass 
shooting? N = 256 
Somewhat/Very worried 
(coded 1; 40.17%) 
Not too worried/Not worried at all 
(coded 0; 59.83%) 
 
Sex: Respondent’s Sex 
Female (coded 1; 51.10%) 




Age Range: Ordinal variable of age 
18 to 34 (coded 1; 25.65%) 
35 to 49 (coded 2; 23.54%) 
50 to 44 (coded 3; 28.16%) 
65 and older (coded 4; 18.34%) 
NA/Refused (coded 9; 4.31%) 
 
 
Voted in 2016: Which presidential candidate 
did you voted for in 2016? (collapsed) 
Donald Trump (coded 1; 25.65%) 
Hillary Clinton (coded 2; 37.59%) 
All others (coded 3; 36.78%) 
 
Watch Local News: How often do you watch 
WMUR news? 
Every Day (coded 4; 35.91%) 
Several Times a Week (coded 3; 
15.50%) 
Occasionally (coded 2; 27.35%) 
Never (coded 1; 21.24%) 
Gun Owner: Do you have a firearm in your 
household?  
Yes (coded 1; 43.75%) 
All others (coded 0; 56.25%) 
NHPR: How often do you listen to NHPR? 
Every Day (coded 4; 17.38%) 
Several Times a Week (coded 3; 
13.59%) 
Occasionally (coded 2; 31.25%) 
Never (coded 1; 37.78%) 
Attend Religious Services: How often do you 
attend religious services? 
One or more times per week 
(coded 4; 17.66%) 
One or two times per month 
(coded 3; 6.18%) 
A few times a year (coded 2; 27.98%) 
Never/Don’t Know/NA (coded 1; 
48.18%) 
Conservative Talk Radio: How often do you 
listen to Conservative Talk Radio? 
Every Day (coded 4; 6.62%) 
Several Times a Week (coded 3; 
4.92%) 
Occasionally (coded 2; 13.02%) 
Never (coded 1; 75.44%) 
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Bivariate Analyses 
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 below chart the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat 
worried” or “very worried” about they or someone they know becoming the victim of a terrorist 
attack and compare this to the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat worried” or “very 
worried” about they or someone they know becoming the victim of a mass shooting. These 
charts also include the results of bivariate Chi2 tests, assessing whether group differences in fear 
of victimization can be found when respondents are given either a question about a terrorist 
attack or a mass shooting. 
Figure 4.1 charts the proportion of respondents who are “very” or “somewhat” worried that 
they or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack, and compares it to the 
proportion of respondents who are “very” or “somewhat” worried that they or someone they 
know will become the victim of a mass shooting against control variables of sex and age. This 
chart also includes the results of bivariate Chi2 tests. Bivariate tests found a significant difference 
in reported fear between males and females for both terrorist attack (p<.001) and mass shooting 
(p<.01). These analyses did not find a statistically significant difference in fear of terrorist 
attacks by age range (p=.275) or fear of mass shootings by age range (p=.128). Although, the 
graphical representation suggests that older respondents are more worried about terrorist attacks, 
while younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings. 
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Figure 4.1 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Sex, Age Range, and Type of Attack 
(Terrorist Attack and Mass Shooting) 
 
Other variables now also show statistically significant relationships which did not previously. 
Figure 4.2 charts the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they 
or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack and compare this to the 
proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they or someone they 
know will become the victim of a mass shooting against gun ownership and religious attendance. 
This chart also includes the results of bivariate Chi2 tests.  
A statistically significant difference in fear of terrorist attacks was not found by gun 
ownership (p=.609), however gun ownership is significantly different for fear of mass shootings 
(p<.01). Specifically, gun owners are less worried about victimization in a mass shooting than 
non-gun owners. Additionally, a statistically significant difference was found in fear of a terrorist 
attack by attendance of religious services (p<.001). Specifically, respondents who never attend 
are less likely to fear victimization in a terrorist attack than those who attend weekly or more. No 
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statistically significant difference was found in fear of a mass shooting by religious attendance 
(p=.909). 
Figure 4.2 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Gun Ownership, Religious Service 
Attendance, and Type of Attack (Terrorist Attack and Mass Shooting) 
 
Figure 4.3 charts the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that 
they or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack and compare this to the 
proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they or someone they 
know will become the victim of a mass shooting against the candidate voted for in the 2016 
Presidential election. The results of bivariate Chi2 tests also included in this chart. A statistically 
significant difference in fear of victimization in a terrorist attack found by the candidate that 
respondents voted for in the 2016 election (p<.05). Specifically, Trump voters are more worried 
about a terrorist attack than other voters. A statistically significant difference in fear of 
victimization in a mass shooting was also found for which candidate the respondent voted for in 
the 2016 election (p<.001). Specifically, Clinton voters are most worried about mass shootings, 
Trump voters are least worried about mass shootings, with others in between. 
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Figure 4.3 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Candidate Voted for in 2016 
Presidential Election and Type of Attack (Terrorist Attack and Mass Shooting) 
 
Finally, Figure 4.4 charts the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” 
worried that they or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack and 
compares this to the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they 
or someone they know will become the victim of a mass shooting against mass media 
consumption habits. This includes watching WMUR local news, listening to NHPR, and 
listening to Conservative Talk Radio. The results of bivariate Chi2 tests are also included. 
Frequency of viewing WMUR News did not show a statistically significant difference in fear of 
victimization in a terrorist attack (p=.322) or fear or victimization in a mass shooting (p=.461), 
although graphical data suggest that more frequent viewers are more worried about both terrorist 
attacks and mass shootings.  
Frequency of listening to NHPR did not show a significant difference in fear of victimization 
in a terrorist attack (p=.187), however it does show a significant difference in fear of 
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victimization in a mass shooting (p<.05). Specifically, listeners of NHPR are more worried about 
a mass shooting than non-listeners. Similarly, frequency of listening to conservative talk radio 
did not reveal a statistically significant difference in fear of victimization in a terrorist attack 
(p=.154), while it does reveal a significant difference in fear of victimization in a mass shooting 
(p<.05). Specifically, listeners of conservative talk radio are less worried about a mass shooting 
than non-listeners. 
Figure 4.4 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Frequency of Watching WMUR, 
Listening to NHPR, Listening to CTR, and Type of Attack (Terrorist Attack and Mass 
Shooting) 
 
Political Leanings and Selective Media Exposure 
The reinforcing spirals model plays an important role in conceptualizing the relationship 
between political beliefs and selective media exposure. In tables 4.2-4.4 below, I examine the 
relationship between selective media exposure and political candidate support in the 2016 
election. Bivariate tests of association find that Trump and Clinton voters have different media 
preferences. Table 4.2 examines the association between candidate support in the 2016 election 
and frequency of viewing WMUR TV News. Tests of association do not reveal and significant 
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differences in watching WMUR news by candidate supported in the 2016 election (Chi2 = 7.46; 
p=.280). 
Table 4.2 Bivariate Association Between Political Candidate Support and watching 
WMUR News (Chi2 Reported) 
Vote in 2016 Watch WMUR News  









































 Chi2 = 7.46 p=0.280 
 
Table 4.3 examines the association between candidate support in the 2016 election and 
frequency of listening to NHPR. Bivariate tests of association do find significant differences in 
listening NHPR (Chi2 = 44.36; p<.001). Clinton voters make up the majority of daily NHPR 
listeners (63.89%), while Trump voters make up the largest portion of respondents who never 
listen to NHPR (39.31%). 
 
Table 4.3 Bivariate Association Between Political Candidate Support and listening to 
NHPR (Chi2 Reported) 
Vote in 2016 Listen to NHPR  









































 Chi2 = 44.36 p<.001 
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Table 4.4 examines the association between candidate support in the 2016 election and 
frequency of listening to conservative talk radio. Again, this table and tests of association show 
significant differences in listening to conservative talk radio (Chi2 = 123.19; p<.001). Trump 
voters make up the overwhelming majority of daily CTR listeners (80.00%). Conversely, Clinton 
voters represent over have of respondents who never listen to CTR (52.73%). 
 
Table 4.4 Bivariate Association Between Political Candidate Support and listening to 
Conservative Talk Radio (Chi2 Reported) 
Vote in 2016 Listen to Conservative Talk Radio  









































 Chi2 = 125.19 p<.001 
 
 
Clearly, liberal leaning voters favor NHPR and conservative leaning voters favor CTR. 
However, the reinforcing spirals model predicts that selective exposure to partisan media 
contributes to the maintenance of political attitudes, and in some cases can amplify pre-existing 
beliefs on political issues. 
Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses 
These multivariate analyses use a series of logistic regressions to estimate the effects of 
predictor variables including socio-demographics, political leanings, and media consumption on 
fear of victimization in a terrorist attack and fear of victimization in a mass shooting, 
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respectively. Logistic regression is commonly used in social research and is appropriate for 
models which use a categorical dependent variable such as binary fear of terrorist attack. These 
models report the log odds (L) of the likelihood of a particular category of the dependent variable 
being selected. 
Li = ln[P(yi = 1)/P(yi = 0)] 
The log odds that y = 1 for the ith observation are subsequently estimated as a linear 
function of independent variables. β0 represents the model’s Y-intercept, while β1X1i ; β2X2i  ; etc. 
represent X-variable predictors. This portion of the model describes the value of Y as a function 
of X1, X2, etc. 
Li = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i  + … + βmXmi 
Table 4.5 shows the results of three mixed-effects logistic regressions. Model 1 compares 
logistic regression results of fear of terrorist attack and fear of mass shooting on demographic 
variables of sex, and age, as well as gun ownership and religious attendance. Model 2 compares 
logistic regression results of fear of terrorist attack and fear of mass shooting on sex, age, gun 
ownership, religious attendance, and adds measures of support for political candidates voted in 
2016. Model 3 compares fear of terrorist attack and fear of mass shooting on sex, age, gun 
ownership, religious attendance, voted in 2016, and adds measures of mass media consumption 
watch WMUR news, listen to NHPR and listen to conservative talk radio. The ‘Odds’ columns 
give odds ratios corresponding to exp(β), interpreted as multipliers for odds of respondents 
reporting being “somewhat” or “very” worried about victimization in a terrorist attack. Odds 
ratios greater than 1.0 represent positive effects, while odds ratios less than 1.0 represent 
negative effects. Based on bivariate analyses and existing literature, several operational 
hypotheses are tested in logistic regression analyses in Table 4.5. These hypotheses are described 
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below. In table 4.5, statistical significance in two-tailed hypothesis tests are indicated by one star 
at the .05 level, two stars at the .01 level, and three stars at the .001 level. Statistical significance 
at the .10 level is indicated by a cross “+”. Multivariate logistic regression results reported in 
Table 2 include Census survey weights calculated by the UNH Survey Center. 
 
  
Table 4.5 Survey weighted logistic regression comparing fear of terrorist attack to fear of 
mass shooting on demographics, lifestyle, political candidate support, and selective media 
consumption (Odds Ratios Reported) 
 Model 1 – OR(SE) Model 2 – OR(SE) Model 3 – OR(SE) 












Sex       
Male - - - - - - 
Female 6.06(2.40)*** 2.06(0.73)* 7.37(3.11)*** 1.88(0.68)+ 8.24(3.47)*** 1.86(0.71) 
Age Range       
18-34 - - - - - - 
35-49 0.44(0.24) 0.47(0.23) 0.40(0.21)+ 0.61(0.30) 0.38(0.21)+ 0.45(0.24) 
50-64 1.06(0.54) 0.46(0.22) 0.90(0.46) 0.47(0.23) 0.88(0.45) 0.32(0.16)* 
65+ 0.50(0.27) 0.38(0.17)* 0.48(0.26) 0.34(0.16)* 0.38(0.22)+ 0.23(0.11)** 
NA/Ref. 0.68(0.48) 0.19(0.19)+ 0.70(0.49) 0.27(0.28) 0.62(0.46) 0.22(0.19)+ 
Gun in HH       
No/NA/Ref. - - - - - - 
Yes 1.54(0.58) 0.50(0.17)* 1.42(0.54) 0.56(0.20)+ 1.49(0.56) 0.48(0.17)* 
Relig. Attd.       
Never/NA - - - - - - 
Few x/Yr. 2.61(1.09)* 0.68(0.27) 2.49(1.05)* 0.59(0.24) 2.57(0.56)* 0.43(0.19)+ 
1-2x/Mo. 0.85(0.54) 0.57(0.35) 0.65(0.40) 0.57(0.33) 0.74(0.47) 0.58(0.34) 
Weekly+ 3.16(1.85)* 0.70(0.30) 2.54(1.49) 0.81(0.38) 2.79(1.72)+ 0.70(0.32) 
Voted 2016       
Trump - - - - - - 
Clinton - - 0.40(0.18)* 3.46(1.65)** 0.72(0.40) 2.84(1.45)* 
Other - - 0.39(0.19)+ 1.55(0.81) 0.65(0.35) 1.60(0.88) 
Media Use       
WMUR - - - - 1.04(0.17) 1.47(0.27)* 
NHPR - - - - 0.91(0.17) 1.42(0.24)* 
CTR - - - - 1.73(0.44)* 0.95(0.23) 
Constant 0.13(0.06)*** 1.47(0.81) 0.26(0.15)* 0.66(0.46) 0.08(0.07)* 0.18(0.19)+ 
 N = 245 N = 256 N = 245 N = 256 N = 245 N = 256 
Two-tailed hypothesis tests 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, +p<.10 
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Results of Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses (Survey Weighted) 
The multivariate analysis in Table 4.5 – Model 1 examines the relationship in Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 more closely, confirming the relationships found in that bivariate analysis, and revealing 
new ones. First, when examining the fear of terrorist attack results, the control variable sex 
(p<.001) is a significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack, however age range is not. 
Specifically, for female respondents the odds of being “very” or “somewhat” fearful of a 
victimization in a terrorist attack increase by 6.06 times. Gun ownership is not a significant 
predictor of fear of victimization in a terrorist attack, however religious attendance is. 
Specifically, compared to individuals who do not attend religious services, attending religious 
services 1-2 times per year (p<.05) increases the odds of being “very” or “somewhat” fearful of a 
terrorist attack by 2.61 times, and attending religious services weekly or more frequently (p<.05) 
increases the odds of being “very” or “somewhat” fearful of a terrorist attack by 3.16 times. 
Comparatively, when examining the fear of mass shooting results in Table 4.5 – Model 1, 
the control variables sex (p<.05) and age range are both statistically significant predictors of fear 
of a mass shooting. Specifically, for female respondents the odds of reporting being “very” or 
“somewhat” worried about victimization in a mass shooting increase 2.06 times, while 
respondents who are 65 or older (p<.05) decreased the odds of reporting being “very” or 
“somewhat” fearful of mass shooting victimization by 0.38 times compared to 18-34 year old 
respondents – a result which runs contrary to previous fear of crime findings. This means that 
younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings than older respondents. 
Respondents who did not answer the question about age were also less likely than 18-34 year old 
respondents to report being “somewhat” or “very” worried about becoming the victim of a mass 
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shooting (p<.10). Additionally, gun ownership (p<.05) was a significant predictor of fear of mass 
shooting, decreasing the odds of an individual being “somewhat or “very” worried about 
victimization in a mass shooting by half, however attending religious services was not.  
The multivariate analysis in Table 4.5 – Model 2 retains the variables tested in Model 1 
and adds measures of Presidential candidate support in the 2016 election, examining Figure 4.3 
in detail. First, the regression results of fear of terrorist attack still finds that sex (p<.001) is a 
significant predictor of fear of victimization in a terrorist attack. Female respondents are 7.37 
times more likely to report being “very” or “somewhat” fearful than male respondents. Age is 
statistically significant only at the p<.10 level when comparing 35-49 year old respondents to 18-
35 year old respondents, decreasing the odds of reporting feeling “somewhat” or “very” worried 
about victimization in a terrorist attack by 60 percent. Gun ownership is not a significant 
predictor of fear of a terrorist attack. The effect of religious attendance (p<.05) is partially 
mediated in Model 2. Specifically, attending religious services a few times per year increases 
fear of victimization in a terrorist attack by 2.49 times compared to respondents who never attend 
religious services. Respondents who attend weekly or more frequently are no longer statistically 
significantly different from individuals who never attend, at least in terms of how worried they 
are about victimization in a terrorist attack in Model 2. 
Adding respondents’ support for political candidates finds that voting for Clinton (p<.05) 
decreased the odds of fearing victimization in a terrorist attack by 60 percent when compared to 
Trump voters. Respondents who voted for other candidates, did not vote, refused, etc. (p<.10) 
were also significantly less likely to fear victimization in a terrorist attack, though only at the 
p<.10 level. Compared to Trump voters, respondents choosing the “Other” category decreased 
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the odds of being more fearful of a terrorist attack by 61 percent. Figure 4.5 charts the predicted 
values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack against candidate 
voted for in the 2016 election with 95% confidence intervals included. This graphic does reflect 
that Trump voters are significantly more worried about terrorist attacks than Clinton and Other 
voters. 
Figure 4.5 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried about 
a Terrorist Attack by Candidate Voted for in 2016 Presidential Election with 95% CI 
 
Comparatively, the fear of mass shooting regression results in Model 2 also maintain 
variables tested in Model 1, while adding measures of support for 2016 Presidential candidates. 
In Model 2, both sex (p<.10) and age are statistically significant predictors of fear of 
victimization in a mass shooting, though Model 2 does show partial mediation of some 
relationships in Model 1. Specifically, for female respondents, the odds of reporting being “very” 
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or “somewhat” worried about victimization in a mass shooting is now1.88 times higher than 
male respondents, and only significant at the p<.10 level. Again, compared to 18-34 year old 
respondents, 65+ year old respondents are decrease the odds of reporting being “very” or 
“somewhat” fearful of mass shooting victimization by 66 percent. Younger respondents are more 
worried about mass shootings than older respondents, hoverer they are not significantly different 
from respondents who refused to answer the age question in Model 2. Gun ownership (p<.10) is 
still a significant predictor of fear of mass shooting, however now only at the p<.10 level. 
Having a gun in the household decreases the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” 
worried about victimization in a mass shooting by 44 percent. Religious attendance was not a 
significant predictor of fear of victimization in a mass shooting in Model 2. 
Support for political candidates again revealed statistically significant relationships for 
fear of a mass shooting, voting for Clinton (p<.01) increases the odds of reporting being “very” 
or “somewhat” worried about victimization in a mass shooting 3.46 times compared to 
respondents who voted for Trump. Respondents who voted for “Other” candidates, or did not 
vote, were not statistically significantly different from Trump voters. Figure 4.6 charts the 
predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack against 
candidate voted for in the 2016 election with 95% confidence intervals included. This 
visualization also reflects that Clinton voters are significantly more worried about terrorist 
attacks than Trump and Other voters. 
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Figure 4.6 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried about 
a Mass Shooting by Candidate Voted for in 2016 Presidential Election with 95% CI 
 
The multivariate analysis in Table 4.5 – Model 3 retains variables tested in Model 2, and 
adds the media consumption variables asking how frequently respondents watch WMUR news, 
listen to NHPR, and listen to conservative talk radio, examining Figure 4.4 in detail. Model 3 
largely finds similar relationships to Model 2, however some effects are mediated by the addition 
of mass media consumption measures. First, the regression results of fear of terrorist attack still 
find that sex (p<.001) is a significant predictor variable. Specifically, for female respondents, the 
odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack 
increase by 8.42 times compared to male respondents. Comparing the fear of mass shooting 
regression in Model 3 reveals similar patterns to Model 2, while partially mediating some 
relationships. Sex is no longer a statistically significant predictors of fear of victimization in a 
mass shooting. Figure 4.7 charts the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of 
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victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting against sex election with 95% confidence 
intervals included. 
Figure 4.7 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Sex with 95% CI 
 
 
In Model 3, Age is a significnt predictor of both fear of a terrorist attack and fear of a 
mas shooting. Compared to 18-35 year old respondents, both 35-49 year old respondents (p<.10) 
and 65+ year old respondents (p<.10) are 0.38 times less likely to report feeling “somewhat or 
“very” worried about victimization in a terrorist attack, although this is only significant at the 
p<.10 level. When examining fear of a mass shooting, compared to 18-35 year old respondents, 
50-64 year old respondents (p<.05) decrease the odds of reporting feeling “somewhat” or “very” 
worried about victimization by 68 percent, 65+ year old respondents (p<.01) decrease the odds 
by 77 percent, and respondents who refused (p<.10) decrease the odds by 78 percent. Figure 4.8 
charts the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack 
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and a mass shooting against age with 95% confidence intervals included. This reflects that 
younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings that older respondents. 
In Model 3, Gun ownership (p<.05) is a significant predictor of fear of a mass shooting, 
however it is not a significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack. Having a gun in the 
household decreases the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” worried about 
victimization in a mass shooting by 52 percent compared to non-gun owners. Figure 4.9 charts 
the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack and a 
mass shooting against gun ownership election with 95% confidence intervals included. This also 
reflects the decreased worry about mass shooting victimization by gun owners. 
Figure 4.8 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 




Figure 4.9 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Gun Ownership with 95% CI 
 
 
Religious attendance is a significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack as well, and for 
fear of a mass shooting at the p<.10 level in Model 3. Specifically, compared to respondents who 
never attend religious services, those who attend a few times per year (p<.10) are 2.57 times 
more likely to report feeling “somewhat” or “very” worried about victimization in a terrorist 
attack, and respondents who attend weekly or more frequently (p<.10) are 2.79 times more likely 
to repost feeling “somewhat” or “very” worried. Attending religious services a few times per 
year decreased the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” worried about victimization in 
a mass shooting by 57 percent compared to respondents who never attend. Figure 4.10 charts the 
predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack and a 
mass shooting against religious attendance with 95% confidence intervals included, visualizing 
the relationhips described in Model 3. 
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Figure 4.10 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Religious Service 
Attendance with 95% CI 
 
Measures of political candidate support and fear of a terrorist attack and fear of a mass 
shooting found in Model 2 are mediated and partially mediated by the inclusion of mass media 
consumption variables in Model 3, respectively. Voting for Clinton and “Others” is no longer a 
significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack compared to voting for Trump. The inclusion of 
selective mass media consumption measures does mediate the effect of political candidate 
support on fear of a terrorist attack from Models 2 to Model 3. However, as in Model 2, voting 
for Clinton (p<.05) is still a significant predictor of fear of a mass shooting compared to voting 
for Trump. Voting for Clinton increases the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” 
worried about victimization in a mass shooting by 2.81 times, slightly less than Model 2 and 
representing a partial mediation effect in Model 3. “Other” voters are still not significantly 
different from Trump voters. Figure 4.11 charts the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” 
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worried of victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting against candidate voted for in 
the 2016 election with 95% confidence intervals included. 
Figure 4.11 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Candidate Voted for in 2016 Presidential 
Election with 95% CI 
Figure 4.12 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Watching WMUR TV 
News with 95% CI 
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Figure 4.13 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Listening to NHPR with 
95% CI 
 
Figure 4.14 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried 







The study of media effects is a unique contribution to the literature examining the politics of 
fear. It provides clear evidence that not only does mass media influence the public’s views on 
mass violence, but what type of media individuals choose is associated with worry about one 
type of violence versus another. This study set out to test whether an individual’s political 
orientation and selective media consumption habits are associated with elevated fear of a terorrist 
attack compared to fear of a mass shooting. In a series of mulltivariate logistic regression 
analyses, I find that selective media exposure does significantly predict fear of a terrorist attack 
and fear of a mass shooting separately, and based on the media outlet chosen. More frequent 
listeners of conservative talk radio are more worried about victimization in a terrorist attack, and 
more frequent listeners of NHPR are more worried about a mass shooting. Furthermore, the 
effect of selective media exposure are observed even when accounting for political leanings, and 
mediate or partially mediate the effect of political candidate support. This finding includes 
controls for sex, age, gun ownership, and religious attendance. 
Controlling for sociodemographic factors which have been found to generally predict fear of 
violent crime victimization in other studies (i.e. Sex and Age) and lifestyle factors (e.g. Gun 
Ownership and Religious Attendance), I find evidence for my assertion that fear of terrorism and 
fear of mass shootings is not simply a response to the violence of these tragic events, but also a 
response to the meanings, messages, and politics that are associated with the frames “Terrorist 
Attack” and “Mass Shooting”. The framing of mass violence events is used to communicate 
distinct messages about the nature of risk, the threat to society, and how the general public 
should interpret the events. This is done in response to characteristics of the attack and 
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perpetrators, priorities of law enforcement and politicians, and how newsworthy mass media 
deems the event to be. This in turn serves to shape individuals’ worldviews, opinions on political 
topics, and perceptions of risk and danger. However, individuals are also likely to seek out 
information sources and politicians that conform to their previously held beliefs. In this manner, 
the worldview, politics, media cycle becomes somewhat of a feedback loop. Combined with the 
algorithm-driven content creation and distribution systems of the internet age and the 24-hour 
news cycle, this makes it increasingly difficult to escape the propaganda. Essentially, the politics 
of fear becomes amplified in modern media systems. 
Based on the analyses in this study, factors which are associated with elevated fear/worry 
about victimization in a terrorist attack or a mass shooting can be divided into three categories: 1. 
Factors which may influence Self-Assessed Perceptions of Vulnerability – i.e. Sex, Age, Gun 
ownership; 2. Factors which may influence respondents’ World-Views and Political Views – i.e. 
voting patterns, party affiliation, religious attendance; and 3. Interactions with Social Institutions 
– particularly mass media consumption habits. It is noteworthy that these factors are alo 
interrelated in the reinforcing spirals model (Slater 2007, 2015). 
Perceptions of Vulnerability 
A good deal of prior ciminological research has found that a respondent’s sex and age is a 
consistent and statistically significant predictor of fear of crime, at least when examining 
perceptions of conventional “street crimes” (Akers et al 1987, Callanan and Teasdale 2009, 
Franklin and Franklin 2009, Henson and Reyns 2015, Lagrange and Ferraro 1989, Rader and 
Haynes 2011, Reid and Konrad 2004, Smith and Torstensson 1997, Stafford and Galle 1984, 
Warr 1984). This analysis reveals similar findings, while also challenging popular theories of 
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why these individuals report greater fear of victimization. Specifically, female respondents are 
more likely to express fear of both a terrorist attack and a mass shooting in every model tested. 
However, female respondents are more worried about terrorist attacks than mass shootings. The 
significant discrepency between this and sex differences in fear of a mass shooting are 
counfounding. Previous research has also found that female respondents report greater levels of 
fear and woory about terrorists attacks (Brück and Muller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 
2012), which I also find. My findings also call into question dominant theoretical explanations of 
why previous research has consistently found that female respondents express more worry of 
victimization than male regardless of the crime assessed. 
Several explanations have been offered as to why female respondents report higher levels of 
fear of violent victimization (see Franklin and Franklin 2009; Henson and Reyns 2015, Rader 
and Haynes; 2011; Reid and Konrad 2004; Smith and Torstensson 1997, Warr 1984). The first, is 
that women are generally less physically able to resist violent victimization than men, while the 
second emphasizes women’s concern about victimization as a response to the percieved risk of 
sexual assault. A third possible explanation is that women are more likey to express fear than 
men, regardless of whether they are experiencing fear or worry at similar rates. The first 
explanation is the most plausibly related to the findings in this study. The second is inadequate 
for explaining this particular findings, as neither terrorist attacks or mass shootings typically 
involve sexual assault or related crimes. The third explanation is beyond the scope of what this 
study can test, and is better addressed by qualitative methods. 
Age is the second most consistent predictor of fear of violent victimization, in the fear of 
crime literature which is again typically explained in terms of the victim’s self-assessed ability to 
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resist victimization. This study did find that in some models, fear of terrorism was elevated 
among older respondents, as predicted. However models testing fear of mass shootings found the 
opposite effect. Younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings that older 
respondents. This is likely is related to perceptions of mass shootings as occuring in places that 
younger people frequent – schools, concerts, etc. – and may believe that are more vulnerable to 
this type of violence. Age is a significant factor in n individuals’s fear ov mass violence 
victimization, but not in the way that the classic fear of crime literature would suggest. 
World-View, Lifestyle, and Political Beliefs 
Perceptions of individual vulnerability do play a part in explaining why individuals may feel 
more fear or worry about victimization in a mass violence event, however in the case of this 
study, it does not fully explain why individuals are more likely to report elevated fear of a 
terrorist attack versus a mass shooting and vice versa. This study also tested factors which 
measure individuals’ worldviews and political orientations, in the form of religious attendance 
and vote cast in the 2016 Presidential election. 
Gun ownership was also found to be associated with a reduced the fear of mass shooting 
victimization. Though this is a lifetyle factor, which has been somewhat controversial in its role 
in the fear of crime literature. Gun owners may concievably believe that they are more able to 
resist victimization in a mass shooting, and that they percieve their vulnerability to be lower by 
having a weapon to protect themselves. Anecdotal evidence would appear to support this 
proposition as well. However, in this chapter I do not find evidence to support the protective 
factor or deterrence theories. Protection and deterrence mechanisms by which gun owners 
evaluate their risk of victimization would not explain the disparity if worry among gun owners 
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between terrorist attacks and mass shootings. Instead, I find support for the hypotheses that 
because mass shootings are often followed by politicians talking about gun control policies 
(Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass 
2016; Vizzard 2015). 
Religious attendance was a statistically significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack in 
Model 1, and approaching statistical significance in Models 2 and 3. The literature investigating 
the relationship between religious attendance and political attitudes is mixed in tis findings. 
However, some studies do suggest that certain religious groups may hold overly negative views 
of other religious groups, especially those which they believe to be antagonistic to their own. In 
this case, it is possible that due to the association of terrorism with Muslims, more religious 
individuals may view terrorism as an inherently religious or cultural conflict. That is to say, 
religious individuals may susbscribe to the “Clash of Civilizations” argument in how they 
understand terrorism and the relationship between the Islamic world and the Western world. I 
find support for research which has found that some Christian denominations hold antagonistic 
views of Muslims and Islam (Gorski 2017; Hinze, Mencken, and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012). This 
is particularly pronounced among conservative Christians in the US (Yancy, Eisenstein, and 
Burge 2017), who may feel a greater status threat from “foreign” groups with religious 
differences. Again, this supports the notion that traditionalist views of the US as a white-
Christian dominant society result in Muslims being reported as the least trusted group by highly 
religious Americans, and considered the definitive outsider group (Gorski 2017; Hinze, 
Mencken, and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012; Yancy, Eisenstein, and Burge 2017). 
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Political orientations were statistically significant in nearly every model, for both fear of 
terrorist attack and fear of mas shooting. Individuals who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 
election are more likely report being fearful of terrorist attacks, while individuals who voted for 
Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election are more likely to report being fearful of mass shootings. 
This result is not terribly surprising, as Trump emphasized terrorism as a threat to the US 
homeland throughout his campaign, and used racially charged rhetoric to win the presidency, 
while Clinton and other Democratic politicians have emphasized gun control as a policy 
objective. In the US, both political parties use the politics of fear to attempt to win office and 
enact policy objectives, however the effects of leveraging the fear of terrorism have proven to 
have much more insidious in the past two decades. 
Media Consumption Habits 
The association between media consumption and fear of terrorism has been somewhat 
studied, with some research finding a link between the frequency of media consumption and the 
level of reported fear. The present study includes multiple mesaures of media consumption: 
frequency of watching local TV news, frequency of listening to NHPR, and frequency of 
listening to Conservative talk radio. In previous research, a link between the frequency or 
amount of news consumed was associated with higher or lower reported fear of terrorism. In the 
current study, watching more local TV news is associated with elevated fear of a mass shooting, 
but not aterrorist attack. This may be due to the timing of the survey, which occurred in the 
immediate aftermath of the October 2017 Las Vegas shooting. 
More frequent listening to NHPR was associated with higher reported fear of a mass 
shooting, but not a terrorist attack, and more frequent listening to Conservative talk radio was 
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associated with higher reported fear of a terrorist attack, but not a mass shooting. All statistically 
significant media effects inculded control estimates for socio-demographics, lifestyle and 
worldview factors, and political orientations. What this demonstrates is the reciprocal siloing 
effect of mass media – certain media outlets promote certain views, and individuals choose 
media outlets which confirm their previously held beliefs. The feedback loop of mass media in 
the digital age is amplified by content algorithms which promote content similar to previously 
consumed media. 
Some previous research theorizes that the reinforcing spirals effects is symmetrical, i.e. both 
conservatives and liberals are similarly affected by partisan media. I do not support this point 
with my analyses, and I assert that my findings point to an asymmetrical effect of reinforcing 
spirals, which are more pronounced in conservative media sources. Even though not all 
conservative talk radio host share the same outlook (Mort 2012), I find evidence that supports the 
perspective that conservatives are more prone to media reinforcing spirals (see McCright 2011, 
McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 2014). It is reasonable to presume that much of the 
worry about mass shootings reported by WMUR viewers and NHPR listeners is in response to 
the October 2017 Las Vegas shooting. Given the high-profile nature of this event, it is very 
telling that CTR listeners are not more worried about a mass shooting but are more worried about 
a terrorist attack. These findings also support research that asserts conservative media pushes 
individuals further from reality than liberal preferred media such as NHPR. Conservative media 
sources frequently contradict scientific research and influence individuals’ perceptions on critical 
issues such as climate change and public health (see Bolin and Hamilton 2018 for an example). 
Limitations 
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Several limitations to this anallysis exist as well, including temporal effects, cross sectional 
data, and ambiguous findings. The survey used in this analysis was conducted shortly after 2017 
Las Vegas Mass Shooting. This likely influenced results. Notably, evidence for this is found in 
the increased worry about a mass shooting – but not a terrorist attack – by more frequent viewers 
of Local TV news channel WMUR. While New Hampshire is physically very distant from Las 
Vegas, a large amount of media coverage of the event concieveably elevated public concern of 
mass shootings as an issue. 
This analysis also relies on cross-sectional data and therefore can’t determine causality. 
Ideally, the Reinforcing Spirals Model calls for longitudinal data to evaluate the reciprocal 
relationship between attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and selective mass media exposure. This 
data is cross-sectional in nature, and only able to test associations at one particular time and 
place, New Hampshire in October 2017. 
Because of the limitations, the findings in this chapter are somewhat ambiguous. It is not 
possible to establish which comes first, attitudes, beliefs, and beghaviors, or selective media 
exposure. The Reinforcing Spirals Model does suggest that not such cause-and effect 
relationship exists, instead positing that the relationship is a dynamic and self-reinforcing 
process. What this study does demonstrate is that media effects, particularly selective exposure 
to partisan media, does have a measureable effect on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors above and 
beyond one’s core beliefs. 
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Implications beyond the current study 
The politics of fear has been leveraged by both political parties in recent election cycles. The 
techniques for winning political office in the US differ little between parties, although the 
specific policy proposals and objectives pursued are vastly different in their intent and effect. 
The fear of terrorism has deliberately been leveraged to oppress vulnerable minority groups 
within the US, and as justification to continue to pursue the War on Terror in the Middle East. In 
the second edition of Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2017), he argues that the 
Trump Presidential campaign is the result of more than a decade of propaganda shaping 
American’s perceptions and fears. Altheide very successfully outlined the process of how 
politicians and mass mediaworked together to build a case for the Iraq war in the years following 
the September 11, 2001 attacks. This paper agrees with this proposition and Altheide’s findings, 
however, I will note that the Trump campaign leveraged the racist and xenophobic attitudes 
present throughout US history, simply directing the distrust, anger, fear, and loathing at Muslims 
and other recent immigrants. 
The politics of fear – particularly those policies carried out as a response to the fear of 
terrorism – have profound consequences, even today. At the time of the writing of the paper, the 
War on Terror is entering it’s 18th year. Thousands of US Troops have lost their lives in the 
Middle Eastern wars, along with millions of Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis, Kurds, and 
others as effects of the war on terror spread and destabilize an entire region of the world. 
Countless others bear the physical and psychological scars of these conflicts. Under the USA 
PATRIOT Act, US intelligence and Law Enforcement agencies have sweeping surveillance 
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powers, and the NSA alone collects millions of private communications every day, all in 
cooperation with major telecom companies. 
The 2016 Presidential election is perhaps the most visible way in which the racialized fear of 
terorrism has been leveraged by societal elites to win office, accrue power, and gain wealth. The 
right-wing populist politics of the current era play on blatantly racist and discriminatory policies 
to combat the alleged threats of terrorism and other violence committed by Muslims and 
immigrants. Minority groups – especially those percieved as “Muslim” – have been increasingly 
victimized in the wake of the 2016 populist movements and white supremacist groups have 
become bolder in recent years (Levin and Reitzel 2018). Additionally, the Trump administration 
has separated families aprehended attempting to cross the southern border and keeping asylum 
seekers and other immigrants in concentration camps reminiscent of the darkest chapters in 
human history. All the while, powerful societal elites have taken the opportunity to enrich 
themselves and their cronies, directing attention towards supposed threats of non-white 
foreigners and away from the arguable more severe threats to the long-term security of the US 
such as global climate change, growing income and wealth inequality, looming mass automation 
of jobs, skyrocketing healthcare costs, and government corruption. Whether or not the US will 
deal with these issues depends on a firm public vioce, willing politicians, and changes to 
structural conditions which promote these drastic inequalities. 
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CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The world has changed. Digital technology, globalization, deindustrialization, and migration 
have reorganized societies around the globe. Many parallels are apparent between the social and 
structural forces that classical sociological theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were 
writing about during the Industrial Revolution and the current day. The US economy has 
reorganized around a post-industrial mode of production (due to the twin forces of offshoring 
and automation), resulting in the decline of communities once based around factory production, 
and the increased importation of consumer goods. At the same time, global migration, often from 
poorer regions to richer regions, has become a political wedge issue around the world.  All the 
while, mass media now reaches more people than ever before and penetrates our lives more 
deeply due to the expansion of both traditional and digital media sources. Today we are 
constantly bombarded with messages from innumerable sources, and false or misleading 
information is increasingly prolific and difficult to distinguish from facts.  
As a society we are in a state of Anomie as understood by Durkheim (1897) and Merton 
(1938). Many are unsure of their place in the world and feel anxious in the face of drastic 
change. They want answers or something to blame. So-called populist politics have emerged in 
wealthy nations as a response to this anomic state. Some may blame powerful actors that hoard 
resources and rig systems in their favor. Some may blame foreigners for their problems, i.e. 
Muslims are terrorists, Mexicans are taking jobs/criminals, China is unfairly trading, etc., rather 
than looking at how structural conditions have produced their perceived plight. Racism and 
xenophobia are not new to the US and have been part of our society since its inception. 
However, today, politicians across the globe effectively capitalize on these racist and xenophobic 
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feelings using the modern media landscape to speak directly to a section of the population that 
attributes their anomic state – caused by structural changes – to the influences of foreign non-
white “others”. This includes a reality TV host who embraced the racially charged rhetoric that 
many people had been harboring for years and won the Presidency despite being the less popular 
candidate. 
The structural changes that have occurred, and are still unfolding to this day, certainly have 
affected the lives and well-being of populations around the globe. In this case, I contend that a 
substantial part of the US population is afraid, anxious, and unsure of their place in the world in 
the face of a globalized, digital, deindustrialized, and increasingly diverse and multicultural 
society. When combined, these forces can produce a sense that a valued and traditional culture 
and way of life is under attack or in decline. This may even be partly true as factories close and 
shift the means of production to robots or overseas, as children grow up and move to urban areas 
in search of employment, and as economic inequality deepens. However, the causes of these 
anxieties associated with changing social structures are often misattributed to foreigners and 
becomes cloaked in the language of social identity.  
This social construction of the foreigner-as-threat is useful for societal elites who want to 
rally support and make money, while deflecting blame for social inequalities on the current 
structures. This is plainly evident by rhetoric used regularly by President Trump who often 
places blame for US social problems on groups such as Muslims, Latin American immigrants, 
and China. Even the frenetic response to the current COVID-19 pandemic by the Trump 
administration has continually shifted blame to foreigners, to the neglect of effective domestic 
measures. The paradox of anti-immigrant sentiment is that those who are most opposed to 
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immigrant groups are often those who have the least contact with them and face the least actual 
“threat”. For instance, Republicans who live further away from the Mexican-US border are more 
likely to support a building a wall on the southern US border than those who live within 350 
miles of the border (Jones 2017).  The perception of a threat – and not necessarily the reality of 
the threat – fuels anxiety.  
Both the bottom-up effects of anomic anxieties on the individual level, and the top-down 
machinations of power- and wealth-seeking elites manipulating public sentiment contribute to a 
distorted view of reality along a whole host of issues. For another example, public opinion 
research finds that people believe crime rates to be the same or increasing even when violent 
crime rates are going down by all official measures (Glassner 2009).  Researchers have found 
that public perception of crime – and resulting calls for particular ill-suited policies on crime – is 
reflective of significant mass media attention to it (Altheide 1996, 2006, 2017; Glassner 2009).  
The expansion of mass media into so many aspects of life and 24-hour news has made news 
coverage of bad things a part of daily life more so than in previous eras; and with all the social 
changes taking place already, the combination turns into perceptions of reality that may not be 
reflective of actual things going on. 
Consequently, in the study of the causes and consequences of terrorism, I assert that it is 
essential to evaluate what the term “terrorism” means, not just academically, but especially in 
common discourse. How is this term understood and used by news media, politicians, and the 
public? Who is labelled as a “terrorist”, and under what conditions? Why is it that Ramzi Yousef 
is portrayed as part of a conspiracy trying to topple the West, while Timothy McVeigh is 
portrayed as a quiet loner who is the unfortunate product of his circumstances? Why is Nidal 
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Hasan a radicalized extremist while James von Brunn is a racist old man? Why are Sayeed 
Farook and Tashfeen Malik ISIL sleeper agents, while Dylann Roof is a troubled kid? I argue 
that, in addition to the violence committed, it has to do with their race, ethnicity, birthplace, and 
religion. Specifically, I assert that in popular discourse, news media coverage, and political 
communications that Muslims are disproportionately portrayed as “terrorists”, and that this is an 
integral part of the racialization of Muslims in the US. Essentially, to be Muslim is to be 
associated with terrorism. This is part of a larger social phenomena whereby the anxieties and 
anomie caused by structural changes invoke a status threat, and are attributed to a grab bag of 
foreigners and “others” who pose a perceived threat to the dominant US culture and way of life. 
In this dissertation, I study the public’s fear of terrorism not as a fear of violence, but as a 
fear of losing status, power, and dominance to a foreign-Muslim threat among traditionally 
powerful groups in the US. Based on analyses of data from multiple sources, I find evidence that 
fear of terrorism in the US is shaped more by media coverage and attention from political elites 
to terrorism as a topic than actual terrorist attacks or casualties in the US. I find that the content 
of news coverage of mass violence is racially biased, focusing on violence perpetrated by 
Muslims, and that association with radical Islamic ideology overrides racial concerns and 
“revokes” whiteness in media coverage of mass violence. I also find that members of the public 
develop their perceptions of terrorism and mass violence by selectively consuming mass media 
that supports and amplifies their prior political beliefs. 
Power, Politics, Mass Media, and Constructing the Enemy 
In many ways, my dissertation examines power: the power of media and elites to shape 
conversations, to construct enemies, and to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. I 
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conceptualize a model of power based on C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1956) where the 
relationship between societal elites and mass media is not separate but of shared power among a 
class of people who move between the spheres of government, military, and big business. 
Neither societal elites nor mass media are dominant in their power to influence the public, and 
who is driving media coverage depends on a particular social context. While the specific goals of 
media and political elites may not always align, the ruling class generally shares the goal of 
maintaining and expanding their power and wealth. 
To begin, I find that power constructs terrorism as a social problem worthy of significant 
social concern. In chapter 2 I use data from Gallup’s Most Important Problem poll and compare 
it with data from the Global Terrorism Database on terrorist attacks in the US, news media 
coverage data from Lexis Nexis, and presidential addresses from the American Presidency 
Project. I examine the trends in this data to give context to the long-term national trends in the 
US public’s worry about terrorism as the most important problem facing the nation. I find that, at 
least in bivariate analyses, the US public is most worried about terrorism when mass media 
outlets devote more attention to terrorism as a topic. Surprisingly, neither the number of terrorist 
events occurring in the US nor the number of American terrorism casualties are significantly 
correlated with public perception of terrorism as the most important problem. There is, however, 
a correlation between terrorist events and attention to terrorism as a topic by the President and 
news media. This suggests a complex relationship and provides evidence to support previous 
research that asserts the important role of mass media as an intermediary between current events, 
government entities, and the general public. 
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I find evidence that both the President and prominent news outlets exert an influence on the 
public’s perception of social problems facing the US, and that they influence each other. Politics 
and mass media are key in telling us what a social problem is and controlling the broad 
conversation. Hermann and Chomsky (1988) articulated a propaganda model of mass media that 
states that media is used by social elites to build support for their policy objectives among the 
public. This was written as a rebuttal to the popular notion that mass media is often at odd with 
politics and able to hold politicians accountable. In the modern era, mass media has largely not 
held politicians accountable for their disastrous policies. In fact, David Altheide (2006; 2009; 
2017) argue that almost all mass media outlets and politicians mutually benefit from fear-
inducing rhetoric, especially around issues such as terrorism because it directly increases their 
viewership and revenue. Trump sells newspapers and gets people to tune in to the news. 
On the other hand, considering a potential counterhypothesis, I do not find evidence that 
economic insecurity is driving the fear of terrorism and associated anti-Muslim sentiments. To 
the contrary, I find that the public is less concerned about terrorism during economically 
challenging times. Likewise, immigration research has additionally found that anti-immigrant 
politics are pursued in both good and bad economic times, and that social institutions are 
primarily responsible for engendering anti-immigrant attitudes (Tichenor 2002). This is 
supported by other research that has found that fears and concerns about labor market 
competition are not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Heinmueller et al 2015). If 
economic insecurity does amplify feelings of racial, foreign, or terrorist threat, it does not do so 
in an easily measurable way, at least not with the data that is currently available to me. Instead, I 
find evidence that the fear of terrorism is related to a perceived threat to the power and status of 
dominant groups in the US, supporting the findings of Mutz (2018). 
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To be more specific, I find that fear of terrorism is associated with a fear of Muslims. In 
chapter 3 I examine the content of news stories about suspected terrorists, by collecting data on 
the characteristics of terrorist attacks in the US and their suspected perpetrators, as available 
from the Global Terrorism Database. Then, I collect broadcast news transcripts through Lexis-
Nexis by searching the suspects’ names, taking a quantitative content analysis approach. While 
the previous chapters examined the relationship between mass media and the public, this analysis 
examines the content of those news media messages, and how terrorism and terrorists are 
socially constructed through framing of suspected terrorist perpetrators in the US. I find that 
suspected perpetrators of terrorist attacks, as defined by the GTD, who are Middle-Eastern/North 
African in origin, associated with radical Islam, and foreign born are more likely to be called a 
terrorist by news media, even controlling for other characteristics of the attack. 
However, when analyzed together in the same model, these factors are mediated by 
association with radical Islamic ideology. This suggests that the construct of the suspected 
terrorist’s race is not solely based on skin color and nationality, but on other ethnic markers 
associated with Islam, and that this racial construct is central to the definition of who a terrorist 
is, rather than the violence itself. Furthermore, by emphasizing non-Middle Eastern suspects who 
are Muslim or associated with Radical Islam, this points out implicit biases in news media 
coverage of terrorist suspects. Anyone who is Muslim or associated with Radical Islam is more 
likely to be called a terrorist, however, emphasis is placed on clarifying that fact when the 
suspect does not appear stereotypically “Muslim”. That is to say, there appears to be an 
unspoken understanding that Middle Eastern suspects accused of committing violent acts are 
Terrorists, while members of other racial groups could have had other motivations. Additionally, 
this supports the view that “Muslim” is a racial category (Constadine 2017; Skenderovic and 
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Spaeti 2019; Taras 2013), even if it is not based primarily on skin color (Dunn, Klocker, and 
Salabay 2007) and seen as a “voluntary” one (Meer and Modood 2009), that Muslims are viewed 
as non-white (Galonnier 2015; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015), and that one can lose benefits of 
whiteness by associating with Islam (ibid.). 
My dissertation provides evidence that “Muslims” have been racialized in the US – though 
this is not based entirely on nationality or skin color.  Racial Formation Theory (Omi and 
Winant 1986, 1994, 2015) helps address this compared to traditional concepts of race as skin-
color based. Racial formation theory emphasized the role of macro-level processes and social 
institutions in creating and constructing racial categories. The findings in my dissertation 
research repeatedly point to mass media as the primary social institutions that shapes the public’s 
perception about issues such as race and terrorism. Mass media does this by setting agendas and 
deciding what is newsworthy (McCombs and Shaw 1993), by framing events and providing the 
language and imagery used to understand what is happening in society (Entman 1993), and 
increasingly by reinforcing previously existing beliefs through selective media exposure (Slater 
2007, 2015). Media effects, and specifically the promotion of the fear of Muslims as a terrorist 
threat to Americans, have far reaching consequences in how the behavior of institutions and 
individuals have been shaped over the past 20 years. This includes the US wars in the Middle 
East, erosion of civil liberties domestically, and the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency 
in 2016 to start. 
As we know, whites and non-whites clearly have different lived experiences and media 
constructions in the US. Prior research demonstrated that when a mass shooter is white, media 
rarely discusses their race (Mingus and Zopf 2010). Consequently, when a mass shooter is non-
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white, media over-emphasizes the suspect’s race in their reporting (Chuang 2012). Other 
research found that while white converts to Islam can still benefit from greater respect in society, 
their whiteness is precarious, and they can lose some of the benefits of their whiteness (Moosayi 
2015). Like Selod (2015), I find that white privilege appears to be unable to overcome a 
connection to Islam. My research finds that, at least in news reporting about terrorism suspects, 
association with Islam essentially “revokes” a suspect’s whiteness. Not only are Muslims 
racialized as terrorists, when a white person adopts Muslim ethnic markers, they find themselves 
facing a similar terrorist-threat construction as a non-white Muslim. This also demonstrates that 
“whiteness” as a social construct is fragile and not just based on skin color either. Whiteness 
carries behavioral expectations and standards that if not met, decrease or rescind an individual’s 
white privilege. For example, a white man who commits mass murder is still perceived as white 
and upholding of whiteness so long as he is not associated with radical Islam. This person is not 
labelled as a “terrorist” and their actions are attributed to individual abnormalities rather than a 
characteristic of their social group. If that person is Muslim, or pledging allegiance to the Islamic 
State group, they are called a “terrorist”, perhaps even more so when they are violating societal 
expectations and standards of whiteness. The US public popularly presumes Muslims to be 
predisposed to committing terrorist acts.  Consequently, we must acknowledge that in the US 
today being “Muslim” is not only associated with terrorism but is thought of as being excluded 
from whiteness, despite skin color. 
Perhaps the most notorious example of Muslim racialization is in the case of President 
Barack Obama. Race was a constant factor in Obama’s candidacy and Presidency (Fraser 2009). 
While President Obama, whose father was a black Kenyan, is often cited as the first Black 
President (ibid.), he can equally claim white parentage from his mother. Further, from the time of 
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his initial 2008 campaign to the present day, rumors spread that Obama was both Muslim and 
foreign. He was alleged to be a secret Muslim (Layman et al 2014). This misinformation is easily 
disproven, as Obama attends Christian religious services and identifies with the Christian faith. 
Another controversy of the 2008 campaign directly challenges the notion that President Obama 
is a Muslim: his association with Reverend Jeremiah Wright of the Trinity United Christian 
Church of Chicago (McKenzie 2011). The Birther movement, championed by Donald Trump, 
subsequently made other claims that Obama was not born in the United States (Hughley 2012). 
These claims, however, do not come from a place of good faith (ibid.). President Obama’s 
multiracial heritage, which is the basis for these conspiracy theories, are presumed to be 
frightening to whites and were embraced by conservatives (Hughley 2012; Layman et al 2014). 
This is a key element of constructing the alleged enemy – defining who is a terrorist and 
building support for political agendas such as a “Muslim ban” around this conception of 
terrorism as Muslim violence. It is beneficial for social elites to have a foreign enemy on which 
to focus the US public’s attention. If we do not have foreigners to blame for our problems, then 
the public may become conscious of and we might have to fix the issues of structural inequality 
that we have domestically or face up to the failed foreign policies we have pursued since World 
War II. 
The racialization of Muslims is central to understanding both Islamophobia and the 
contemporary populist politics that make use of xenophobic, nativist, and white supremacist 
ideas. Islamophobia plays on historical constructs of Orientalism (Skenderovic and Späti 2019). 
Islamophobia in Western societies is racial in nature (Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and 
Salabay 2007; Garner and Selod 2015; Taras 2013). Like others, I have found that anti-Muslim 
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rhetoric plays on negative stereotypes of Islam (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007), particularly 
by constructing a narrative of a Muslim terrorist threat. In some ways, this iteration of racialized 
anti-foreign sentiment is complex, due to the diversity of Muslims in the real world. Muslim 
immigrants come from many different continents with many different skin colors (Dunn, 
Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Galonnier 2015; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015). In others, it is 
deceptively simple. Despite the findings here and in other research that this is not necessarily 
based on skin color, the racialization of Muslims contributes to perceptions that Muslims do not 
belong in the US. The racial project of defining Muslims as terrorists draws boundaries around a 
social group as not only distinct from others, but as an enemy. 
This has implications for integration and assimilation of Muslims into US society. Over time, 
many groups not considered “White” in the US were eventually assimilated into dominant 
culture, e.g. Irish and Italians.  Some even argue this is true of Jews today, who were considered 
largely non-white in Europe and the US in the early 20th Century and, who like Muslims, are 
associated with a religious affiliation (Hafez 2019; Skenderovic and Späti 2019). It is unclear if 
Muslims will be able to integrate and/or assimilate into US society in some manner. Currently, 
Muslims are viewed more as a threat than a disadvantaged group and are seen less favorably and 
less deserving of legal protections than other religious minorities in the west (Meer and Modood 
2009). Numerous studies indicate that Muslims of all skin colors experience discrimination 
across Western societies including the US (Galonnier 2015; Herda 2018; Mansson McGinty 
2020; Selod 2019), the UK (Moosavi 2015), Canada (Wilkins 2018), Ireland (Carrand Haynes 
2015), and Australia (Dunn, Klocker and Salabay 2007). 
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Some racialized groups are perceived as un-assimilated and much research argues they are 
unable to do so due to specifics of their racialization and oppression, e.g. African Americans 
(Massey and Mullan 1984; Massey and Denton 1993). Consequently, Islamophobia and its 
accompanying discrimination and violence presents a barrier for Muslims to integrate and 
assimilate.  Islamophobia has increased in the US and Europe since the 1990’s, especially 
following the 9/11 attacks (Nebhan 2017; Skenderovic and Späti 2019) and is still used in 
contemporary politics. Some scholars have linked this to increases in the movement of 
population groups globally, which prompts reactions from dominant social groups in destination 
countries to maintain status (Gans 2017). While this may certainly be the case, I find more 
evidence in this dissertation that links Islamophobic attitudes to specific political orientations in 
the US, particularly those who favor right-wing authoritarianism (Beck and Plant 2018). The 
anti-Muslim/ anti-Immigrant populist movements that gained traction in both Europe and the US 
in response to the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis are almost exclusively far-right in orientation 
(Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019; Teitelbaum 2019; Vieten and Poynting 2016). These 
movements did not simply appear in response to a new refugee crisis but were long-standing 
political orientations of right-wing parties that developed throughout the early 21st Century 
(Williams 2010). Contemporary anti-immigrant, nativist, and nationalistic populism, of which 
Islamophobia is one expression, are rooted in large-scale social changes precipitated by 
globalization, deindustrialization, and technological changes of the 21st Century. 
Public Fear and Reinforcing Spirals 
I argue that fear of terrorism is associated with politicalized media consumption. In chapter 4 
I address the public’s fear of a terrorist attack compared with the public’s fear of a mass shooting 
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in the Granite State Poll. Both of these interrelated constructs have garnered a great deal of mass 
media attention and political debate in recent years. Both are relatively rare in occurrence but 
have severe consequences when they do occur. I find that, despite the similarities and overlap in 
definitions and measures of “terror attacks” and “mass shootings”, fear of terrorist attacks and 
fear of mass shootings is predicted by an individual’s interaction with social institutions such as 
political parties and media consumption, even when controlling for characteristics that already 
influence fear of criminal victimization. I conclude that, when members of the public report that 
they are worried about victimization in a terrorist attack versus a mass shooting, they are 
responding to messages about violence communicated via mass media including who a terrorist 
is and who a mass shooter is. If the public is simply worried about the violence of these events, 
then there should not be a statistically significant difference in who reports fear/worry about 
terrorist attacks and mass shootings. In contrast, selective exposure to partisan mass media 
sources predicts likelihood of worrying about one or the other, even when controlling for 
background characteristics and prior political beliefs. Clearly, the labels of “Terrorist Attack” 
and “Mass Shooting” evoke distinct images and ideas separate from the violence that takes place, 
and news media is a source of those differences for the general public. 
The findings in this dissertation project can be interpreted in the context of criminological 
research on the fear of crime victimization. My findings cast doubt on the mainstream 
vulnerability hypothesis. In other words, I find limited evidence that fear of violent crime 
victimization is the result of perceived inability to resist or defend against violence. For example, 
respondents who possessed a gun in the home reported less fear of a mass shooting and yet were 
no less worried than others about a terrorist attack. Nevertheless, sex and age are still significant 
predictors of fear of violent victimization in most models tested. I do find evidence to reject the 
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notion that women’s expressed fear of crime generally is a fear of sexual assault specifically 
(Franklin and Franklin 2009 make a similar claim). Neither do I find support for the social 
learning perspective of a gendered fear of crime (Rader and Haynes 2011), or evidence to 
support the overestimation hypothesis (Callanan and Teasdale 2009; Snedker 2012). In other 
words, because female respondents were more fearful of terrorist attacks than mass shootings, I 
do not think that their fears can be explained by legitimated fears, gender socialization, nor 
statistical overestimation. My results are much more consistent with other studies of the fear of 
terrorism (see Brück and Müller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 2012), although I find 
additional influence of political orientation and selective media exposure. These findings suggest 
a need for further research testing fear of victimization theories. 
Additionally, I find a confounding relationship between age and fear of victimization. Older 
respondents were more likely to report being worried about a terrorist attack than younger 
respondents, although this is not always statistically significant. When examining fear of 
victimization in a mass shooting, I find that younger respondents are significantly and 
consistently more worried than older respondents. This suggests that individuals are evaluating 
their risk of victimization not in relation to their ability to resist, but in their proximity to 
perceived targets or to be targets. Woods et al (2008) similarly found that individuals who lived 
closer to presumed terrorist “targets” were more fearful of victimization in a terrorist attack. 
Again, additional research into perceptions of violent victimization vulnerability among age 
groups is prudent in light of these findings. 
I also examined the role of gun ownership on fear of violent victimization. My analysis 
suggests that gun ownership is not simply a protective factor for violent victimization, but a 
180 
reflection of deeply held social and political beliefs. Individuals who own a firearm are not 
simply attempting to defend themselves against victimization as some suggest (see Strobe, 
Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Turchan, Zeoli, and Kwiatkowski 2017; Warner and Thrash 
2020) or deter violent victimization as others assert (see Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004). Instead, 
I find evidence that gun culture in the United States influences people’s views about violent 
crime, particularly mass violence events. For example, in the GSP analysis I find that gun owners 
are not significantly different from non-gun owners in their worry about a terrorist attack; 
however, gun owners are significantly less worried about a mass shooting. If protection and 
deterrence were the primary mechanisms by which gun owners evaluate their risk of 
victimization, this disparity would be unlikely. I find support for the hypotheses that gun owners 
base their opinions on mass shootings on political beliefs (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2017) 
because mass shootings are often followed by politicians talking about gun control policies 
(Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass 
2016; Vizzard 2015). Additionally, this is further supported when we consider that individuals 
who own guns frequently own multiple firearms and are more likely to be involved in 
organization that promote gun rights (Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017). The predictability 
of gun ownership and fear is a reflection of the unique gun culture and politics in the US. 
Relatedly, I find additional support for my hypothesis that fear of terrorism is linked to social 
identities as well as anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment in the GSP analysis, particularly 
when examining the effects of religious attendance and political leanings. There is frequently a 
link between one’s political leanings and religious affiliation (Risen and Ksiazkiewicz 2015), 
however I find independent effects of religiosity and politics in my analyses. In particular, semi-
frequent and very-frequent religious attendees are more worried about a terrorist attack than non-
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religious respondents, however they are not more likely to worry about a mass shooting. Again, 
this demonstrates that these respondents are not just concerned about the violence, after all 
religious centers have been targets of mass shootings as well as terrorist attacks. Rather, this is 
reflective of a worldview that is antagonistic with Muslims and Islam and leans on traditionalist 
views of the US as a white-Christian dominant society (Gorski 2017). This should not be too 
surprising when we consider that other research found that Muslims are the least trusted group 
by highly religious Americans, and considered the definitive outsider group (Hinze, Mencken, 
and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012). 
Further, religiosity can limit individuals’ ability to acquire and process some types of 
political information, particularly when it contradicts their closely held beliefs (Gaskins 2019). 
This may partly explain why a terrorist attack, which is associated with Islam, invokes more fear 
among religious respondents than a mass shooting. I find support for studies which have also 
shown bias against Muslims in US public attitudes (see Blackman 2018; Hinze, Mencken, and 
Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012; Thomas 2004), and among certain mainline and fundamentalist 
Christian sects in the US (Hinze, Mencken, and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012). This is particularly 
pronounced among conservative Christians in the US (Yancy, Eisenstein, and Burge 2017), who 
may feel a greater status threat from other religious groups, especially when they are seen as 
foreign. While increased contact with out-groups is typically associated with reductions in 
antagonistic feelings, the opposite may be true in the case of US conservative Christians and 
evangelicals who are were more likely to have low levels of respect for Islam (Jung 2012; Pevey 
and McKenzie 2009). This is consistent with my other findings that conclude that people with 
conservative ideologies and institutions are more likely to express fear of terrorism and, 
therefore, Muslims.   
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This is especially true of their selection in media. In my analysis of Granite State Poll data, I 
find support for the reinforcing spirals model (Slater 2007, 2015) in that listeners to conservative 
talk radio are more likely to worry about a terrorist attack than others, even when controlling for 
background characteristics and prior political beliefs. Conversely, NHPR listeners are more 
likely to worry about a mass shooting than a terrorist attack, although this was also the case in 
viewers of non-partisan local TV news. Further, while NHPR listeners skew toward liberal 
political orientation, their news coverage is decidedly non-partisan. While some previous 
research believes the reinforcing spirals effects to be symmetric, i.e. affecting conservative and 
liberals similarly, I do not argue this point. Even though not all conservative talk radio host share 
the same outlook (Mort 2012), I find evidence that supports the perspective that conservatives 
are more prone to media reinforcing spirals (see McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, 
Wicks et al 2014). Just prior to the Fall 2017 GSP, a mass shooting in Las Vegas, NV occurred 
and dominated news media sources during the survey collection period. It is reasonable to 
presume that much of the worry about mass shootings reported by WMUR viewers and NHPR 
listeners is reflective of this single event. These findings also support research that asserts 
conservative media pushes individuals further from reality than liberal preferred media such as 
NHPR. For example, conservative media sources frequently contradict scientific research and 
influence individuals’ perceptions on critical issues such as climate change and public health (see 
Bolin and Hamilton 2018). This demonstrates that the effects of the propaganda machine are 
targeted at a particular group of people: conservative and conservative leaning voters. 
Conservative party discipline and authoritarian tendencies make the propaganda effect more 
pronounced. This makes sense when we consider public opinion data that shows that liberals 
trust a wider range of sources than conservatives, with the notable exception of FOX News 
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(Jurkowitz, Mitchell, Shearer, and Walker 2020). Conservatives conversely trust FOX News and 
a limited range of conservative media much more than sources to which liberals listen (ibid.). 
The effect of reinforcing spirals does appear to be stronger on conservatives based on my 
findings and other related studies (McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 
2014). Therefore, the effect of the reinforcing spiral is not symmetrical and not equivalent, 
despite the evidence that “both sides” engage in the politics of fear. 
The political and social ramifications of the fear of terrorism in the US have been much more 
damaging than the fear of mass shootings, in so much as these are framed as separate issues in 
the news media. This study also demonstrates that the social construction of terrorism as a 
foreign, Muslim threat is not simply a top-down phenomenon where media dictates what the 
public think, rather it is something that involves active participation of media consumers. The 
type of media consumed may be chosen based on the audiences’ attitudes and beliefs while also 
reinforcing and amplifying their viewpoints. 
Broader Implications and Policy Recommendations 
This dissertation primarily deals with the issues of fear, violence, and racialization in the 21st 
Century by studying media effects, and contributes to theories of Agenda Setting, Framing, and 
Reinforcing Spirals. A wealth of research into both societal and individual perceptions of risk 
has found that there is often a disconnect in terms of our perceptions of risk and the risks that we 
actually face (Woods et al 2008). Issues such as diseases, vaccines, natural disasters, car 
accidents, climate change, and other threats to our well-being may be attributed far greater or far 
less probability of inflicting harm than is actually the case. The general public often lacks 
information about topics, or even rejects evidence that opposes with their core beliefs (Nickerson 
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1998). In some cases, experts are distrusted by segments of the public. This has been 
demonstrated in research about public trust in the science of vaccines and climate change (e.g. 
Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Hamilton et al 2015). Public perceptions of crime rates and prevalence 
of violent offenses are also frequently out of line with what official statistics reflect, terrorism 
and mass shootings being misunderstood in a similar vein. The average person is not very adept 
at assessing risk, particularly when it comes to these types of high-impact, low-probability events 
(Woods 2007). When our views are out of sync with regard to a whole host of phenomena, the 
consequences can be disastrous when enhanced and operating at the societal level. 
Notably, I find quantitative confirmation of the theoretical and qualitative work in David 
Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017). Throughout my dissertation, I find 
that media, politics, and fear play a significant role in the construction of Muslims as terrorists. 
In this conclusion chapter, I discuss how this is used for the political and economic gain of 
societal elites. It is important to note that the politics of fear is not new, nor is it unique to 
terrorism. Evidence in this dissertation points to a politics of fear around mass shootings and gun 
violence as well. However, these are not equivalent as the politics of fear around terrorism have 
much greater and more damaging consequences. These include the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
controversial legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, and the scapegoating of minority 
populations in the US and Europe. 
Taken together, my research links the fear of terrorism among individuals in the public more 
directly to the propaganda and institutional biases that have used and exacerbated these 
xenophobic tendencies in American society. Racial tensions have been a fact of American life 
since the founding of the nation, and newer immigrant groups often bear the brunt of hostility 
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from the dominant majority. In the case of US Muslims, the fear of a threat to dominant 
American culture posed by these non-white foreigners is leveraged and exacerbated by powerful 
social actors. Not only has this detrimentally affected a vulnerable minority population in the US, 
the proliferation of fear around immigrants and Muslims have had far-reaching consequences to 
national security and global stability. 
As of the writing of this dissertation, the efforts by the United States to combat terrorist 
organizations in response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of 2001 – the bulk of 
which have been focused on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars – is now in its’ 18th year, with few 
results to show for it. Although President Obama announced an “end” to Operation Enduring 
Freedom in 2014, the US Government’s official name for the War on Terror, the conflict 
continues to this day and US forces still operate in multiple theaters in the Middle East. Some US 
Troops are now fighting in a war that started before they were born – a first in American history. 
Nearly two decades on, the consequences of the War on Terror are disastrous for both the United 
States and the world. 
Of the objectives outlined by President Bush during the launching of the War on Terror, the 
only real success is the elimination of many high-ranking members of al Qaeda. The most 
notable is the killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy SEALs in 2011. The original al Qaeda 
organization was destroyed. However, the Taliban still operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
many al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa have since grown in strength, and the 
brutal Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, arose out of the wars in Iraq and Syria. 
In fact, the US failed to achieve most of its objectives and exacerbated many of the 
underlying conditions that terrorist organizations seek to exploit. The conflicts in Afghanistan 
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and Iraq have directly resulted in the deaths of thousands of US Troops, caused millions of 
civilian casualties, and cost trillions of taxpayer dollars (Watson Institute for International and 
Public Affairs 2020). Countless others bear the physical and psychological scars of these 
conflicts and will for the rest of their lives (ibid.). To this day, the mission is ill-defined, with no 
clear enemy, and no end in sight (Coll 2018). The extreme violence of ISIL – which was formed 
as a direct result of US action in Iraq – triggered the world’s largest refugee crisis since the 
Second World War (Stern and Berger 2015). This contributed to the destabilization of the 
European Union, the rise of reactionary far-right groups across Western democracies, and the 
2016 Brexit decision. 
The US is not winning the war of ideas either. The controversial policies enacted to combat 
terrorist organizations such as the drone warfare program, extraordinary rendition of terror 
suspects, indefinite detention of enemy combatants, and torture of prisoners squandered much of 
the international goodwill the US cultivated after the Cold War. This, combined with anti-
Muslim rhetoric from politicians, provides a treasure trove of propaganda for anti-US 
organizations seeking to recruit disaffected young people (Stern and Berger 2015). Military force 
alone cannot defeat extremist ideologies. 
Domestically, the War on Terror is just as problematic. The USA PATRIOT Act allowed for 
the development of a surveillance apparatus of Orwellian proportions under the pretense of 
protecting US citizens from terrorism. Intelligence and Law Enforcement agencies, in 
cooperation with telecom companies, now collect millions of private communications every day. 
The War on Terror also furthered the militarization of domestic police forces in the US. The 
187 
Pentagon’s controversial 1033 program directly provides surplus military uniforms, weapons, 
equipment, and vehicles to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the US. 
The focus on foreign groups also means that the US has overlooked many domestic 
extremists. The FBI estimates that most terrorist attacks in the US are carried out by homegrown 
actors (FBI 2005). Criminologists conclude that anti-US terror groups are much more likely to 
attack US targets abroad than in the US homeland (LaFree et al 2009). Terrorist attacks in the US 
which result in fatalities are predominantly carried out by individuals espousing far-right 
ideologies, such as white supremacism, militia affiliation, radical anti-abortion views, and incel 
extremism. These domestic threats are largely ignored by the War on Terror and are now boiling 
over as our politics become increasingly contentious. 
Nearly two decades of costly wars, heated rhetoric, erosion of civil liberties, and 
fearmongering have not made the US safer. If anything, we are more vulnerable while the fear of 
terrorism is used as a political weapon against vulnerable minorities. In response to ISIL-inspired 
attacks in 2015-2016, Donald Trump campaigned on banning Muslims from entering the US to 
combat terrorism. During his presidency, he has tried to do exactly that, and continues to vilify 
non-white immigrants. Recently, hate crimes targeting minorities, especially individuals 
perceived to be Muslim or immigrants have skyrocketed (Levin and Reitel 2018), and white 
supremacist groups are a resurgent menace. President Trump’s foreign policies have resulted in 
the US becoming increasingly isolated from allies (Yarhi-Milo 2018), haphazardly participating 
in existing Middle Eastern conflicts, all while simultaneously courting war with Iran. 
The War on Terror is a multi-generational conflict, with no end in sight (Coll 2018). The US 
cannot win if there is no clear-cut enemy, objectives are ambiguous, conditions of victory are ill-
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defined, and thoughtful follow through is absent. To truly make the US safer, a policy shift to 
address root causes of terrorism is necessary rather than playing whack a mole in Middle East. 
The US must act humanely in the pursuit of security, both at home and abroad, or risk creating 
more terrorists. Careless foreign military interventions are unsustainable. The erosion of 
Americans’ civil liberties is intolerable. The current administration’s words and actions against 
Muslims, treatment of immigrants, and stoking of racial conflict are unacceptable and antithetical 
to American values. The US government’s inaction in the face of growing domestic extremist 
violence is inexcusable. The distraction from arguably greater risks to national security such as 
increasing economic inequality and global climate change threatens not just the US, but the 
entire world. 
Far-right extremist groups pose a clear and present danger to the national security of the 
United States. A Department of Homeland Security (2009) report warned about a grown 
recruitment effort by far-right extremist groups since the 2007/2008 recession. Yet, the public’s 
attention remained focused on radical Islamic extremists in the following decade. News media 
consistently underemphasizes the threat posed by far-right domestic extremist groups, while also 
contributing to the racist ideologies that they often espouse. This threat posed by far-right 
domestic groups and individuals deserves at least equivalent attention to the threat posed by 
foreign groups and radical Islamists. Arguably, climate change, inequality, and healthcare are 
even greater concerns. Conservative news media is intentionally working to erode public trust in 
science on the issues of climate change, vaccinations, and pandemics. These distortions of fact 
about terrorism and extremist violence is found in this dissertation, as well as those found by 
others researching the acceptance of science around climate change, vaccines, and public health 
(see Bolin and Hamilton 2018 for an example) are dangerous, and cost human lives. 
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The tension exists between terrorism being framed as a foreign threat, committed by 
Muslims, and the academic understanding of terrorism in the US as a more complex and nuanced 
phenomenon. By emphasizing terrorism as something that foreigners do, specifically Muslims, 
the responses and actions to address the problem will be focused on foreigners. This is perhaps 
why terrorism frequently is also discussed alongside issues of immigration, despite official 
statistics reflecting that most terrorist threats in the US are primarily linked to domestic or 
homegrown actors. The members of the public who accept this interpretation of terrorism and its 
response want to blame foreigners for the problems that the US faces today, and for the anomic 
state that they are experiencing. Not only this, these individuals interpret the societal changes as 
a threat to their status, as evidenced by the heightened fear of terrorist attacks by individuals who 
belong to some traditionally dominant social groups. 
At the same time, social elites seek to maintain and enhance their wealth and power. For 
many of these elites, evil foreigners are a convenient scapegoat. Often times, societal elites have 
overemphasized and even invented alleged threats to which they conveniently have the only 
viable solution. This occurs even when these solutions contradict academic research, official 
statistics, or do not logically fit the available evidence. For example, elites have cited a terrorist 
attack, such as the 2015 San Bernardino attack as a reason to restrict immigration from Muslim 
countries despite the fact that the attack was carried out by US citizens. Similarly, elites 
proposed the notion that Saddam Hussein had WMDs and ties to Al Qaeda and the only way to 
remedy the situation was to depose him were two claims by the Bush administration used to 
justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These were based on falsified intelligence and have never 
proven to be factual to this day. Several politicians have claimed that Latin American immigrants 
are dangerous criminals, which has been thoroughly debunked by criminological research 
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(Barranco and Shihadeh 2015, Barranco et al 2018, Feldmeyer et al 2015, Feldmeyer et al 2018, 
Ferraro 2016, Harris and Feldmeyer 2013, Light 2017, Light and Miller 2018, Ousey and Kubrin 
2009, Reid et al 2005, Vaughn and Salas-Wright 2018; Wadsworth 2010; also see Ousey and 
Kubrin 2018 for a review), and that the only solution is to build a costly and ineffective wall. We 
must ask why supposedly rational human beings would support a position that all available 
evidence suggests will be ineffective (Massey et al 2016). These strategies are useful for societal 
elites because a proportion of the US public already believes that these premises are true. It 
deflects attention away from domestic problems, or the reality of the alleged problems. 
In a world that faces a multitude of risks (Beck 1992), it is important that we, as a society and 
a species, appropriately prioritize risks and how we will address them. In practical terms, as a 
global society this includes the need to prioritize what is important both objectively, as actual 
threats to well-being, and subjectively in terms of what kind of lives we want to live. Arguably, 
the biggest two threats are healthcare and climate change in an objective sense when it comes to 
our survival and, therefore, to most any subjectively lived good life. As we have seen in the 
current COVID-19 crisis, one “little” virus can cripple the world without even impacting the 
physical resources that are available to us in a major way. The ever-growing threat of global 
climate change adds in an impact on resources that could potentially unravel civilization as we 
know it. 
Nevertheless, extremist violence has very real consequences and must be taken seriously. 
One clear application of these analyses from an implications and policy standpoint is that, both 
as individuals and as a society, we tend to over-emphasize the threats presented by some 
individuals or groups and under-emphasize those presented by others. Since the attacks of 
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September 11, 2001, counterterrorism has been made a top priority of the US government. This 
has involved a massive allocation of resources to combat what is perceived as a dire threat to 
national security. Even looking past racially discriminatory processes that may be at work, 
protecting public safety effectively may require a better alignment between how we frame the 
terrorism phenomenon and the risks that we actually face. In other words, if terrorism is a unique 
threat and type of mass violence that we deem worthy of targeted policies and enhanced 
resources, then “getting it right” is especially important. The entities charged with protecting the 
US homeland must consider a wide range of threats, and taking domestic groups seriously is as 
important as the focus on international terrorism. On a positive note, there has been a recent 
acknowledgement within parts of the Federal government agencies that the threat posed by white 
supremacist and other far right groups pose a threat to national security on par with Islamic 
radicals (for example, see the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019)9. 
Terrorism is a complex problem with no easy solutions. Counterterrorism is especially 
difficult to get right and must be done thoughtfully or risk creating more terrorists. Research 
shows that poorly managed counterterrorism policies that result in social exclusion, 
discrimination, and hate crime victimization could foster negative emotions and end up creating 
more terrorists in the long run (see Agnew 2010). It is reasonable to hypothesize that 
discrimination, both experienced and perceived, may further alienate individuals who already 
face the challenges of integrating into a society. By focusing on the racial characteristics and 
religious motivations of terrorist offenders, we ignore the historical and systemic root causes of 
extremist violence. More attention to these forces is needed outside of academia.  
 
9 For more information on this proposed legislation visit https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s894/BILLS-
116s894is.xml 
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In the digital era, media consumers have not rationally taken in multiple opinions to weigh 
evidence when given access to the wealth of human knowledge. Nor has the average person 
become more educated about the social issues of the day. The alleged openness and freedom of 
the internet are an illusion when large companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, 
Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter control a disproportionate amount of information that the average 
internet user encounters on a daily basis. The websites these companies operate censor content 
that appears in people’s news feeds and search results to fit the messages they want to portray. 
Conversely, they frequently allow misinformation to spread with little in the way of verification 
of information or fact checking (Iosifidis and Nicoli 2020). Although the “fake news” moniker 
that arose out of the 2016 election is frequently misused, it is nevertheless a real issue when 
insidious actors such as Vladimir Putin are so easily able to stoke discord in Western 
democracies (Moretto Ribeiro and Ortellado 2018; Tandoc, Jenkins, and Craft 2019). 
The mass media landscape is fundamentally different from what it was thirty years ago. 
While on the face of it, consumers have a greater wealth of media sources to choose from, they 
are controlled by a small number of multinational media conglomerates such as Disney, News 
Corp, and Comcast. In the US today, ninety percent of television and film media is currently 
controlled by only six companies (Lutz 2012). This enormous shift in homogenization due to 
changes in the structure and laws of mass media can be directly linked to telecom deregulation in 
the 1990’s that was allowed by the Telecommunications Act, signed by Bill Clinton in 1996 
(McCabe 2016). The subsequent decades of mergers and acquisitions by the largest mass media 
companies have led to a news and entertainment media landscape that is increasingly dominated 
by a few points of view. Walt Disney alone controlled an estimated 38% of all North American 
Box office earnings in 2019 (Coyle 2019). This must be undone. The deregulation of mass media 
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and the relaxing of FCC guidelines and rules have allowed monopolies to form and propaganda 
to masquerade as news. 
Today’s media landscape is one of extreme compartmentalization where news sources that 
support and confirm previously held beliefs are preferred over those that challenge beliefs, a 
phenomenon especially present in the conservative media environment (Jurkowitz 2020; 
McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 2014). The channels of information in 
the digital age have become more restrictive rather than more open. This has been mirrored in 
traditional news media with the growth of partisan news outlets (Jones 2002; Mayer 2004). 
Conservative news outlets such as FOX News are mouthpieces for billionaires such as Rupert 
Murdoch, owner of the massive News Corp media conglomerate. Conservative talk radio shows 
are barely disguised propaganda, whose hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity 
regularly stir controversy and partisanship (Conway, Grabe and Grieves 2004). In 2020, even 
these traditional news media sources contribute to the spread of biased or outright false 
information. 
The politics of fear are not new, and it is unlikely to go away, although it may be directed at 
new targets in the future. So, what is next and what can be done? Clearly, traditional mass media 
still exerts a significant influence on the public in the digital era. However, with the growing 
influence of digital media, and use of social media as a primary news source, more research is 
needed. The 2016 Presidential election exposed the pitfalls and perils of the contemporary mass 
media structures. The “fake news” problem, and the degree to which it exists and impacts us, are 
still heavily debated. Regardless, this demonstrates two things: 1. misinformation can be spread 
through populations more easily than ever before; and 2. even the most open-minded and 
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educated person can be impacted by media bubbles. Societal elites will continue to leverage 
social fear for their own gain, and their efforts can now bypass traditional media filters entirely. 
In this dissertation I have demonstrated, as have others, that what we are worried about as a 
society is influenced by what mass media are telling us. The way we prioritize problems and 
issues is partly based on the information that is coming from these sources. When examining 
trends over the long term because perception of what is and is not the most important problem 
changes over time, this demonstrates a myopic view of social issues. The public tends to focus 
on the immediate and readily apparent concerns and not long-term causes and consequences of 
social issues. As a society, it is apparent that we have a fairly short attention span for issues that 
are rooted in structural conditions, such as terrorism or inequality or the economy or healthcare 
or immigration. None of those things are easy to fix in a short time but we jump from one to the 
other at a fairly rapid pace. 
This is also concerning as I and others have demonstrated that the information and opinions 
presented in mass media is often not the reality that is reflected in official statistics or rigorous 
scientific research. Additionally, I like others, find that not all media outlets are created equally, 
and some are more guilty of distorting the public’s views than others. The damage of this 
myopic, often inaccurate, and increasingly partisan media landscape is readily apparent when we 
examine the current state of domestic and global politics. The divisions and inequalities we face 
as a society are not a reflection of a natural state of the world or moral order. They are created by 
actors who seek to grow their own power and wealth at the expense of the common good. The 
politics of fear is very intentionally used to obfuscate societal elites’ goals and redirect attention 
from social problems to a grab-bag of scapegoats. 
195 
The good news is that we do not have to buy into it. As consumers of mass media, critical 
media analysis, i.e. evaluating the validity, accuracy, and reliability of the media we consume, is 
more important than ever. Making good choices about where we get our news is critical as well. 
Beyond what we as individuals can do to address misinformation, structural solutions can 
address these problems before individuals need to take action. We, as a nation and a species, face 
a turning point in history when we can still avert total disaster. This requires collective action. 
Strong democratic institutions are an essential safeguard against the moral panics around 
racialized mass violence. Additionally, re-regulation of mass media, including internet media, 
and a reversal of nearly thirty years of failed telecommunications policy can help restore a true 
diversity of perspective and restrict the proliferation of false information. 
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Appendix 1 (MIP). Timeline of Major Terrorist/Mass Violence Events Impacting the US 
1995-2016 
Date Year Event Location 
19 April 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing Oklahoma City, OK 
24 April 1995 Final Unabomber Attack Sacramento, CA 
03 April 1996 Ted Kaczynski Arrested Lincoln, MT 
24 April 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Signed  
15 June 1996 IRA Manchester Bombing Manchester, UK 
27 July 1996 Centennial Olympic Park Bombing Atlanta, GA 
30 October 1996 ELF Arson of Oakridge Ranger Station Oakridge, OR 
07 August 1998 East African US Embassy Bombings Kenya/Tanzania 
15 August 1998 Omagh Bombing RIRA Northern Ireland, UK 
19 October 1998 ELF Arson of Vail Ski Resort Vail, CO 
17 February 1999 Israeli Consulate Attack by Kurdish Rebels Germany 
20 April 1999 Columbine Mass Shooting Littleton, CO 
12 October 2000 USS Cole Bombing Yemen 
21 May 2001 ELF Arson of University of Washington Seattle, WA 
11 June 2001 Timothy McVeigh Executed Terra Haute, IN 
11 September 2001 Al Qaeda Attacks on WTC and Pentagon NY/VA/PA 
26 October 2001 USA PATRIOT Act Signed into Law  
October 2001 US Invades Afghanistan  
Oct.-Nov. 2001 Anthrax Mail Attacks NY, D.C., FL, NV, 
CT 
22 December 2001 Attempted Shoe Bombing (American Airlines) Paris, FR/Boston, 
MA 
04 July 2002 El Al Israeli Airlines Shooting Los Angeles, CA 
October 2002 Beltway Sniper Attacks D.C., MD, VA 
23 October 2002 Moscow Theater Siege Russia 
25 November 2002 Homeland Security Act signed into Law  
March 2003 US Invades Iraq  
11 March 2004 Al Qaeda Madrid Train Bombings Spain 
28 June 2004 Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decided (GITMO)  
01 September 2004 Beslan School Siege Russia 
07 July 2005 Al Qaeda London Bombings UK 
December 2005 13 ELF Members Arrested  
03 March 2006 Vehicular Attack at UNC Chapel Hill, NC 
29 June 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decided (GITMO)  
17 October 2006 Military Commissions Act of 2006 signed into Law  
16 April 2007 Virginia Tech Shooting Blacksburg, VA 
12 June 2008 Boumediene v. Bush decided (GITMO)  
27 July 2008 Unitarian Church Shooting Knoxville, TN 
 2009 Attempted NYC Subway Bombing New York, NY 
01 June 2009 Military Recruitment Center Shooting Little Rock, AK 
10 June 2009 National Holocaust Museum Memorial Shooting Washington, D.C. 
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05 November 2009 FT Hood Shooting Killeen, TX 
25 December 2009 Attempted Underwear Bombing Detroit, MI 
18 February 2010 IRS Airplane Attack Austin, TX 
04 March 2010 Pentagon Shooting Arlington, VA 
01 May 2010 Attempted Times Square Bombing New York, NY 
01 September 2010 Discovery Communications Hostage Taking Silver Spring, MD 
Oct./Nov. 2010 Series of Shootings Against US Military Buildings VA 
November 2010 WikiLeaks Begins Releasing US Diplomatic Cables  
06/07 January 2011 Mail Bombs Sent to MD Gov., US SoT, US SHS MD, D.C. 
January 2011 Arab Spring Protests begin in Middle East/North Africa  
08 January 2011 Shooting of US Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and Others Tucson, AZ 
17 January 2011 Attempted Bombing of MLK March Spokane, WA 
15 March 2011 Syrian Civil War Begins  
02 May 2011 Osama Bin Laden Killed in US Raid Pakistan 
22 July 2011 Utoya/Oslo Norway Attacks (Anders Brevik) Norway 
18 December 2011 US Troops Withdraw from Iraq  
31 December 2011 NDAA Authorizes Indefinite Detention of Terror Suspects  
01 January 2012 NYC Anti-Muslim Incendiary Attacks New York, NY 
20 July 2012 Aurora Theater Shooting Aurora, CO 
05 August 2012 Sikh Temple Shooting Oak Creek, WI 
11 September 2012 Benghazi US Diplomatic Compound Attack Libya 
February 2013 Christopher Dorner Attacks and Standoff CA 
15 April 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing Boston, MA 
19 April 2013 Tsarnaev Brothers Shootout and Apprehension MA 
June 2013 Edward Snowden NSA Surveillance Leaks  
01 November 2013 LAX TSA Shooting Los Angeles, CA 
12 April 2014 Bundy Armed Standoff Near Bunkerville, 
NV 
13 April 2014 Jewish Community Center Attack Overland Park, KS 
April-June 2014 Ali Muhammed Brown Shootings WA, NJ 
23 May 2014 UCSB Incel Attacks Isla Vista, CA 
24 May 2014 ISIL Jewish Museum of Brussels Attack Belgium 
June 2014 Interest in ISIL Begins on Google Trends  
06 June 2014 Forsyth County Courthouse Attack Cumming, GA 
08 June 2014 Las Vegas Wal-Mart Attack Las Vegas, NV 
15 June 2014 US Assessment, Advising, and Surveillance of ISIL begins Iraq 
07 August 2014 President Obama orders airstrikes against ISIL Iraq 
September 2014 US Allies begin airstrikes against ISIL Iraq 
11 September 2014 US Rep. Cleaver Offices Attack Kansas City, MO 
12 September 2014 PA State Trooper Barracks Attack Blooming Grove, PA 
22 October 2014 Canadian Parliament Attack Ottawa, ON Canada 
23 October 2014 NYC Hatchet Attack New York, NY 
20 December 2014 NYC Police Shooting New York, NY 
07 January 2015 Charlie Hebdo Shooting Paris, France 
03 May 2015 Curtis Culwell Center Attack Garland, TX 
17 June 2015 Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church Shooting Charleston, SC 
16 July 2015 Military Recruitment/Support Center Attacks Chattanooga, TN 
23 July 2015 “Trainwreck” Theater Shooting Lafayette, LA 
August 2015 Interest in Syrian Refugee Crisis begins on Google Trends  
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01 October 2015 Umpqua Community College Incel Attack Roseburg, OR 
04 November 2015 UC Merced Knife Attacks Merced, CA 
13 November 2015 ISIL Paris Attacks France 
23 November 2015 BLM Rally Attack Minneapolis, MN 
27 November 2015 Planned Parenthood Attack Colorado Springs, 
CO 
02 December 2015 San Bernardino Attack San Bernardino, CA 
07 December 2015 Candidate Trump calls for Muslim Travel Ban  
02 Jan.- 11 
Feb. 
2016 Occupation of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge Princeton, OR 
07 January 2016 Philadelphia Police Shooting Philadelphia, PA 
11 February 2016 Columbus Machete Attack Columbus, OH 
22 March 2016 ISIL Brussels Bombings Belgium 
12 June 2016 Pulse Nightclub Attack Orlando, FL 
07 July 2016 TN Police Shooting Bristol, TN 
07 July 2016 Dallas Police Shooting Dallas, TX 
14 July 2016 Nice Truck Attack France 
17 July 2016 Baton Rouge Police Shooting Baton Rouge, LA 
16 September 2016 Philadelphia Police Shooting Philadelphia, PA 
17/18 Sept. 2016 NY/NJ Bombings NY/NJ 
08 November 2016 Donald Trump elected President  
28 November 2016 OSU Vehicle Attack Columbus, OH 
19 December 2016 Berlin Christmas Market Attack Germany 




Appendix 2 (MCA). List of Suspects Sampled from Global Terrorism Database 
SUSPECT NAME RACE/ETHN. SEX NATIONALITY YEAR 
ABDUL RAZAK ALI ARTAN B M Somalia 2016 
ABDULHAKIM 
MUHAMMAD 
B M US 2009 
AHMAD AJAJ MENA M Palestine 1993 
AHMAD KHAN RAHAMI MENA M Afghanistan (Naturalized) 2016 
ALI MUHAMMAD BROWN B M US 2014 
AMANDA MILLER W F US 2014 
BENJAMIN NATHANIEL 
SMITH 
W M US 1999 
BRUCE IVINS W M US 2001 
BUFORD O'NEAL FURROW 
JR. 
W M US 1999 
CHARLES BISHOP W M US 2002 
DAHIR AHMED ADAN B M Somalia (Naturalized) 2016 
DENNIS MARX W M US 2014 
DYLANN ROOF W M US 2015 
DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV W M Russia (Naturalized) 2013 
EDWARD ARCHER B M US 2016 
ELTON SIMPSON B M US 2015 
ERIC FREIN W M US 2014 
ERIC RUDOLPH W M US 1996 
FAISAL MOHAMMAD MENA M US 2015 
FLOYD CORKINS B M US 2012 
FRAZIER GLENN CROSS 
[MILLER] 
W M US 2014 
GAVIN LONG B M US 2016 
HESHAM MOHAMED 
HADAYET 
MENA M Egypt 2002 
ISMAAIYL BRINSLEY B M US 2014 
JAMES CHARLES KOPP W M US 1998 
JAMES LEE Asian M US 2010 
JAMES W. VON BRUNN W M US 2009 
JERAD MILLER W M US 2014 
JIM DAVID ADKISSON W M US 2008 
JOHN PATRICK BEDELL W M US 2010 
JOHN RAYNE RIVELLO W M US 2016 
JOHN RUSSELL HOUSER W M US 2015 
JOHN SALVI III W M US 1994 
JOSEPH STACK W M US 2010 
JUSTIN NOJAN SULLIVAN W M US 2014 
LARRY MCQUILLIAMS W M US 2014 





MAHMUD ABOUHALIMA MENA M Egypt 1993 
MATTHEW WILLIAMS W M US 1999 
MICAH XAVIER JOHNSON B M US 2016 
MIR AIMAL KANSI MENA M Pakistan 1993 
MOHAMED BARRY B M Guinea 2016 
MOHAMMAD SALAMEH MENA M Palestine 1993 
MOHAMMAD YOUSSUF 
ABDULAZEEZ 
MENA M Kuwait (Naturalized) 2015 
MOHAMMED REZA 
TAHERI-AZAR 
MENA M Iran (Naturalized) 2006 
NADIR SOOFI MENA M US 2015 
NAVEED AFZAL HAQ MENA M US 2006 
NIDAL AYYAD MENA M Kuwait 1993 
NIDAL MALIK HASAN MENA M US 2009 
OMAR MATEEN MENA M US 2016 
PAUL CIANCIA W M US 2013 
RACHELLE SHANNON W F US 1992 
RAMZI YOUSEF MENA M Kuwait 1993 
ROBERT LEWIS DEAR W M US 2015 
RUSSELL WESTON W M US 1998 
SCOTT ROEDER W M US 2009 
SYED RIZWAN FAROOK MENA M US 2015 
TAMERLAN TSARNAEV W M Russia (Naturalized) 2013 
TASHFEEN MALIK MENA F Pakistan (Naturalized) 2015 
TED KACZYNSKI W M US 1993 
TIMOTHY MCVEIGH W M US 1995 
TYLER WILLIAMS W M US 1999 
UMAR FAROUK 
ABDULMUTALLAB 
B M Nigeria 2009 
WADE MICHAEL PAGE W M US 2012 
WASIL FAROOQUI MENA M US 2016 
ZALE THOMPSON B M US 2014 
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Appendix 3. Media Content analyses with Alternate Measures of Religion and Race 
TABLE A.1. PREDICTORS OF USE OF TERROR FRAME IN BROADCAST NEWS TRANSCRIPTS: 
MIXED-EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH A RANDOM INTERCEPT – ODDS RATIOS 
REPORTED (FOUR CATEGORY RACE/MUSLIM VARIABLE) 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
ABOUT 2.62 1.35 0.96  0.52 
YEAR 1.07* 0.03 0.07* 0.03 
EXPERT GUEST 6.58*** 2.52 1.89*** 0.38 
NUM. KILLED 1.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
WEAPON USED     
FIREARM - - - - 
OTHER WEAPON 4.31** 1.33 1.46** 0.47 
RELIGION AND 
RACE 
    
NOT-MUSLIM - - - - 
MUSLIM/WHITE 6.86 7.28 1.93 1.06 
MUSLIM/BLACK 16.95*** 13.03 2.83***  
MUSLIM/MENA 9.39*** 5.74 2.24*** 0.47 
PLACE OF BIRTH     
US BORN - - - - 
FOREIGN BORN 1.14 0.69 0.13 0.60 










0.88 0.27   
LR TEST VS FIXED 
EFFECTS 
p=0.0059    
 N = 312 
Groups = 57 
   





TABLE A.2. PREDICTORS OF USE OF TERROR FRAME IN BROADCAST NEWS TRANSCRIPTS: 
MIXED-EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH A RANDOM INTERCEPT – ODDS RATIOS 
REPORTED (THREE CATEGORY MENA/RI VARIABLE) 
 Odds Ratio Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. 
ABOUT 2.53 1.30 0.93 0.51 
YEAR 1.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 
EXPERT GUEST 6.61*** 2.54 1.89*** 0.38 
NUM. KILLED 1.03 0.02 1.09 0.02 
WEAPON USED     
FIREARM - - - - 
OTHER WEAPON 2.97* 1.33 1.09* 0.45 
IDEOLOGY AND 
RACE 
    
NOT-RI/NOT-MENA - - - - 
RI/NOT-MENA 20.72*** 12.95 3.03*** 0.62 
RI AND MENA 10.83*** 6.13 2.38*** 0.57 
PLACE OF BIRTH     
US BORN - - - - 
FOREIGN BORN 1.14 0.62 0.13 0.54 










0.71 0.27   
LR TEST VS FIXED 
EFFECTS 
p=0.032    
 N = 312 
Groups = 57 
   
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
The mediation effect of race/ethnicity by ideology may be the result of previous measures 
not properly accounting for the overlap found in Table A.1. Therefore, I created a new three 
category variable from the crosstabulation in Table A.1 to more accurately assess the effects on 
suspects’ race/ethnicity and ideology on use of the terrorism frame in broadcast news transcripts. 
The three-category variable is coded as: 1 = Not-Radical Islam/Not-MENA (N = 162); 2 = 
Radical Islam/Not-MENA (N = 72); 3 = Radical Islam/MENA (N = 78). This variable then 
replaces the old race/ethnicity and ideology measures. Both MENA and not-MENA categories 
which are associated with radical Islam are compared to cases which are not associated with 
either radical Islam or MENA suspects. In addition, the weapon used measure was simplified to 
reflect cases where the incident involved primarily firearms (coded 1, N = 192), and other 
weapons (coded 0, N = 120). Again, a mixed-effects logistic regression with a random intercept 
is used to estimate the effect of suspect’s characteristics on the use of the terror frame while 
controlling for characteristics of the incident and characteristics of the transcripts/cases. Table 4 
details the results of this analysis, reporting both odds ratios and coefficients. 
The mixed-effects logistic regression with a random intercept reported in Table A.2 
assesses the effect of the suspects’ association with radical Islamic ideologies, MENA 
race/ethnicity, and place of birth on use of the terrorism frame in broadcast news transcripts. The 
regression also includes whether the transcript is about the incident, the year in which the 
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incident took place, the number of people killed in the incident and the weapon used in the 
incident as control variables, and a group-level random effect on the incident id number from the 
GTD (coef. = 0.71, p=0.032). 
 
Whether the transcript was about the incident or not, the year in which the incident took 
place and the number of people killed in the incident are all not statistically significant predictors 
of use of the terrorism frame in broadcast news transcripts. The appearance of an expert guest 
increases the odds of transcripts using the terrorism frame by 561% (multiplied by 6.61, p<.001) 
compared with transcripts that did not feature an expert guest. Additionally, the type of weapon 
used was a significant predictor of use of the terrorism frame. Incidents which involved weapons 
other than firearms (multiplied by 2.97, p<.05) were more likely to be called terrorism than 
incidents which primarily involved firearms. As for suspect characteristics, the newly created 
three category race/ethnicity/ideology variable does significantly predict use of the terrorism 
frame. Compared to cases where the suspect was not associated with radical Islam or of MENA 
race/ethnicity, cases involving individuals associated with radical Islam, both not-MENA and of 
MENA race/ethnicity, were more likely to be discussed in the terrorism frame. Specifically, 
when cases involve suspects who are associated with radical Islam but not-MENA, the odds of 
the terror frame being used in transcripts increased by about 1972% (multiplied by 20.72, 
p<.001) when compared to cases involving not-radical Islam not-MENA suspects. When cases 
involve suspects who are both associated with radical Islam and of MENA race/ethnicity, this 
increases the odds that news transcripts will use the terrorism frame by about 983% (multiplied 
by 10.83, p<.001) compared with suspects who are not associated with radical Islam. Place of 
birth, however, was not a significant predictor. This finding provides strong evidence for an 
interaction effect between ideological affiliation and race/ethnicity when broadcast news 
organizations discuss mass violence. Essentially, even when accounting for association with 
radical Islamic ideologies, suspects who are or appear to be Middle Eastern are still more likely 
to be discussed as “terrorists” in news media. Interestingly, the odds of non-Middle Eastern 
suspects associated with Radical Islam being framed as “terrorists” is even higher. Figure 7 
below visually charts the finding in Table 4. 
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Figure A.1 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Suspect Race/Ethnicity and 
Ideology, with 95% Confidence Intervals – Three Category Measure 
 
This analysis does not, however fit as well as Model 4 in table A.2, as the group-level 
random effects are again statistically significant, meaning that factors outside the variables 
included influence variation between one incident and another. Taken together, it appears that 




Appendix 4. Granite State Poll Questions 
Questions Submitted by for Dissertation Research 
05 October 2017 
Question with two versions (assigned randomly to half sample): 
Version 1: “How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a mass 
shooting?” 
Version 2: “How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a 
terrorist attack?” 
Answers (flip order randomly): 
“Very worried”; “Somewhat worried”; “Not too worried”; “Not worried at all” 
Questions Typically Included in GSP 
D1 
“Now, a few final questions ...”  
“Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?” 
 
 1 MARRIED (INCLUDE COMMON LAW MARRIAGE & SPOUSE AWAY IN MILITARY) 
 2 WIDOWED 
 3 DIVORCED 
 4 SEPARATED 
 5 NEVER MARRIED (INCLUDING ANNULMENTS) 
 6 LIVING TOGETHER NOT MARRIED (VOLUNTEERED) 
 




“Are you or any other person in your household a member of a labor union?” 
 
 1 YES 
 2 NO 
 
 98 DK (DO NOT PROBE) 
* 99 NA / REFUSED 
 
VET 
“Are you or any person in your household a member or veteran of the armed forces?” 
 
 1 YES 
 2 NO 
 
 98 DK (DO NOT PROBE) 





"Do you or does anyone in your house own a gun?" 
 
 1 YES 
 2 NO 
 
 98 DK (DO NOT PROBE) 
* 99 NA / REFUSED 
 
D3 
“What is the highest grade in school, or level of education that you’ve completed and got credit for ...” [READ 
RESPONSES] 
 
 1 “Eighth grade or less, 
 2 Some high school, 
 3 High school graduate, (INCLUDES G.E.D.) 
 4 Technical school, 
 5 Some college, 
 6 College graduate, 
 7 Or postgraduate work?” 
 
 98 DK (DO NOT PROBE) 




"Do you subscribe to or regularly read ..." 
 
 (READ LIST AND CHECK ALL SAY YES TO) 
 
  1 The Union Leader or the New Hampshire Sunday News?” 
 2 The Boston Globe?” 
 3 A local daily newspaper, such as the Concord Monitor or the Nashua Telegraph?” 




"How often, if ever, do you watch WMUR, Channel 9 News?  Would you say everyday ... several times a week ... 
occasionally or never?" 
 
  1 EVERYDAY 
 2 SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK 
 3 OCCASIONALLY 
 4 NEVER 
 
 98 DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 




"How often, if ever, do you listen to New Hampshire Public Radio?  Would you say ... everyday ... several times a 
week ... occasionally or never?" 
 
  1 EVERYDAY 
 2 SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK 
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 3 OCCASIONALLY 
 4 NEVER 
 
 98 DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE 




“GENERALLY SPEAKING, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or 
what?” 
 
(IF REPUBLICAN):  “Would you call yourself a STRONG Republican or a NOT VERY STRONG Republican?” 
(IF DEMOCRAT):  “Would you call yourself a STRONG Democrat or a NOT VERY STRONG Democrat?” 
(IF INDEPENDENT, NO PREFERENCE, OR OTHER):  “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or 
to the Democratic party?” 
 
 1 STRONG DEMOCRAT 
 2 NOT VERY STRONG DEMOCRAT 
 3 INDEPENDENT, BUT CLOSER TO DEMOCRATS 
 4 INDEPENDENT--CLOSER TO NEITHER 
 5 INDEPENDENT, BUT CLOSER TO REPUBLICANS 
 6 NOT VERY STRONG REPUBLICAN 
 7 STRONG REPUBLICAN 
 8 OTHER PARTY 
 
* 99 DK / NA / REFUSED 
 
TPARTY 
"Overall would you say you support the political movement known as the Tea Party, you oppose the Tea Party, or 
that you neither support nor oppose it?" 
 
IF NEITHER / DK: "Would you say you lean towards supporting or opposing the Tea Party movement?" 
 
 1 SUPPORT TEA PARTY 
 2 LEAN - SUPPORT 
 3 NEITHER SUPPORT OR OPPOSE 
 4 LEAN - OPPOSE 
 5 OPPOSE TEA PARTY 
 
 98 DK / NOT SURE 
* 99 NA / REFUSED 
 
VOTE16 
“Think back to the election for President in 2016.  Did you vote for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Gary Johnson, 
Jill Stein, someone else, or did you skip that election? 
 
 1 DONALD TRUMP - REPUBLICAN 
 2 HILLARY CLINTON - DEMOCRAT 
 3 GARY JOHNSON – LIBERTARIAN 
 4 JILL STEIN – GREEN 
 5 OTHER 
 
 97 DID NOT VOTE 
 
 98 DK / NOT SURE 





“We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.  What about yourself--that is, in politics, do you 
generally think of yourself as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?”  
 
(IF LIBERAL):  “Would you say you are EXTREMELY liberal, FAIRLY liberal, or just SOMEWHAT liberal?”  
(IF CONSERVATIVE):  “Would you say you are EXTREMELY conservative, FAIRLY conservative, or just 
SOMEWHAT conservative?” 
(IF MODERATE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD):  “Would you say that you LEAN a little more toward the LIBERAL 
side or the CONSERVATIVE side?” 
 
 1 EXTREMELY LIBERAL 
 2 FAIRLY LIBERAL 
 3 SOMEWHAT LIBERAL 
 4 MODERATE--LEANS LIBERAL 
 5 MODERATE--LEANS NEITHER 
 6 MODERATE--LEANS CONSERVATIVE 
 7 SOMEWHAT CONSERVATIVE 
 8 FAIRLY CONSERVATIVE 
 9 EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE 
 
 97 REFUSED 
 98 DK (PROBE:  “In general . . .”) 




"On another topic ... What is your religious preference?  Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no 
religion?" 
 
 1 PROTESTANT 
 2 CATHOLIC 
 3 JEWISH 
 4 NONE, NO RELIGION 
 5 OTHER (SPECIFY) 
 
 97 REFUSED 
 98 DON'T KNOW / NOT SURE 




"How often do you attend religious services apart from occasional weddings, baptisms, or funerals ... more than 
once a week ... once week ... once or twice a month ... a few times a year ... or never?" 
 
 1 MORE THAN ONCE A WEEK 
 2 ONCE A WEEK 
 3 ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH 
 4 A FEW TIMES A YEAR 
 5 NEVER 
 
 98 DK (DO NOT PROBE) 






“Which of the following statements BEST represents your position on abortion ... abortions should be legal in ALL 
circumstances ... abortion should be legal in limited circumstances, such as in cases of rape or incest or when the 
mother’s life is in danger ... or, abortion should not be legal in ANY circumstance?” (ROTATE ANSWER 
OPTIONS)  
 
 1 LEGAL IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES 
 2 LEGAL IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES 
 3 NOT LEGAL IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE 
 98 DK/NOT SURE (DO NOT PROBE) 
* 99 NA / REFUSED 
D8 
“And what is your current age?” 
 
   ___    ___ 
 :       : :      : (RECORD EXACT NUMBER OF YEARS OLD -- E.G., 45) 
 :       : :      : 
 
 96 NINETY-SIX YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER 
 97 REFUSED 
 98 DK 




“How many years have you lived in the State of New Hampshire?” 
 
IF “ALL MY LIFE” ASK – “About how many years is that?” 
 
RECORD EXACT NUMBER OF YEARS OF RESIDENCE 
 
 1 ONE YEAR OR LESS 
 
 96 96 YEARS OF MORE 
 97 REFUSED 
 98 DK 




"Have you always lived in New Hampshire or did you move here from another state?" 
 
IF MOVED HERE ASK: "What state did you move here from?" 
 
 ENTER STATE NUMBER 
 
 95 ALWAYS LIVED IN NH → SKIPTO D10 
 96 CANADA 
 97 OTHER COUNTRY 
 
 98 DON'T KNOW 
* 99 REFUSED 
 
MVTONH1 
"What year did you move to New Hampshire?" 
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 ENTER LAST TWO DIGITS OF YEAR RESPONDENT SAYS. 
 
 EXAMPLE: 1965 ENTER "65" 
 EXAMPLE 2004 ENTER "04" 
 
 998 DON'T KNOW 
* 999 NA/REFUSED 
 
D10 
“How many of the persons who CURRENTLY live in your household are under 18 years of age, including babies 
and small children?” 
   
 0 NONE 
 1 ONE 
 2 TWO 
 3 THREE 
 4 FOUR 
 5 FIVE 
 6 SIX 
 7 SEVEN OR MORE 
 
 98 DK 




“Including yourself, how many adults CURRENTLY live in your household?” 
 
 1 ONE 
 2 TWO 
 3 THREE  
 4 FOUR 
 5 FIVE 
 6 SIX 
 7 SEVEN OR MORE 
 
 98 DK 





"Which of the following best describes your current employment status ... Are you currently ... 
 
  READ RESPONSES.   IF R GIVES 2 RESPONSES, ENTER LOWER NUMBER 
 
   1 Employed full-time,  
 2 Employed part-time,  
 3 Self-employed, 
 4 Retired and not working, 
 5 Unemployed and looking for work, 
 6 Homemaker, 
 7 Disabled, or a 
 8 Student?" 
 
235 
 98 DK / NOT SURE (DO NOT PROBE) 




“Not counting business lines, extension phones, or cellular phones -- on how many different telephone NUMBERS 
can your household be reached?” 
 
 0 NO LANDLINE 
 1 ONE 
 2 TWO 
 3 THREE  
     4 FOUR 
 5 FIVE 
 6 SIX 
 7 SEVEN OR MORE 
 
 98 DK 




“And on how many different cellphone NUMBERS can your household be reached?” 
 
 0 NO CELL PHONE 
 1 ONE 
 2 TWO 
 3 THREE  
     4 FOUR 
 5 FIVE 
 6 SIX 
 7 SEVEN OR MORE 
 
 98 DK 





“How much TOTAL income did you and your family receive in 2015, not just from wages or salaries but from ALL 
sources -- that is, before taxes and other deductions were made?  Was it ...  (READ CATEGORIES) 
 
  ANNUAL MONTHLY EQUIVALENT 
 1 Less than $15,000, LESS THAN $1,250 
 2 $15,000 - $29,999, $1,250 - $2,499 
 3 $30,000 - $44,999, $2,500 - $3,749 
 4 $45,000 - $59,999, $3,750 - $4,999 
 5 $60,000 - $74,999, $5,000 - $6,249 
 6 $75,000 - $99,999, or $6,250 - $8,333 
 7 $100,000 and over?” $8,334 AND OVER 
 
 97 REFUSED 
 98 DK 
* 99 NA 
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Appendix 5 (GSP) – Ancillary Analyses 
Ancillary analyses were also conducted examining further interaction by sex and age group. 
Effects examined in Table 2 are present for female respondents when asked about fear of a mass 
shooting. But not males, orrespondents asked about a terrorist attack. 
Table A.3. Analyses by Sex 
VARIABLE TERROR ATTACK MASS SHOOTING 
GROUP Male Female Male Female 
UNDER 40 0.67(0.41) 2.76(1.58)+ 2.20(1.22)+ 3.25(1.77)* 
GUN OWNER 1.37(0.73) 1.44(0.71) 0.88(0.49) 0.31(0.16)* 
RELIG. 
ATTEND. 
1.44(0.38)+ 1.17(0.31) 0.94(0.19) 0.79(0.17) 
VOTED IN 2016     
TRUMP - - - - 
CLINTON 0.67(0.46) 0.56(0.38) 1.39(1.04) 4.02(2.95)* 
OTHER 0.54(0.39) 0.67(0.49) 1.67(1.17) 1.79(1.45) 
WMUR NEWS 1.12(0.25) 1.08(0.23) 1.27(0.31) 1.59(0.33)* 
NHPR 0.86(0.25) 0.93(0.23) 1.42(0.34)+ 1.49(0.32)* 
CONS. TALK 
RADIO 
1.49(0.42)+ 1.59(0.63) 1.30(0.37) 0.59(0.19)+ 
CONSTANT 0.07(0.07)** 0.44(0.58) 0.04(0.06)* 0.13(0.18)+ 
 N = 131 N = 114 N = 115 N = 141 




Interestingly, media effects observed in Table 2 are still persent in this analysis – but only in the 
older cohort. This could be because younger respondents simply do not use traditional media 
sources tested in this analysis, instead relying on social media or similar sources for their news. 
Table A.4 Analyses by Age Group 
VARIABLE TERROR ATTACK MASS SHOOTING 
GROUP Under 40 Over 40 Under 40 Over 40 
SEX 55.46(55.60)*** 4.64(1.99)*** 2.07(1.33) 1.49(0.65) 
GUN OWNER 2.68(2.08) 1.19(0.51) 0.75(0.44) 0.42(0.18)* 
RELIG. 
ATTEND. 
1.10(0.49) 1.33(0.26) 1.26(0.35) 0.69(0.12)* 
VOTED IN 2016     
TRUMP - - - - 
CLINTON 0.19(0.22) 0.74(0.42) 2.87(2.44) 2.29(1.31) 
OTHER 0.35(0.36) 0.76(0.46) 1.42(1.35) 1.35(0.81) 
WMUR NEWS 0.99(0.32) 1.17(0.21) 1.07(0.35) 1.43(0.27)* 
NHPR 0.70(0.30) 1.02(0.20) 1.10(0.30) 1.52(0.27)* 
CONS. TALK 
RADIO 
1.45(0.63) 1.61(0.46)* 1.26(0.58) 0.83(0.23) 
CONSTANT 0.12(0.14)* 0.04(0.05)** 0.13(0.21) 0.14(0.17)* 
 N = 62 N = 183 N = 67 N = 189 




Table 8. Analyses By Political Party 
 
  
TABLE A.5LOGISTIC REGRESSION COMPARING FEAR OF TERROR ATTACK TO FEAR OF MASS 
SHOOTING ON DEMOGRAPHICS, LIFESTYLE, POLITICAL CANDIDATE SUPPORT, AND MASS MEDIA 
CONSUMPTION BY POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION (SURVEY WEIGHTED, ODDS RATIOS 
REPORTED) 













SEX       





2.53(1.93) 5.54(6.62) 0.56(0.40) 
AGE RANGE       
18-34 - - - - - - 
35-49 0.37(0.36) 0.22(0.18)+ 0.33(0.33) 0.10(0.12)* 0.20(0.26) 3.57(4.50) 
50-64 1.38(1.05) 0.17(0.12)* 0.26(0.32) 0.16(0.15)+ 0.83(0.72) 0.97(0.95) 
65+ 0.32(0.28) 0.17(0.12)** 0.18(0.39) 0.04(0.05)* 0.32(0.40) 0.37(0.44) 
NA/REF. 0.65(0.77) - 0.33(0.50) 0.03(0.03)** 0.41(0.58) - 
GUN(S) IN HH       
NO/NA/REF. - - - - - - 
YES 1.15(0.72) 0.66(0.34) 0.24(0.22) 0.05(0.05)** 5.35(4.74)+ 0.60(0.50) 
RELIG. 
ATTEND. 
      
NEVER/DK/N
A 
- - - - - - 
FEW 
TIMES/YR. 
1.99(1.36) 1.20(0.82) 1.52(1.34) 0.03(0.03)*** 8.13(6.58)* 0.12(0.17) 
1-2 
TIMES/MO. 
0.26(0.35) 0.22(0.20) 2.11(3.39) 2.69(3.43) 2.15(2.26) 1.19(1.52) 
WEEKLY+ 2.35(2.30) 0.72(0.49) 7.17(11.05) 0.09(0.10)* 2.91(2.67) 3.75(3.56) 
MEDIA 
EFFECTS 
      
WMUR (TV) 0.96(0.27) 1.13(0.27) 2.27(0.93)* 3.56(1.92)* 0.58(0.20) 1.38(0.12) 
NHPR 
(RADIO) 
0.68(0.19) 1.72(0.38)* 0.83(0.37) 1.46(0.69) 0.96(0.33) 1.38(0.49) 
CTR (RADIO) 8.14(0.04)+ 1.48(0.54) 1.14(0.05) 0.05(0.05)** 2.12(0.85)+ 1.35(0.50) 
CONSTANT 0.03(0.04)* 0.20(0.25) 0.03(0.05)* 15.83(28.84) 0.10(0.16) 0.04(0.06)* 
 N = 102 N = 118 N = 69 N = 70 N = 74 N = 63 
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001, +P<.10 TWO-TAILED HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
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Table A.6 The Effect of Fear of Terrorism and Fear of Mass Shootings on Voting for 
Trump in the 2016 Election 
FIGURE X. VOTING FOR DONALD TRUMP IN 2016 ELECTION 
 Fear of Terror Attack Fear of Mass Shooting 
VARIABLE OR SE OR SE 
POLITICAL PARTY     
DEMOCRAT - - - - 
INDEPENDENT 18.66** 18.58 4.60* 3.38 
REPUBLICAN 74.48*** 80.57 50.38*** 36.68 
NA 6.51 8.21 5.64+ 5.55 
SEX     
FEMALE - - - - 
MALE 3.68* 2.12 0.41 0.23 
AGE RANGE     
18-34 - - - - 
35-49 1.65 1.36 3.97+ 2.82 
50-64 5.97+ 5.85 2.92 2.13 
65+ 1.47 1.28 3.26 2.67 
NA/REF. 0.77 1.03 0.54 0.55 
GUN OWNERSHIP     
NO/NA/REF. - - - - 
GUN OWNER 1.04 0.55 8.20*** 4.85 
FREQ. RELIG. 
ATTD. 
1.58* 0.35 1.99** 0.45 
MEDIA USE     
WMUR 0.85 0.20 0.92 0.18 
NHPR 0.56* 0.14 0.69 0.16 
CTR 3.11*** 1.01 3.91*** 1.15 
HOW WORRIED?     
NOT AT ALL 
WORRIED 
- - - - 
NOT TOO WORRIED 3.78+ 3.02 0.53 0.33 
SOMEWHAT 
WORRIED 
4.95* 3.61 0.32+ 0.20 
VERY WORRIED 3.03 2.94 0.18 0.21 
CONSTANT 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.21 
 N = 245 N = 256 
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001, +P<.10 TWO-TAILED HYPOTHESIS TESTS 
 
